Selecting and Designing European ICT Innovation Policies by RENDA Andrea
 1 
 
Andrea Renda (CEPS, Duke University) 
 
Editors: Federico Biagi, Marc Bogdanowicz, 
Paul Desruelle, Nikolaus Thumm (JRC) 
Selecting and Designing European 
ICT Innovation Policies  
2016  
 
EUR 28205 EN 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
This publication is a Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s 
science and knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policy-
making process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. 
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use 
which might be made of this publication. 
 
Contact information  
European Commission, Joint Research Centre 
Address: Edificio Expo. c/Inca Garcilaso, 3. 41092 Seville (Spain) 
E-mail: b06-sec@jrc.ec.europa.eu 
Tel.: +34 954488318 
 
JRC Science Hub 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc 
 
 
JRC103661 
 
EUR 28205 EN 
 
PDF ISBN 978-92-79-63498-7 ISSN 1831-9424 doi:10.2791/077076 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 
© European Union, 2016 
 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
 
How to cite: Andrea Renda; Selecting and Designing European ICT Innovation Policies; Joint Research Centre 
Science for Policy Report; EUR 28205 EN; doi:10.2791/077076 
 
All images © European Union 2016 
 
Title: Selecting and Designing European ICT Innovation Policies 
Abstract 
This report analyses the peculiarities of innovation in Information and Communications Technologies (ICT), an 
ecosystem composed of various layers: from infrastructure to applications and content, and including end users. 
The report observes that innovation is becoming more open and collaborative in all layers, with various degrees 
of R&D intensity (greater at lower, physical layers); a prevalence of system goods with platforms and 
complementors mostly competing “for” rather than “in” the market; pervasive network effects coupled with 
relatively low entry barriers; short product life-cycles; and a high degree of co-evolution and co-dependency 
across and between layers.  
 
The nature of the ICT ecosystem determines a growing need for flexible, adaptive regulation, and the adoption of 
new policy instruments such as prizes and challenges. Policies should aim to create an environment favourable to 
the development of new, welfare-enhancing business models and avoid hindering the entrance of new players. 
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Abstract 
This report analyses the peculiarities of innovation in Information and Communications 
Technologies, which is described as an ecosystem composed of various layers, from 
infrastructure to applications and content, and including end users. The report observes 
that innovation is becoming more open and collaborative in all sectors. In the ICT 
ecosystem, this trend is especially evident, thanks to fundamental features such as the 
digital nature of information flows, the rapid drop of hardware costs, the end-to-end 
design of the Internet, and the modularity of ICT platforms and products. These factors 
in turn lead to various degrees of R&D intensity in the ICT ecosystem (greater at lower, 
physical layers); a prevalence of system goods with platforms and complementors, 
mostly competing “for”, rather than “in” the market; pervasive network effects coupled 
with relatively low entry barriers; short product life-cycles; and a high degree of co-
evolution and co-dependency across and between layers. In this context, platforms often 
play the role of entrepreneurs, orchestrating cumulative innovation and competing with 
other platforms to capture the attention of end users. These features call for a dedicated 
approach by EU policymakers. In particular, EU innovation policy should focus on 
infrastructure, basic research and a wholly new set of skills. At the same time, it should 
encourage the creation of mission-led platforms, needed to ensure that innovation 
addresses pressing societal challenges. The nature of the ICT ecosystem, and emerging 
trends such as artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things, also determine a growing 
need for flexible, adaptive regulation, and the adoption of new policy instruments such 
as prizes and challenges. Even more importantly, horizontal and sector-specific EU 
policies should aim to create an environment in which the need to protect user privacy 
does not hamper the development of new, welfare-enhancing business models. This has 
potentially far-reaching consequences for established policy domains such as copyright 
and data protection law. Finally, innovation policy and its related new instruments (the 
“innovation principle” and “innovation deals”, among others) should avoid relying mostly 
on input from incumbents, thereby hindering the entrance of new players.  
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Foreword  
This report was prepared in the context of the three-year research project on European 
Innovation Policies for the Digital Shift (EURIPIDIS) jointly launched in 2013 by JRC-IPTS 
and DG CONNECT of the European Commission. This project aims to improve 
understanding of innovation in the ICT sector and ICT-enabled innovation in the rest of 
the economy.1  
 
The purpose of the EURIPIDIS project is to provide evidence-based support to the 
policies, instruments and measurement needs of DG CONNECT for enhancing ICT 
Innovation in Europe, in the context of the Digital Agenda for Europe, of the European 
Digital Single Market, and of the ICT priority of Horizon 2020. It focuses on the 
improvement of the transfer of best research ideas to the market.  
 
EURIPIDIS aims to:  
1. better understand how ICT innovation works, at the level of actors such as firms, 
and also of the ICT “innovation system” in the EU; 
2. assess the EU's current ICT innovation performance, by attempting to measure 
ICT innovation in Europe and measuring the impact of existing policies and 
instruments(such as FP7 and Horizon 2020); and 
3. explore and suggest how policy makers could make ICT innovation in the EU work 
better. 
 
This report concentrates on point 3 above. 
 
 
  
                                           
1  For more information, see: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/euripidis 
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Executive summary  
During the past few decades, understanding of how innovation occurs has evolved 
significantly in social sciences. At least seven generations of models used to capture the 
features and determinants of innovation can be distinguished today. In these 
generations of economic models, innovation has been increasingly conceptualized as an 
ecosystem in which institutional, cultural, regulatory and market constraints are 
essential to determine the outcome and intensity of the innovation process. In this 
ecosystem, governments are playing a more and more proactive role in steering 
innovation towards societal challenges, and facilitating innovation by securing the 
availability of infrastructure, skills and an innovation-friendly regulatory environment. 
Most importantly, innovation changes along with the possibilities offered by technology. 
This is why Information and Communications Technology (ICT) has led to very 
significant changes to the way in which innovation can occur.  
The ICT ecosystem 
ICT can be defined as the integration of information processing, computing and 
communication technologies. We define it as an ecosystem, which makes it slightly 
broader than the ICT sector stricto sensu since it includes not only the companies that 
operate in the specific ICT NACE codes, but also their interdependencies. It also includes 
their institutional and architectural constraints, as represented by the main features of 
the networked environment in which these companies and institutions operate. In 
addition, end users in the ICT ecosystem play an increasingly active role in the 
generation of new products, services, and ideas. Moreover, the ICT ecosystem partly 
overlaps with the Internet and includes all hardware and network equipment companies 
that form the underlying infrastructure on which the Internet runs; however it is 
narrower than the Internet since it does not comprise a number of companies that 
operate in “bricks and mortar” sectors, but participate in the Internet by operating their 
own websites.  
The foundational, differentiating features of the ICT ecosystem include computing power 
(in particular Moore’s law), modularity, the end-to-end architecture (i.e., the possibility, 
for every end user to engage in communication and exchange information with every 
other end user) and neutrality of the Internet, and the digital nature of information 
goods. These foundational characteristics have determined the emergence of some of 
the features that are typically attributed to the ICT ecosystem by industry analysts: 
 R&D intensity and innovation rates tend to be greater than in other sectors.  
 innovation was initially largely incremental, due to modular architectural design.  
 product life-cycles are becoming shorter due to the acceleration of technological 
change.  
 the end-to-end architecture of the Internet and the digital nature of information 
goods have led to the emergence of network effects and large economies of scale in 
the ICT ecosystem. This, in turn, has led to the emergence of multi-sided platforms 
that are gradually changing the architecture of the network. 
All these aspects have consequences in terms of innovation performance/dynamics, 
industry performance, competition, overall societal welfare.  
These features should also be appraised in the light of the constant evolution of the ICT 
ecosystem. The report highlights six trends:  
 the increasingly “platformized” ICT ecosystem;  
 the ongoing virtualization of a growing number of functions made possible by 
technological evolution and underlying standardization;  
 openness and collaboration as key elements of emerging business models;  
 the importance of data analytics,  
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 the explosion of the Internet of Things, and  
 the “Internet of Value”.  
All these trends are very important for the future of the ICT ecosystem. However, even 
more important is the fact that they are occurring at the same time. The combination of 
disruptive innovation in network architectures (e.g. BlockChain), new sensors and 
wireless communication technologies (e.g. 5G), nanotechnologies, robotics, and artificial 
intelligence is likely to create unprecedented possibilities for innovation, most often 
based on predominantly open standards and free/open source software, low entry 
barriers, and innovative funding and management arrangements.  
ICT innovation: main features 
In the ICT ecosystem, innovation takes place in different ways across layers. While 
openness seems to be an increasingly defining feature of all layers of the ICT ecosystem, 
the degree of granularity reached by more virtualized layers such as cloud-based 
platforms and applications, is unrivalled in the “physical layer”. Moreover, the pace of 
innovation differs across layers: the higher the layer, the more intangible the investment 
behind new products and services, the faster the pace of innovation. The pace of 
innovation in each layer is also dependent on the evolution of other layers. The existence 
of a robust, high capacity network and the development of facilities such as Internet 
exchanges and data storage networks determine the evolution of the higher layers. For 
example, the App economy could develop only when the underlying mobile infrastructure 
and cloud platforms became well developed. And countries in which the infrastructure 
has greater capacity have more developed and dynamic application and content layers. 
In the physical layer, large R&D-based companies seem to be increasingly playing the 
role of catalysts of external R&D through the development and refinement of open 
innovation models. Higher layers, however, depend on the essential role of platforms as 
online intermediaries, which means that platforms often end up becoming the real 
entrepreneurs of this part of the ecosystem, as they provide a market for nascent ideas. 
The public sector should also be considered as performing entrepreneurial functions: 
governments play the role of entrepreneurs both in terms of funding high risk-high 
reward basic research projects, but also by making it easier for digital innovators to use 
the facilities they would need to develop their ideas.  
Against this background, funding channels for start-ups and new ventures abound. In 
ICT, venture capital is not the only source of financing available to ICT firms. A 
peculiarity of the ICT ecosystem is the greater importance of distributed platforms for 
the funding of innovative products. The relative ease with which prototypes and beta 
application versions can be developed in the ICT ecosystem, and the fact that innovation 
in higher layers probably has very low entry barriers and low start-up costs, is creating 
new opportunities for funding innovation, particularly through the proliferation of 
crowdfunding platforms. In addition, public support schemes for ICT start-ups and scale-
ups are another channel available to entrepreneurs: schemes such as the U.S. SBIR, the 
UK SBRI, the Horizon 2020 SME Instrument, the Start-up Europe initiative and the 
innovation vouchers at the EU level, all aim to provide entrepreneurs with funding to test 
and commercialise their innovative business ideas. In addition, the use of prizes, pay-
per-success schemes and challenges is on the increase, particularly in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Finally, and importantly, funding and support for start-ups is 
provided by large ICT companies that adopt an open innovation model, and by platforms 
seeking to maximise the number of their applications so that they can beat the 
competition and establish themselves as de facto industry standards. 
Finally, another key peculiarity of the ICT ecosystem, at least for the time being, is the 
growing importance of the human factor, considered as an increasingly scarce resource. 
In this respect, it is clear that challenges already perceived today will only become more 
pressing in the coming years. Evidence from global markets suggests that many 
industrialized countries no longer compete on low salaries, but rather on the availability 
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of reliable authorities, world-class infrastructure and, most importantly, a highly 
educated and skilled workforce. This is why re-launching Europe’s objectives in higher 
education is key to Europe’s future innovation and employment policies.  
Policy implications 
The report maps interrelations between foundations, features and trends of the ICT 
ecosystem; and their consequences for ICT innovation and for ICT policies, as shown in 
the figure below.  
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Analysing all the interactions and interrelations between the pillars shown in the figure 
above, leads to the formulation of a number of policy recommendations. In the physical 
layer, EU policy should prioritize the deployment of a robust, resilient ultra-fast 
broadband network throughout the European Union. Scalable technologies such as 
optical fibre networks could be used and more resources could be devoted to the 
development of the digital infrastructure, including both fixed and wireless networks and 
cloud storage facilities. This would be helped by a more coordinated spectrum policy 
throughout the EU28, and effective EU involvement in the 5G standard development. In 
addition, it is important that the regulatory framework for digital services be 
streamlined, by abandoning the current silo approach and implementing symmetric, 
principles-based regulation, rather than asymmetric access regulation. Overall, platform 
regulation such as platform neutrality should be avoided as it contrasts starkly with the 
Internet’s current evolution.  Instead, policymakers should engage with online 
intermediaries by developing principles of responsible cooperation in the monitoring and 
enforcement of specific legal rules, including counter-terrorism, copyright, and privacy.  
In terms of innovation policy, the role of instruments for the promotion of public and 
private R&D seems to be most relevant for the physical (and partly the logical) layer of 
the ICT ecosystem. At higher layers of the ICT ecosystem, more agile instruments and 
innovative demand-side innovation policy are likely to be particularly effective. 
Instruments such as prizes and challenges, and pay-for-success schemes are potentially 
suited for the application layer. And policies should seek to facilitate data-driven 
innovation.  
Importantly, the governance of innovation policy should be improved in order to create 
an environment that is more directly conducive to ICT innovation. At the moment, there 
seems to be an excessive level of complexity in the governance of innovation policy at 
the EU level. This can hamper the ICT ecosystem even more than other parts of the 
economy due to the former’s fast product cycles, and the prevalence of very small and 
even individual ventures, especially at the higher layers. Possible improvements, not 
exclusive to ICT, would include the consolidation of existing research and innovation 
platforms; and the identification of a limited number of organizations in the management 
of ICT research and innovation projects, which could then develop technology roadmaps 
related to specific societal challenges. Most of these actions would become more 
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effective if they were coupled with a strengthening of institutional capacity at the 
regional and local level. 
Greater efforts must also be made to improve the availability of skills. Europe needs a 
major reflection on the future of jobs. Education is a fundamental driver of ICT uptake 
and competitiveness, and must include a high-quality university system, widespread e-
skills and digital literacy among both firms (in particular, SMEs) and citizens. 
Importantly, the skills needed are not a single set, but rather a combination of notions, 
capabilities and attitudes that can help fill all the current gaps in the EU job market, at 
the various layers of the ICT ecosystem. The recommended skill set includes, i.a. coding 
skills; creativity skills; Science Technology Engineering and Maths (STEM) education; 
cross-disciplinary skills; managerial skills; financial and accounting education; and 
leadership and team-working skills. All these skills must be developed and constantly 
updated.  
Finally, what matters for innovation is not exclusively innovation policy, especially at the 
EU level. There is considerable evidence in the EU that existing instruments and funding 
channels need to be simplified, and complicated and burdensome legislation eliminated 
(especially for SMEs). Apart from the need to simplify regulation by removing 
unnecessary red tape, it is important that regulation is made innovation-friendly. This 
also applies to important horizontal policy areas such as competition policy, data 
protection and copyright policy. In addition, policymaking should avoid bias in favour of 
incumbents and accommodate innovative business models that make use of big data and 
more generally transformational ICT applications. Possible ways to make policy more 
flexible and adaptive include:  
(i) the use of regulatory sandboxes and other experimental approaches to allow 
ongoing monitoring of the market and social impacts of innovative techniques;  
(ii) the consideration of technology roadmaps and the opinion of multi-stakeholder 
platforms in the policymaking process, to ensure that innovative, welfare-
enhancing technologies are adequately represented in policy processes and 
outcomes;  
(iii) the ongoing monitoring of policy impacts, including through open government 
techniques.  
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Résumé 
Au cours des dernières décennies, la compréhension du processus d’innovation a 
considérablement évolué au sein des sciences sociales. Nous pouvons notamment 
distinguer au moins sept générations de modèles utilisés pour capturer les 
caractéristiques et les déterminants de l'innovation. Au cours de ces générations de 
modèles économiques, l'innovation a de plus en plus été conceptualisée comme un 
écosystème au sein duquel les contraintes institutionnelles, culturelles, réglementaires et 
de marché sont perçues comme essentielles pour déterminer le résultat et l'intensité du 
processus d'innovation. Dans cet écosystème, les gouvernements jouent un rôle de plus 
en plus proactif sur le pilotage de l'innovation, notamment pour répondre aux nombreux 
défis sociétaux, ainsi que pour garantir la disponibilité des infrastructures, des 
compétences et d’un environnement réglementaire favorable. Plus important encore, 
l'innovation change en fonction des possibilités offertes par la technologie. Ceci est la 
raison pour laquelle les Technologies de l'Information et des Communications (TIC) ont 
été un vecteur majeur, conduisant à des changements importants du processus 
d’émergence de l’innovation.  
L'écosystème des TIC 
Les TIC peuvent être définies par l'intégration d’outils de traitement de l'information, 
d'informatique et de technologies de communication. Le fait de les définir comme un 
écosystème implique une conception plus large que le seul secteur des TIC, car il 
comprend non seulement les entreprises TIC qui opèrent dans les codes NACE 
spécifiques, mais aussi les secteurs dépendants ainsi que leurs déterminants 
institutionnels et architecturaux, comme illustrés par les spécificités de l'environnement 
en réseau dans lequel ces entreprises et ces institutions opèrent. Mais l'écosystème des 
TIC comprend également les utilisateurs finaux, qui jouent un rôle de plus en plus actif 
dans la production de nouveaux produits, services et autres idées. De plus, l'écosystème 
des TIC inclut en partie l'Internet: l'écosystème des TIC englobe toutes les entreprises 
d'équipement matériel et de réseau qui forment l'infrastructure sous-jacente grâce à 
laquelle l'Internet fonctionne. Il est cependant plus restreint dans la mesure où il 
n'englobe pas un certain nombre d'entreprises de vente traditionnelle ayant pignon sur 
rue, bien que ces entreprises participent à l'Internet par l'exploitation de leurs propres 
sites Web. 
Fondamentalement, les caractéristiques distinctives de l'écosystème des TIC 
comprennent la puissance informatique (principalement la loi de Moore), la modularité, 
l'architecture "de bout en bout" (rendant possible pour chaque utilisateur final de 
communiquer et d'échanger des informations avec n'importe quel autre utilisateur final) 
et la neutralité de l'Internet, ainsi que la nature numérique des produits d'information. 
Ces caractéristiques fondamentales ont déterminé l'émergence de certaines 
particularités généralement attribuées à l'écosystème des TIC par les analystes de 
l'industrie. Premièrement, l’intensité en R&D et les taux d'innovation ont tendance à être 
plus grands que dans les autres secteurs. Deuxièmement, l'innovation a d'abord 
tendance à être largement incrémentale, en raison d’une conception architecturale 
modulaire. Troisièmement, les cycles de vie des produits deviennent de plus en plus 
courts en raison de l'accélération du changement technologique. Quatrièmement, 
l'architecture de bout en bout de l'Internet, et la nature numérique des produits 
d'information ont conduit à l'apparition d’effets de réseau et de grandes économies 
d'échelle dans l'écosystème des TIC, conduisant ainsi à l'émergence de plateformes 
multi-faces qui changent progressivement l'architecture du réseau. Tous ces aspects ont 
des conséquences en termes de performances/dynamiques d’innovation, de performance 
industrielle, de concurrence, et de bien-être global de la société. 
Ces caractéristiques doivent être évaluées à la lumière de l'évolution constante de 
l'écosystème des TIC. Le rapport met en évidence six tendances: la croissante 
« plateformisation » de l'écosystème des TIC ; la virtualisation continue d'un nombre 
croissant de fonctions, rendue possible par l'évolution technologique et la standardisation 
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sous-jacente; l’ouverture et la collaboration comme éléments clés des modèles d'affaires 
émergents; l'importance de l'analyse des données en vue de l'explosion de « l'Internet 
des objets » et de ce qu’on appelle « l’Internet de la valeur ». Toutes ces tendances sont 
primordiales pour l'avenir de l'écosystème des TIC, et le fait qu'elles se produisent en 
même temps est encore plus important. En effet, la combinaison de « l’innovation de 
rupture » dans les architectures de réseau (par exemple le « BlockChain »), des 
nouveaux capteurs et des technologies de communication sans fil (par exemple le 5G), 
des nanotechnologies, de la robotique et de l'intelligence artificielle, est susceptible de 
créer des possibilités sans précédent en terme d’innovation ; d’autant plus grâce aux 
normes ouvertes et aux logiciels en source libre, à des barrières à l'entrée basses, et à 
des modalités de financement et de gestion complétement innovants.  
L’innovation des TIC: principales caractéristiques  
Au sein de l'écosystème des TIC, l'innovation intervient de différentes manières selon les 
couches. Tandis que l'ouverture semble être de plus en plus applicable à toutes les 
couches de l'écosystème des TIC, le degré de granularité atteint par les couches les plus 
« virtualisées » (telles que les plateformes et les applications basées sur le « cloud ») 
reste inégalé dans les couches physiques. Par ailleurs, le rythme de l'innovation varie 
selon les couches: plus haute est la couche, plus intangible est l'investissement 
supportant de nouveaux produits et services, plus rapide est le rythme de l'innovation. 
De plus, le rythme de l'innovation au niveau de chaque couche est dépendant de 
l'évolution des autres couches: l'existence d'un réseau robuste, à haute capacité, et le 
développement d'installations telles que les points d’échanges Internet et les réseaux de 
stockage de données, déterminent l'évolution des couches supérieures. Par exemple, 
« l’économie des applications » a pu voir son essor uniquement après que les 
infrastructures mobiles et les plateformes en nuage (cloud) sous-jacentes se soient 
développées. Ainsi, les pays où les infrastructures ont une plus grande capacité voient 
leurs couches d'application et de contenu plus développées et plus dynamiques. 
D’autre part, alors qu’au sein de la couche physique, de grandes entreprises bénéficiant 
de large financement en R&D semblent davantage jouer le rôle de catalyseurs en R&D 
externe, notamment à travers le développement et le raffinement des modèles 
d'innovation ouverte, les couches supérieures dépendent du rôle essentiel des 
plateformes comme les intermédiaires en ligne. Ceci implique que les plateformes 
finissent souvent par devenir les véritables entrepreneurs de cette partie de 
l'écosystème, car ils fournissent un marché aux idées naissantes. Par ailleurs, le secteur 
public doit aussi être considéré comme exerçant des fonctions entrepreneuriales: les 
gouvernements jouent des rôles d’entrepreneurs tant en termes de financement de 
projets de recherche fondamentale à haut risque et haute récompense, mais aussi en 
permettant au innovateurs du numérique d’utiliser les installations dont ils ont besoin 
pour développer leurs idées. 
Dans ce contexte, les canaux disponibles pour financer les startups et les nouvelles 
entreprises abondent. En ce qui concerne les TIC, le capital-risque n’est pas la seule 
source de financement disponible pour les entreprises: une des particularités de 
l'écosystème des TIC est le rôle important joué par les plateformes distribuées pour le 
financement de produits innovants. La relative facilité de développement des prototypes 
et des versions d'applications « bêta » dans l'écosystème des TIC, ainsi que le fait que 
l'innovation dans les couches supérieures soit davantage marquée par de très basses 
barrières à l’entrée et de moindres coûts pour les startups, favorisent la création de 
nouvelles opportunités pour le financement de l'innovation, notamment par la 
prolifération de plateformes de financement participatifs. En outre, les plans de soutiens 
publics pour les startups et scaleups du secteur des TIC sont un autre canal disponible 
aux entrepreneurs: des programmes tels que le « SBIR » aux États-Unis, « SBRI » au 
Royaume-Uni, ainsi que l'instrument PME dans Horizon 2020, l'initiative « Startup 
Europe » et les « bons d'innovation » mis en œuvre par l'UE, tous visent à fournir aux 
entrepreneurs un financement pour tester et commercialiser leurs idées d'affaires 
novatrices. De même, l'utilisation de récompenses, telles que des prix ou des 
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programmes basés sur le principe du « payer pour réussir » (« pay-per-success » or 
« pay for success » schemes), sont de plus en plus fréquents, en particulier aux États-
Unis et au Royaume-Uni. Enfin, et surtout, le financement et le soutien aux startups sont 
fournis par les grandes entreprises des TIC qui adoptent un modèle d'innovation ouverte, 
ainsi que par les plateformes cherchant à maximiser le nombre de leurs applications 
pour battre la concurrence et s’imposer en tant que normes et standards industriels de 
fait. 
Enfin, une autre particularité clé de l'écosystème des TIC, du moins pour le moment, est 
l'importance croissante du facteur humain, considéré comme une ressource de plus en 
plus rare. À cet égard, il est clair que les défis déjà perçus aujourd'hui deviendront 
encore plus pressants dans les années à venir. Comme en témoignent les marchés 
globaux, il semble que la concurrence de nombreux pays industrialisés ne se fait plus sur 
les bas salaires, mais plutôt sur la présence d’autorités fiables, d’infrastructures de 
premier plan, et surtout, d’une main-d'œuvre hautement éduquée et qualifiée. Voilà 
pourquoi relancer les objectifs européens de l'enseignement supérieur est primordial 
pour les futures politiques d'innovation et de l'emploi en Europe. 
Implications politiques 
Le rapport cartographie les interrelations entre les fondements, les caractéristiques et 
les tendances principales de l’écosystème des TIC, ainsi que les conséquences pour 
l'innovation et les politiques en matière de TIC, comme l’illustre le schéma ci-dessous : 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
L'analyse de toutes les interactions et interrelations entre les piliers tels qu’indiqués sur 
le schéma ci-dessus, conduit à la formulation d'un certain nombre de recommandations. 
En ce qui concerne la couche physique, la politique de l'UE devrait accorder sa priorité au 
déploiement à travers toute l’UE, d'un robuste réseau à large bande ultra-rapide, à 
l’utilisation de technologies évolutives telles que les réseaux de fibres optiques, et à 
consacrer davantage de ressources au développement de l'infrastructure numérique, y 
compris les réseaux fixes et sans-fils, et les installations de stockage en nuage. Ceci 
serait d’autant plus réalisable grâce à une politique du spectre plus coordonnée au sein 
de l’UE28, et avec une participation effective de l'UE dans le développement des normes 
5G. En outre, il serait important de simplifier le cadre réglementaire des services 
numériques, en abandonnant l'approche en silo actuelle et la mise en œuvre d’une 
réglementation fondée sur des principes et une symétrie, plutôt qu’une réglementation 
d'accès asymétrique. Dans l'ensemble, une réglementation suivant un principe de 
« neutralité des plateformes » devrait être évitée car elle entre en contradiction avec 
l'évolution actuelle de l'Internet: inversement, les décideurs devraient collaborer avec les 
intermédiaires en ligne pour développer des principes de coopération responsable et 
durable, notamment pour la surveillance et la mise en œuvre de règles juridiques 
spécifiques, dont celles relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme, au droit d'auteur et à la 
vie privée. 
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En terme de politique d'innovation, le rôle des instruments publics et privés pour la 
promotion de la R&D semble être plus pertinent pour la couche physique (et 
partiellement pour la couche logique) de l'écosystème des TIC. Quant aux couches 
supérieures de l'écosystème des TIC, des instruments plus agiles et des politiques 
d’innovation plus novatrices, davantage centrées sur la demande, pourraient être 
particulièrement efficaces. Des instruments tels que des défis et des récompenses, ainsi 
que des programmes sur le modèle « payer pour réussir » sont potentiellement plus 
adaptés à la couche supérieure des applications. Ainsi, les politiques publiques devraient 
chercher à faciliter l'innovation basée sur l’exploitation des données. 
Il est important de souligner que la gouvernance des politiques d'innovation devrait être 
améliorée afin de créer un environnement qui soit plus directement vecteur d'innovation 
des TIC. Aujourd'hui, il semble y avoir un niveau de complexité excessif dans la 
gouvernance des politiques d’innovation au niveau de l'UE. Cela peut être d’autant plus 
nuisible à l'écosystème des TIC, étant donné les courts cycles de vie des produits, et la 
prévalence de très petites entreprises, voire individuelles, comme c’est souvent le cas au 
niveau des couches supérieures. Parmi les améliorations possibles, non-exclusives au 
secteur des TIC, la consolidation des plateformes de recherche et d'innovation 
existantes; ainsi que l'identification d'un nombre limité d'organisations de gestion des 
projets de recherche et d'innovation des TIC, pourraient alors favoriser le 
développement de plans d’actions technologiques plus ciblés et plus étroitement liés aux 
défis sociétaux particuliers. La plupart de ces actions seraient plus efficaces si elles 
étaient accompagnées par un renforcement du support institutionnel au niveau régional 
et local. 
D’importants efforts doivent être faits afin d’améliorer la disponibilité des compétences. 
L'Europe a besoin d'engager une réflexion cruciale sur l'avenir des emplois. L'éducation 
est un facteur fondamental pour l’adoption et pour la compétitivité des TIC. Elle doit être 
conçue plus largement pour inclure un système universitaire de haute qualité apte à 
répandre les compétences requises et permettre « l'alphabétisation numérique » tant au 
sein des entreprises (en particulier les PME) qu’au niveau des citoyens. Il est aussi 
important de noter que les compétences nécessaires ne sont pas un ensemble unique, 
mais plutôt une combinaison de notions clés, d’aptitudes et d’attitudes qui peuvent aider 
à combler l’actuel déficit de compétences qui caractérise le marché européen de l'emploi, 
à plusieurs niveaux de l'écosystème des TIC. L'ensemble des compétences 
recommandées comprend par exemple le codage, les aptitudes de créativité, les 
« Sciences, Technologie, ingénierie et mathématiques (STEM) », les compétences 
transversales et managériales, la finance et la comptabilité, ainsi que le leadership et les 
compétences liées au travail en équipe. Toutes ces compétences doivent être 
développées et constamment mises à jour. 
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Introduction 
This report was commissioned in 2015 by the Institute of Prospective Technological 
Studies (IPTS) at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, in the context 
of the three-year research project on European Innovation Policies for the Digital Shift 
(EURIPIDIS)2. The purpose of EURIPIDIS is to provide evidence-based support to the 
policies, instruments and measurement needs of DG CONNECT for enhancing ICT 
Innovation in Europe, mainly in the context of the Digital Single Market policy agenda 
and of the ICT priority of Horizon 2020. It focuses on the improvement of the transfer of 
best research ideas to the market. More specifically, the aims of EURIPIDIS are: (1) to 
better understand how ICT innovation works, at the level of actors such as firms, and 
also of the ICT “innovation system” in the EU; (2) to assess the EU’s current ICT 
innovation performance, by attempting to measure ICT innovation in Europe and 
measuring the impact of existing policies and instruments (such as FP7 and Horizon 
2020); and (3) to explore and suggest how policy makers could make ICT innovation in 
the EU work better. 
Against this background, this report takes stock of the research carried out so far within 
the EURIPIDIS project and couples it with literature related to innovation and specifically 
ICT innovation, in the attempt to develop a theoretical framework for the design of ICT 
innovation policies in the EU. At the same time, the report discusses the most important 
policy implications of the papers produced so far by the EURIPIDIS project.  
The report is structured as follows. Section 1 below introduces the so-called “innovation 
systems” literature and identifies the main evolution in the literature on innovation 
policy. Section 2 discusses ICT innovation and the peculiarities of the ICT ecosystem, 
and also discusses whether, and how, ICT is different from other sectors when it comes 
to innovation. Section 3 then provides an inventory of existing instruments of ICT 
innovation policy at the EU level, and discusses potential improvements. Section 4 
concludes by offering some policy recommendations for the design and implementation 
of ICT innovation policies at the EU level.  
 
  
                                           
2  This project was launched jointly in 2013 by JRC-IPTS and DG CONNECT of the European 
Commission in order to improve understanding of innovation in the ICT sector and of ICT-
enabled innovation in the rest of the economy, see: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/euripidis  
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1 The evolution of innovation studies: from the “linear 
model” to a focus on environments, actors, and 
interactions 
This section explores various aspects of the academic literature on innovation, without 
making specific reference to the ICT sector (for an analysis of ICT innovation, see 
Section 2 below). As a matter of fact, scholarly literature on innovation has made 
important steps over the past decades in the understanding of the various factors that 
lead to the emergence of innovation and entrepreneurship. In the coming sections, we 
explore the “innovation systems” debate, as well as the triple and quadruple helix 
models, and the emerging literature on entrepreneurship ecosystems. 
1.1 Innovation and the firm: from linear to open models of 
innovation 
Economists and social scientists have devoted significant efforts to the understanding of 
the dynamics and phenomenology of innovation. Initially, efforts were mostly devoted to 
the analysis of the so-called “innovation process”, with peculiar emphasis on what 
happens inside a given firm. One of the leading authors in the analysis of developing 
innovation process models is Roy Rothwell, who distinguished between various 
generations of innovation process models.  
The first generation is what he calls “linear technology push model”, widely used until 
end of 1960s. These models interpret innovation as a linear process, with research, 
development and the outputs of new successful products standing on the same level. 
The chronological alignment of each phase starts from elementary research, and 
encompasses the preparatory phase of production, production, marketing and final sale.  
The second generation is what Rothwell calls “Market Pull Model”. This model reflects the 
fact that in the 1960s and 1970s innovation changed to include what was seen as a 
result of perceived customers’ needs, sourced through market research. The needs and 
demands of the market determined the work of R&D departments in companies. As a 
result, during that phase many companies engaged mostly in incremental, rather than in 
disruptive innovation.  
The third generation was characterized by the coupling of R&D and marketing (leading to 
the so-called “interactive model”), and refers to a period (the end of the 1980s) in which 
it became clear that neither technological push nor market pull strategies were enough 
to successfully handle the innovation process. The combination of technology push and 
market pull models was improved with the addition of feedback loops between science 
and innovation, and labelled as the “interactive” model of technological opportunities and 
the needs of the market.  
Later, a fourth generation of innovation process models led to the identification of a 
more integrated, “chained” model of innovation (Kline and Rosenberg 1986), 
characterized by the parallel use of integrated research teams, and the involvement of 
the supplier and important customers. This generation of innovation clearly stands out 
from the previous one, and models a stronger parallel process of innovation. Cooperation 
between research, development and production is enhanced, and horizontal 
collaboration, regardless of the company’s boundaries, is also considered. Due to the 
constantly shortening product lifecycle, this generation of innovation process models 
include time as a strategic variable. The (chained) model represents a further step 
towards a comprehensive innovation process actively involving research and existing 
knowledge. This model demonstrates the necessity of integrating knowledge into the 
innovation process, where knowledge is not understood as a result of scientific activities, 
but rather as a result of interaction between the individual units of a company, the 
company itself and its environment. The novelty of this model lies mostly in the fact that 
the market represents both the beginning and the end of the innovation process, and 
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knowledge is integrated in all phases of the innovation process (though mainly in the 
research phase) and, therefore, considered as a necessary prerequisite for innovation.  
The fifth generation of innovation process modelling is characterised by the identification 
of system integration and networking as dominant features of innovation. This also 
entails much stronger interaction with external research facilities and cooperation in the 
marketing area. This model also emphasizes the vertical linkages with suppliers and 
customers along the whole innovation process (e.g., suppliers are involved in the co-
development of new products and/or share the technical systems used for it), and the 
horizontal linkages take place in a variety of forms (joint ventures, alliances, consortia, 
etc.). For these reasons the fifth model represents a first step in the emergence of 
distributed innovation. This generation marks also the transition towards a vision of 
innovation that is broader and more systemic than the one adopted in the previous four 
generations. As such, this model contains some elements than the subsequent open 
innovation models would capture more explicitly.3  
The sixth generation of innovation models is what is often termed “Open innovation”. 
Open innovation implies, inter alia, the use of internal and external R&D sources; 
openness to external business models, a variety of IP generators and collaborations 
(SMEs, academics, etc.), and a proactive IP asset management. This is leading to an 
increase in the number of companies collaborating in innovative activities. In the words 
of Henry Chesbrough, the academic that coined the term, open innovation is a paradigm 
that assumes that firms use external ideas as well as ideas developed in-house, and 
internal and external paths to market, as firms look to advance their technology4. Open 
innovation is not only concerned with sourcing of external knowledge into the firm  
(“outside-in”) but also with exploring new channels of revenue generation by granting 
usage rights (joint ventures, licensing or outright sale) of in-house developments to 
other firms (“inside-out”), “especially when the technology has future potential but is not 
part of the firm’s core strategy”5.  
While the original perspective of innovation primarily focused on research and 
development of firms, open innovation has outgrown this narrow view and today 
integrates different streams and perspectives6. Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke and West 
(2014) explain that open and closed innovation are to be understood as two extremes of 
a spectrum, along which most business models can be found. The spectrum they 
describe is a function of the extent to which in-house R&D is involved in product 
development. Figure 1 below shows Chesbrough’s latest description of open innovation. 
  
                                           
3  As reported also by the OECD, “the organisation of innovative activities (technological as well 
as non-technological) across firm boundaries is clearly on the increase, with more balance 
between internal and external sources of innovation ... Industries such as chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and information and communication technology (ICT) typically show high 
levels of open innovation”. See OECD (2008) Open innovation in global networks. OECD, Paris 
4  Chesbrough, H.W., West, J. and Vanhaverbeke, W. (2006) Open Innovation: Researching a 
New Paradigm. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
5  OECD (2008), supra note 126, at 11. 
6  Gassmann, O., Enkel, E., Chesbrough, H.W., 2010. The future of open innovation. R&D 
Management 40 (3), 213–221. 
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Figure 1 – Chesbrough’s description of open innovation 
 
Source: Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke and West (2014) 
 
In its original definition, open innovation was mostly referred to large corporations, 
which could act as catalysts of innovation efforts by becoming purchasers and 
orchestrators of streams of R&D, which involved much smaller companies, whose agility 
and flexibility usefully complement the capacity and organization of larger firms.  
 
Box 1 - Models of distributed innovation: a EURIPIDIS paper by Garry Gabison 
and Annarosa Pesole  
In a recent EURIPIDIS report, Gabison and Pesole (2014) point out that most of 
Chesbrough’s work implies a vision of open innovation as a linear process, whereas 
subsequent developments in the literature (including Chesbrough’s later works) have 
added feedback loops between the main phases of the innovation process (R&D, 
product, development, marketing, and distribution) and from/to the main actors that 
intervene in it, such as competitors, users, governments, and universities. Gabison and 
Pesole (2014) also report that subsequent developments in the literature have made 
open innovation a special case of what they define “distributed innovation” models, 
which include also social and user innovation (see below at the end of Section 1.1.). This 
is even more relevant since open innovation has moved from large manufacturing 
companies to services over the past years, and this shift inevitably implied stronger 
interaction with customers. Another important feature of open innovation is that it seems 
to be relatively more suited for large compared to smaller companies. Gabison and 
Pesole (2014) survey a blossoming stream of literature that shows that open innovation 
requires a company that plays a pivotal role, coordinating the innovation process and the 
flows of information and ideas from a central position: this company can be a large 
manufacturing or service company, or an intermediary. The findings of this literature are 
relevant for the analysis of the innovation in the ICT sector (see Section 2 below).  
Since the emergence of the open innovation model, a number of trends have led to the 
emergence of even more distributed forms of innovation, some of which reach a peak of 
openness in the ICT sector, as will be explained in Section 2 below. Such trends include 
the following:  
 Increasingly proactive user involvement. The emergence of open innovation as 
a dominant mode of generation of new market solutions in several sectors of the 
economy was just the beginning of a new trend, which has led to the gradual 
involvement of many actors along the supply chain as key contributors to idea 
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generation and testing. This lead at once to the gradual rise of the end user as a 
protagonist of the innovation landscape, and to enhanced possibilities for 
organisational innovation as an important new phenomenon, which is even more 
evident in ICT markets (see Section 2 below). Part of this emerging paradigm of 
innovation is the so-called “user innovation” (Von Hippel 1988, 2005). As explained 
i.a. by Henry Chesbrough, the difference between open and user innovation is that 
the user innovation model advocates a decentralization of innovation that changes 
the locus of innovation from firms to users and leads to the “democratisation of 
innovation”. In the user innovation model, innovation results from a collaborative and 
co-creation process, where users share tasks and the cost of developing innovative 
products and services, and then reveal their results. In other words, the motivation 
for innovation revolves around the concept of user utility gains rather than pecuniary 
returns. According to von Hippel (2013), users are firms or individuals that “expect to 
benefit from using a product or a service, in contrast to manufacturers that expect to 
benefit from selling a product or a service.” Therefore, users who contribute to the 
development of the innovative product or service (users-innovators) will adapt the 
innovation to their specific needs. The user-innovators, although they freely reveal 
the innovation, will receive greater utility from the use of this innovation than free-
riders, as the innovation may not completely fulfil the needs of the latter. 
 Cumulative innovation. A specific case of user innovation, sometimes presented as 
a stand-alone category, is “cumulative innovation” in which innovation is generated 
incrementally and collectively by a community of users that share similar values and 
are bound by formal or informal rules. The typical examples here are open source 
communities (Von Hippel 2001) for software development, and creative commons 
communities for content production and sharing. Often these communities emerge on 
a local scale due to geographical proximity; the advent of the Internet, however, has 
made it possible to create global-scale communities and even industry clusters 
without a need for geographical proximity; in addition, the nature of information 
goods allows for easy versioning and reconfiguration, as well as incremental 
changes: this is a key feature for what concerns software and online content 
production. Importantly, users in this form of innovation may include both 
intermediate users (for example users firms, downstream firms in the supply chain), 
and final users such as end consumers (Bogers et al., 2010; Berthon et al. 2006). 
User innovation is normally considered as an opportunity for innovating firms, as 
user creativity can be usefully employed in a co-creation process: however, in some 
cases user innovation can also threaten the firm, in particular for what concerns its 
intellectual property (Baldwin and Von Hippel 2011). The consequences of a massive 
shift towards user innovation and co-creation, especially in some sectors or sub-
sectors of the economy (as will be illustrated in Section 2 below as regards the 
application layer of the ICT ecosystem), are potentially disruptive also for the ability 
of firms to secure intellectual property protection.  
 Social Innovation. Social innovation refers to new ideas, institutions, and 
innovation processes that meet societal needs through new forms of civic 
participation and collaboration. The challenge of social innovation is to involve society 
in finding alternative and novel ways to face current societal challenges such as 
climate change, epidemics, increasing inequality, and poverty. Social innovation is 
not confined to ICT settings, but exploits Internet network effects and Internet 
collaborative power to harness the collective intelligence of communities in order to 
tackle these social challenges. Among the benefits of social innovation are the fact 
that “the involvement of users on a voluntary basis in the co-creation process 
reinforces people's recognition by their communities, increases motivation and 
commitment, and results in the development of more solid innovation practices” 
(Murray, Caulier-Grice, & Mulgan, 2010). The ultimate goal of social innovation 
models is “systemic innovation”, which entails “fundamental changes to the social 
system, affecting many elements which shape society: e.g. social movements, 
business models, laws and regulations, data, infrastructures, and the development of 
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new frameworks and new ways of thinking and acting”. This definition is different 
from other existing definitions, which tend to portray social innovation as a “novel 
solution to a social problem that is more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just than 
present solutions and for which the value created accrues primarily to society as a 
whole rather than private individuals”7; or as "new strategies, concepts, ideas and 
organizations that meet the social needs of different elements which can be from 
working conditions and education to community development and health — they 
extend and strengthen civil society" 8 . Social innovation can take place within 
government, the for-profit sector, the non-profit sector (also known as the third 
sector), or in the spaces between them. Research has focused on the types of 
platforms needed to facilitate such cross-sector collaborative social innovation. 
Typical examples of social innovation are microcredit (e.g. the Grameen bank) and 
the Indian frugal innovation model, which refers to innovative products and services 
that “seek to minimize the use of material and financial resources in the complete 
value chain (development, manufacturing, distribution, consumption, and disposal) 
with the objective of reducing the cost of ownership while fulfilling or even exceeding 
certain pre-defined criteria of acceptable quality standards” (Tiwari and Herstatt, 
2012).  
 Distributed co-creation. Recently, scholars have observed even more open forms 
of innovation, called “distributed co-creation”. This practice mostly consists in 
organizing R&D along a number of independent groups working on parallel and 
complementary streams of research, and composed by both providers and customers 
looking for tailored solutions. Once again, this will require a cocktail of new talents, 
researchers and users (often in constant online contact), and with the need for clear 
and transparent rules on revenue-sharing and IPR management. The peculiarities of 
this form of organisation and production are summarized by Yochai Benkler (2006) in 
his description of granularity, as being an even more advanced form of modularity, 
allowing for micro-contributions to an ever-growing innovative product, the typical 
example being that of Wikipedia and the creative commons approach to content 
production9. A number of companies have implemented co-creation strategies over 
the past few years, including notable examples such as LEGO and Threadless10. In 
the software sector, open-source platforms developed through distributed co-creation 
since the very beginning, and ended up forming entire stacks of products such as the 
“LAMP” (Linux, Apache, MySQL, and PHP/Perl/Python), which have become standard 
components of the IT infrastructure at many corporations.  
The resulting phenomenon is our seventh generation of innovation models: the so-called 
“Open Innovation 2.0” model. In particular, Curley and Salmelin have brought together 
the concepts of Open Innovation, User Innovation and Social Innovation in new a model 
they call Open Innovation 2.0 (OI2)11. The authors emphasise three main points: 
 Co-opetition, i.e. collaboration between competitors 12 . This goes beyond joint 
ventures: interdependent competitors work together to find solutions and develop 
new products (mashed-up products of multiple concepts and ideas).  
                                           
7  See Phills, J. A., K. Deiglmeier and D. T. Miller (2008), “Rediscovering Social Innovation, 
Stanford Social Innovation Review; Fall 2008. 
8  See OECD (2011), Fostering Innovation to Address Social Challenges, OECD: Paris.  
9  See Benkler (2006), p. 100-101. 
10  LEGO, for instance, famously invited customers to suggest new models interactively and then 
financially rewarded the people whose ideas proved marketable. The shirt retailer Threadless 
sells merchandise online—and now in a physical store, in Chicago—that is designed 
interactively with the company’s customer base. 
11  Curley, M., & Salmelin, B. (2013). Open Innovation 2.O: A New Paradigm. Opgehaald van EU 
Open Innovation Strategy and Policy Group: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=21  
12  Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996): Co-opetition, New York: Currency Doubleday. 
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 The user as an integral member of the innovative process. The user, the fourth 
element of the quadruple helix, intervenes earlier in the innovation process to 
experiment, even before the innovation reaches the pilot stage, and actively 
participates in the co-creation of new markets for innovation. According to the 
authors, the co-creative process embedded in the quadruple helix approach leads to 
a win-win situation, as users get the products and services they need, and the 
suppliers get scalable products and services. This allows immediate feedback on 
which innovation is successful and enhances the probability of success, speeding up 
the scalability and quickly dismissing innovation in unsuccessful areas. 
 Value networks and inter-disciplinarity. Intermediaries must connect value 
networks to form value constellations. They point out that interdisciplinary 
approaches must be taken that go beyond the traditional boundaries of disciplines 
such as ICT, chemistry, or mechanics, which should be mixed together. 
The European Commission points at five main elements that define Open Innovation 2.0, 
to be intended as “a new paradigm based on a Quadruple Helix Model where 
government, industry, academia and civil participants work together to co-create the 
future and drive structural changes far beyond the scope of what any one organization 
or person could do alone”13: networking; collaboration (involving partners, competitors, 
universities, and users); corporate entrepreneurship (enhancing corporate venturing, 
start-ups and spin-offs); proactive intellectual property management (creating new 
markets for technology); and research and development (achieving competitive 
advantages in the market). 
In summary, models of innovation used in the literature have significantly evolved over 
the past few decades, along with the modes of innovation observed in reality. Needless 
to say, and as already mentioned above, open innovation has been strongly facilitated 
by the development of new networking technologies, and in particular by the Internet 
and i.a. the versioning possibilities that the information economy has brought. In 
cyberspace, modularity and end-to-end communication have determined the emergence 
of entirely new patterns of innovation, such as open source software and creative 
commons. This stimulated both collaboration between programmers, distributed and 
collective creation of new products, and also co-innovation between customers and 
creators, shifting the frontier of intellectual exchange and co-creation towards previously 
unattainable levels. Table 1 below summarizes the main features of the seven models of 
innovation described in this section. 
  
                                           
13  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/growth-jobs/open-innovation  
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Table 1 – Seven generations of innovation process modelling 
 
Source: Kotzemir and Meissner (2013). 
 
Box 2 – Case studies on open innovation: findings from a EURIPIDIS paper 
In a recent EURIPIDIS paper, Di Minin et al. (2016) analyse 13 case studies of open 
innovation. The authors start from the concept of Open Innovation 2.0 as introduced by 
Curley and Salmelin (2013) and described by Gabison and Pesole (2014) for the 
EURIPIDIS project. The case studies cover a wide range of different sectors and firm 
sizes, from new firms that have successfully leveraged the potential of the collaborative 
economy (BlaBlaCar) to established ICT giants (Philips). The authors find a prevalent 
approach to open innovation, which they term “open but controlled”, since the pivotal 
company adopts a collaborative model but at the same time try to implement strategies 
to ensure a proper return on their investment. The analysis highlighted a number of 
drivers and barriers to open innovation models. Among the drivers, particularly 
important are the role of large EU consortia in enabling Open Innovation Strategies, 
particularly as regards explorative R&D activities; the use of IP as an enabler of greater 
control of innovation, which in turn makes companies more prone to build alliances and 
collaborate; the positive role attributed to the Horizon 2020 SME; and the fact of being 
embed in an ecosystem characterized by easy access to complementary assets, and by 
an intense flow of knowledge and information. Among the barriers, the case studies 
mostly highlighted constraints due to internal management (in particular, achieving the 
right balance between internal R&D and external sourcing of knowledge and 
technology); and the lack of institutional support and/or the presence of rules and 
regulations that prevent.   
The authors draw a number of policy implications for the EU institutions, ranging from 
the need to promote local innovation ecosystems to the parallel need to orchestrate 
global ecosystems through open relationships. This echoes findings from previous IPTS 
research, including that on Poles of Excellences, characterized by local concentration, 
and global interconnection. The authors also conclude that formal IP protection 
mechanisms facilitate collaboration, even if SMEs often struggle to find the appropriate 
partners. Easing the patent search process and exploring alternatives to the patent 
system for SMEs are seen as important tasks for EU policymakers. Moreover, 
policymakers are invited to take action to facilitate user involvement in Open Innovation 
2.0 communities, and strive to achieve a balance between encouraging basic research, 
Generation Period Authors of fundamental ideas Innovation model Essence of the model
1 1950s-late 1960s Technology push Linear Process
2 Late 1960s-First half 
of 1970s
Myers and Marquis (1969) Market Pull R&D on customer wishes
3 Second half of 1970-
end of 1980s
Mowery and Rosenberg (1979); 
Rothwell and Zegveld (1985)
Coupling model Interaction of Different Functions; 
Interaction with research institutions 
and market
4 End of 1980s-early 
1990s
Kline and Rosenberg (1986) Interactive model Simultaneous process with feedback 
loops; "Chain-linked model"
5 1990s Rothwell (1992) Integrated model System integration and networks (SIN)
6 2000s Chesbrough (2003) Networking Model Innovation collaboration and multiple 
exploitation paths
7 2010s Chesbrough (et al.) (2014) Open Focus on the individual and framework 
conditions under which to become 
innovative
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applied research, and innovation models. This implies that policymakers look at the 
whole value chain, including access to funding (e.g. through venture capital), and refrain 
from awarding, explicitly or implicitly, priority to specific innovation models. This leads 
again to what is essentially a facilitating role of policymakers, which focuses on creating 
the conditions for the growth and the diffusion of a strong Open Innovation culture.  
1.2 Conceptualizing places for innovation and entrepreneurship: 
systems and ecosystems 
While gradually improving and refining the understanding of innovation processes, the 
academic literature on innovation has also gradually expanded the view of innovation 
and entrepreneurship to understand the context in which these phenomena take place, 
as well as to capture the environmental interactions that make innovation and 
entrepreneurship possible. The overall premise of this line of thinking, as remarked by 
Wintjes (2015), is that innovation is a social phenomenon, and as such “it does not occur 
in a vacuum, nor can it be regarded as an external given, which becomes accessible to 
us all like ‘manna from heaven’”14. This has prompted scholars to gradually develop the 
concept of “innovation systems”. Carlsson et al. (2002) compare the various concepts of 
innovation systems and conclude that they all involve the creation, diffusion, and use of 
knowledge. The various innovation systems concepts, which have been developed, 
include: national innovation systems (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993), 
regional innovation systems (Cooke, 2010), and sectoral innovation systems (Malerba, 
2002; 2004).  
The original concepts of national, regional and sectoral innovation system had a focus on 
firms as the main actors and on the economic benefit of innovations, and had an 
economic purpose of innovation in mind, while more recent applications of the concept 
have broadened the perspective of innovation by emphasising its diffusion and impacts 
on societal challenges, e.g.: green challenges, healthy aging, or social issues. In 
addition, at least in some sectors of the economy, the increasingly global and granular 
nature of innovation has uncovered the limitation of adopting a national/regional and 
firm-centric approach: on the one hand, private actors increasingly build their own 
innovation systems (alternatively termed platforms, see Fransman 2014) across national 
territories, and this creates an inevitable tension between what a government can do to 
stimulate innovation within its territory, and what the market develops as inherently 
global and interconnected; moreover, the increasing importance of users and institutions 
in innovation systems had led scholars to start using the term “ecosystem” to emphasize 
the multi-dimensional, integrated and user-centric nature of modern innovation 
processes. Below, we explore the “systems” concept, and then move to describing 
entrepreneurial ecosystems.   
1.2.1 National and regional innovation systems 
As reported by Wintjes (2015), many authors have used the concept of National 
Innovation Systems and have contributed to its development as a theoretical concept, 
but there is no commonly agreed definition, not even at the OECD level 15 . In the 
academic literature, after the pioneering work of Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1992), and 
Nelson (1993), the concept has been operationalized by several academics including, 
                                           
14  See Vintjes (2015), Section 2.1. 
15  The Oslo manual (3rd edition; OECD 2005), which is a cooperation between OECD and 
Eurostat on how to measure innovation, shows that the development of the national innovation 
system concept has changed the conception of innovation: “innovation is a more complex and 
systemic phenomenon than was previously thought. Systems approaches to innovation shift 
the focus of policy towards an emphasis on the interplays between institutions, looking at 
interactive processes both in the creation of knowledge and in its diffusion and application. The 
term “National Innovation System” has been coined for this set of institutions and flows of 
knowledge” (OECD 2005). 
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among others, Porter and Stern (2002) and Archibugi et al. (2009), who develop indexes 
of national innovative capacity that rely heavily on the specific role played by each of the 
main actors that shape innovation patterns and success in a given country. These actors 
are mostly large businesses and SMEs, university and research institutes, venture 
capitalists and business angels, and government.  
Although in the early studies on innovation systems the comparison between countries is 
based on descriptions of rather static profiles, more in-depth and qualitative studies 
have focused on the dynamics and (path-dependent) change of systems over time, also 
including a policy perspective (e.g. Fagerberg et al. 2013). The idea that the institutions 
of various policy domains influence the innovation performance of innovation systems 
has been part of the NIS concept from the beginning, but over the years the number of 
policy domains which are considered relevant have increased, moving beyond the 
ministries of industry and economy and the ministries of science and education.  
 
Figure 2: The National Innovation System: Dynamics, processes and policy 
 
Source: Fagerberg et al. (2013). 
 
Focusing on the geographical aspect, several authors have applied the NIS concept to 
study regional innovation systems However, synthesizing the Regional Innovation 
Systems literature, Doloreux and Parto (2004, p.21) state that “most analyses can be 
criticized for failing to adhere to a unified conceptual framework and clear definition or 
conceptualization of such key terms as region, innovation system, and institutions”.  
Similar to the conceptualization of innovation “systems” and largely consistent with it is 
the literature on the so-called “triple” and “quadruple helix”, which focuses on a subset 
of actors within the System of Innovation that are especially relevant for innovation in 
fields where science and technology play an important role (i.e. this explains the focus 
on Universities and research centres). In particular, the Triple Helix model has evolved 
and gone through three different development phases (Torkkeli et al. 2007). In Triple 
Helix I, the three helices are defined institutionally. In Triple Helix II, more attention is 
attached to communication within the system and to the different knowledge systems. 
The Triple Helix III focuses in the hybrid organizations of academia, government and 
industry. Later, contributions such as Yawson (2009) observed that the Triple Helix of 
state, university and industry was missing an essential fourth helix, the “public” or the 
“user”. The user-driven innovation approach can be seen as largely consistent with the 
most recent models of innovation described in Section 1.1 above, and has become an 
essential element of the new “broad-based innovation policy” approach (see Edquist et 
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al. 2009), which emphasises the need to broaden the concept of innovation to include 
product innovations in services, as well as organizational process innovations, and does 
not only relate to economic significance, but also to wider societal benefits, as well as 
measures targeted to support innovation in public services. This new innovation policy 
conception takes also all determinants of the development and diffusion of innovations 
into account when designing and implementing innovation policies. This would then 
include policy instruments operating from the demand side. It would also contemplate a 
wider spectrum of sources of knowledge and more versatile interactions with producers 
and users of knowledge (Edquist et al. 2009). 
The current frontier in the study of innovation and innovation policy is heavily reliant on 
the concept of “smart specialisation”. This concept fundamentally relies on two core 
pillars16: 
 Knowledge ecology. This assumes that “context matters” for the potential 
technological evolution of an innovation system. In other words the potential 
evolutionary pathways of an innovation system depend on the inherited structures 
and existing dynamics including the adaptation or even radical transformation of the 
system.  
 Identification of knowledge-intensive areas as those areas that feature the highest 
presence of key players in the innovation eco-system. Players such as researchers, 
suppliers, manufacturers and service providers, entrepreneurs and users use their 
entrepreneurial skills to acquire and disseminate knowledge and detect existing profit 
opportunities, and ultimately act as catalysts for driving the emerging transformation 
of the economy.  
The smart specialisation concept encompasses both sectoral and geographical aspects, 
and is applied mostly in the concept of regional innovation today: its peculiarity lies in 
the strong link with governance and policy, and its prescriptive, rather than merely 
descriptive, power. Regions can adopt a smart specialization approach only after a 
thorough reconsideration of their fundamentals in terms of knowledge assets, 
capabilities and competences; as well as a detailed mapping of the relative strength and 
development of the main actors of innovation. According to McCann and Ortega-Argilés 
(2011), translating smart specialization into regional policy requires a careful analysis of 
the role of the entrepreneurial agents and catalysts, the relationships between the 
generation, acquisition and transmission of knowledge and ideas at the geographical 
level, the regional systems of innovation, and the institutional and multi-level 
governance frameworks within which such systems operate17. In addition, the issues of 
externalities and interdependency between the region and the rest of the world must be 
solved. Finally, indicators must still be developed in order to link inputs, outputs and 
outcomes of the bottom-up activities taking place within the smart specialization 
approach to regional innovation policy. 
The smart specialization approach appears as an evolution of the slightly older concept 
of “regional innovation systems”, which argues that “firm-specific competencies and 
learning processes can lead to regional competitive advantages if they are based on 
localized capabilities such as specialized resources, skills, institutions and share of 
common social and cultural values”18. As observed by Doloreux and Parto (2005), among 
others, the theoretical model of regional innovation systems mostly looks at the main 
                                           
16  http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/kfg_policy_brief_no9.pdf. 
17  Philip McCann & Raquel Ortega-Argilés, 2011. "Smart specialisation, regional growth and 
applications to EU cohesion policy," Working Papers 2011/14, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona 
(IEB). 
18  See Malmberg A, Maskell P (1997) Towards an explanation of regional specialization and 
industrial agglomeration. European Planning Studies Stud 5:25–41; and Maskell P, Malmberg A 
(1999) Localized Learning and industrial Competitiveness. Cambridge Journal of Economics 
23:167–185.  
 23 
 
ingredients that explain the difference in the performance of regions based on the 
availability of key elements such as human resources, infrastructure and learning 
processes through the interaction of different actors19. However, the fact that defining a 
region has proven quite controversial so far does not allow for a precise categorization 
and measurement of innovation across regions.  
In this respect, part of the literature (including research by the JRC on European poles of 
excellence20) observed that, rather than regions as a whole, it is metropolitan areas that 
are the best location for innovation because they offer firms spatial, technological and 
institutional proximity and specific resources21. In addition, more concentrated areas 
allow for a better implementation of emerging concepts such as that of industrial ecology 
(Frosch and Gallopoulos 1989; Erkman 2004; Fischer-Kowalski 1998; Fischer-Kowalski 
and Hüttler 1998). The natural evolution of these latter contributions is the development 
of approaches that tend to favour the development of “smart cities”22. 
 
Box 3 – Innovation systems – a EURIPIDIS paper by Rene Wintjes 
In what can be considered as the most general paper of the series produced y the 
EURIPIDIS project so far, Wintjes discusses how the concept of Systems of Innovation 
can be fruitfully applied to ICT innovation. Based on a review of the literature on 
(national, regional and sectoral) Systems of Innovation, the author focuses on the need 
to look beyond R&D investments, beyond intra-mural firm activities, and beyond market-
transactions, to capture the broader (global, national, regional, sectoral) context in 
which firms interact with other firms and non-firm actors, and with market and non-
market factors. The result is that innovation becomes subject of study micro, meso and 
macro level, which in turn leads to acknowledging the inherent complexity of innovation 
and the impossibility of developing a “simplistic ‘one-size-fits-all’ set of scientific laws or 
equations which can explain it all”. This finding applies both to ICT-producing and ICT-
using sectors.  
After a literature review of the literature on Systems of innovation, Wintjes introduces a 
focus on sectoral systems of innovation, which anticipates his subsequent focus on ICT. 
In defining sectoral innovation systems, the paper potentially overlaps with what 
Fransman defines as sector-level ecosystems, although the two authors use rather 
different language, and different references. In the case of Wintjes, the key reference is 
the work of Malerba (2002), which adopts a systemic view by arguing for the need to 
focus more strongly on the demand-side of innovation and defining sectoral systems of 
innovation and production as “a set of products and the set of agents carrying out 
market and non-market inter-actions for the creation, production and sale of those 
products”, but then focusing mostly on manufacturing rather than services, and 
providing a rather static view of the interaction between the different actors that operate 
within the system. Also, Wintjes presents this literature by emphasising that the sectoral 
dimension is less studied and mentioned than the geographic dimension (national, 
regional): it is apparent that the sectoral dimension is very often approached as being a 
further specification of a system that is geographically defined, which potentially clashes 
with the global nature of the systems that are observed especially in ICT-producing 
                                           
19  DOLOREUX, D. & S. PARTO (2005) Regional innovation systems: Current discourse and 
unresolved issues. Technology in Society 27, 133-153. 
20  http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/ISG/EIPE.html.  
21  See Audretsch DB, Feldman MP (1996) R&D spillovers and the geography of innovation and 
production. Am Econ Rev 86:630–640; and also Maskell and Malmberg (1999), supra note 
119. 
22  Caragliu A, Del Bo C, Nijkamp P (2009) Smart Cities in Europe. VU University Amsterdam, 
Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics, Series Research Memoranda 
0048/2009; and Komninos N (2009) Intelligent cities: towards interactive and global 
innovation environments. Int J Innov Regional Dev 1:337–355.  
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sectors, but also – thanks to technological innovation – in ICT-using sectors (e.g. Global 
Value Chains)23. Wintjes then refers to the literature on ecosystems as basically using a 
different word for the same concept of innovation systems: however, an important 
difference is exactly the geographical dimension. 
1.2.2 Entrepreneurship ecosystems 
Although the topic of entrepreneurship and related settings has gained the attention of 
academics since the early contributions of Joseph Schumpeter, the measurement of 
entrepreneurship and the analysis of systemic conditions that favour entrepreneurship 
have been subject to significant efforts only recently. As remarked by Bogdanowicz 
(2015), significant efforts were made in particular by OECD and EUROSTAT 
(Entrepreneurship Indicators Program, EIP) to lead to a consensual definition of 
entrepreneurship, a structured perspective on the determinants of entrepreneurship and 
on its economic and social impacts. Likewise, there is now a large body of surveys, 
analysis and research on data included in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 
and the Global Entrepreneurship Index (GEDI), but current measurement efforts still fall 
short of adequately capturing systemic factors such as the impact of entrepreneurship on 
innovation, and the role of “intra-preneurship”.  
Some of these systemic aspects are currently being factored into a nascent literature on 
entrepreneurship ecosystems, which is linked with the innovation systems literature, 
with a peculiarity: the focus specifically and explicitly on the systemic factors that foster 
entrepreneurship 24 . In the literature, a variety of definitions of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems can be found. Isenberg (2010) defines them as a set of individual elements 
– such as leadership, culture, capital markets, and open-minded customers – that 
combine in complex way to stimulate entrepreneurship. According to Isenberg (2010, 
2011), the key to sustainable entrepreneurship lies in the specific combinations of the 
elements of an entrepreneurial ecosystem. Figure 3 below shows the composition of an 
entrepreneurship ecosystem according to Isenberg (2011). It consists of six domains 
which in turn comprise further elements: (1) politics, including leadership and 
government, (2) finances, (3) culture, including entrepreneurial success stories and 
social norms, (4) infrastructural, professional and non-public support, (5) human capital, 
including education and personnel, and (6) markets, consisting of networks and early 
customers. For a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem each of the six domains should be 
available in the region and be entrepreneurship-friendly. However, there is no easy path 
towards a sustainable, fully functional entrepreneurial ecosystem that is at the same 
time innovative. The creation of an entrepreneurship-friendly environment will be 
extremely difficult in particular if there is no explicit political support of and no high 
social and/or political priority on entrepreneurship. 
  
                                           
23  For example, Wintjes (2015) reports two OECD studies, such as the one titled: ‘Boosting 
Innovation: The Cluster Approach’ describes clusters as sector-specific systems of innovation, 
which operate under National Systems of Innovation. Also the OECD study: ‘Innovative 
Clusters: Drivers of National Innovation Systems’, belonged to the second phase of the OECD 
NIS project which was devoted “to deepening the analysis” of National Innovation Systems. 
24  Models of entrepreneurial ecosystems have focused so far on “Entrepreneurial 
Personality”(Valdez 1988), the “Entrepreneurial process” (Gnyawali and Fogel 1994), and 
“Elements” and “Evolution” (Neck et al. 2004). 
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Figure 3 – Isenberg’s entrepreneurship ecosystem 
 
Source: Introducing the Entrepreneurship Ecosystem: Four Defining Characteristics, Daniel 
Isenberg, May 25, 2011, FORBES.COM25 
 
1.3 From innovation to innovation policy: recognizing the 
changing phenomenology and governance of innovation 
Over the past few years the understanding of innovation as a policy subject has followed 
new, important trends, in addition to the ones highlighted in the previous sections. First, 
innovation (and our understanding of it) has become more multi-faceted, systemic, and 
open, as already described in Section 1 above.  
Second, the modelling of the interaction between players that compose the innovation 
system has become more sophisticated, and the notion of ecosystem, rather than merely 
system, is now adopted (not without a degree of uncertainty and variance in definitions) 
to encompass i.a. the institutional and policy interrelations and constraints that 
characterise the life and activity of entrepreneurs and innovators, the proactive role of 
end users, and the involvement of several players in innovation projects.  
Third, scholars have increasingly argued that not all innovation exerts a significant 
impact on long-term policy goals such as sustainable development and growth. More in 
detail, there are innovative products, processes and services that contribute more than 
others to addressing grand societal challenges, such as climate change, water scarcity, 
and for Europe unemployment and the needs of the ageing society. This has led to 
growing emphasis being attached to the so-called “purpose” of innovation, which bears 
substantial relevance for innovation policy. As a matter of fact, both innovation and 
entrepreneurship should be approached in public policy as intermediate, not ultimate 
goals, and as such functional to social welfare in the long run. In particular, the diffusion 
                                           
25  See: http://www.forbes.com/sites/danisenberg/2011/05/25/introducing-the-entrepreneurship-
ecosystem-four-defining-characteristics/#70606ad538c4  
 26 
 
of innovation, and its widespread availability to end consumers is as important as the 
innovation process itself.  
The consequences of this shift in the approach to innovation as an essential element of a 
sustainable development strategy are far-reaching. As a preliminary set of remarks: 
 Innovation policy cannot focus only on product and process innovation, but rather on 
many other forms, including social and organisational innovation. This leads some 
authors to refer, more generally, to “systemic innovation” (Mulgan and Leadbeater 
2013). The OECD recently observed that “social and organisational innovations, 
including new business models, are increasingly important to complement 
technological innovation”26. 
 Innovation policy cannot focus only on the supply-side. Demand side policies such as 
the strategic use of public procurement, policies that incentivise the consumption of 
sustainable and innovative products, and policies that aim at improving the 
accessibility of innovative products (including education policy, and even trade 
policy) are as important as traditional supply-side innovation policies such as R&D 
subsidies and tax breaks, patent law, or public funding of innovation and 
entrepreneurship.  
 Innovation policy is chiefly related not only to the development, but also to the 
diffusion, of new products, processes and services 27 . Public policy in support of 
innovation (especially in Europe) should look beyond the so-called “innovation 
deficit", to encompass the “diffusion deficit” that prevents new technologies and 
business models to reach the market, or to become affordable for the majority of 
consumers. The recent Staff Working Document published by the European 
Commission on “Better Regulation for Innovation-Driven Investment” acknowledged 
the key role of public policy in removing obstacles to the commercialization and 
diffusion of existing technologies, which lack a sufficiently large market in Europe28.  
 Innovation policy cannot rely exclusively on sector-specific industrial policy, since this 
would not constitute the best approach to trigger those organisational, 
transformational, disruptive changes that often create innovation by displacing 
existing business models29. In short, innovation policy has to take a systemic view, 
not a sector-specific view. This is important also in order to avoid so-called 
“incumbency” problems, which emerge whenever policies crafted for a specific sector 
end up hampering disruptive innovation by empowering existing players and 
disadvantaging new entrants (OECD 2015).  
 Relatedly, innovation policy is increasingly in need of “direction” (Fagerberg 2015), in 
addition to facilitation of private sector entrepreneurship, R&D investment and 
knowledge transfer. The direction element implies that governments steer innovation 
efforts towards emergent and urgent societal challenges. This is done, as a matter of 
fact, by the Horizon 2020 programme (in particular in setting up European 
Innovation Partnerships) and even more explicitly in the U.S. strategy for American 
Innovation adopted by the Obama administration, and recently updated and re-
launched in October 2015. This requires that governments choose to support those 
technologies that are more likely to bring social, economic and environmental 
benefits over time, and avoid creating biases or mis-alignments in their policies, 
which would disadvantage sustainable, systemic innovation.  
                                           
26  http://www.oecd.org/sti/OECD-Innovation-Strategy-2015-CMIN2015-7.pdf, at 6. 
27  Freeman, C. (1994), The Economics of Technical Change, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 18: 
463-514. 
28  See European Commission Staff Working Document, “Better regulations for innovation-driven 
investment at EU level”, SWD (2015) 298 final, 15 December 2015. 
29  See 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2011/pdf/ecp438_en.pdf  
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 Moreover, history and geography appear to be very important for a proactive 
innovation and entrepreneurship policy: the innovation and entrepreneurship 
ecosystems literature (which, broadly speaking, encompasses the literature on 
innovation systems and the one on entrepreneurship ecosystems) suggests that not 
every portion of territory can become as innovative, and as such the role of 
government should be that of selecting those environments in which 
entrepreneurship can flourish more easily, and strengthen the ties between the 
various players that populate those environments whenever possible. This finding is 
potentially in line with the “smart specialisation” approach adopted in EU regional 
policy.  
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2 The ICT ecosystem: features, trends, and policy 
consequences  
This section builds on the general findings of Section 1, but focuses specifically on the 
ICT “ecosystem”, and describes its main features, existing and expected trends, and 
related policy consequences. The ICT ecosystem is slightly broader than the ICT sector 
stricto sensu, as defined for example in the PREDICT report, i.e. as comprising NACE 
codes related to both manufacturing and services (see table 2 below)30. It is broader, 
following Fransman (2015), since it includes not only the companies that operate in the 
specific NACE codes, but also their interdependencies; and their institutional and 
architectural constraints, as represented by the main features of the networked 
environment in which these companies and institutions operate. In addition, the ICT 
ecosystem includes also end users, which play an increasingly active role also in the 
generation of new products, services, ideas (see above, Section 1.1 on distributed 
innovation). Accordingly, the next sections will focus on the broader concept of 
ecosystem, as a more appropriate way to encompass, in the analysis, all factors that 
determine the phenomenology, direction, and intensity of ICT innovation. Moreover, the 
ICT ecosystem also partly overlaps with the Internet: again, the former is broader since 
it includes also all hardware and network equipment companies that form the underlying 
infrastructure on which the Internet runs; and is narrower since the Internet can be 
comprises also a number of companies that operate in “brick and mortar” sectors, but 
participate to the Internet by operating their own websites. In this respect, it is fair to 
state that the ICT ecosystem does not encompass the whole Internet root zone, i.e. all 
its domain names. For example, Veugelers (2013) and Fransman (2010) identify five 
layers of the overall digital ecosystem: Equipment; Network; Connectivity, Navigation 
and middleware; and Applications including content. Of these, the ICT sector represents 
the first three only, whereas the ICT ecosystem encompasses all of them.  
 
Table 2 – ICT in the International Standard Industrial Classification 
 
Source: PREDICT report (2015) 
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. Section 2.1 describes the features 
and evolution of the ICT sector, defined as an ecosystem composed of players, users, 
institutions, technologies, and their multiple interactions. Section 2.2 describes the main 
features of innovation in the ICT ecosystem, by highlighting the relevance of platforms 
                                           
30  See https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/predict/predict2016  
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and their impact on business models and entrepreneurship. Section 2.3 discusses 
whether the ICT sector can be considered as different from all other sectors for the 
purposes of innovation policy. Section 2.5 briefly summarises the main findings of this 
chapter.  
2.1 The defining features of the ICT ecosystem 
ICT can be defined as the integration of information processing, computing and 
communication technologies. As such, its birth can be traced back to the 1940s, with the 
development of the first computers; however, when it comes to the actual diffusion of 
ICT products and services on the market, the sector appears much younger31. Designed 
in the mid-1970s, so-called “minicomputers” entered the scene in the early 1980s in 
small businesses, manufacturing plants, and factories32. The market for microcomputers 
increased dramatically when IBM introduced the first personal computer in the fall of 
1981: the choice to endow the new personal computer with a modular architecture, in 
which components (or “complementors”) produced by different firms could interoperate 
within the same system, was essential for the success and diffusion of this product. 
Since then, the “layered” architecture of the personal computer (i.e. hardware, operating 
system, middleware, software applications) became the standard way of organising 
production and business in the IT world. This feature became even more prominent once 
information technology started to gradually merge with communications networks in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, giving birth to a full-fledged ICT sector by mid-1990s, with 
computers (of various sizes and powers) being connected by means of 
telecommunications networks across the globe. The choice to adopt common, non-
proprietary standards such as HTML and HTTP as the foundations of information 
exchange on the Internet proved essential for its diffusion and development, as well as 
for the transformation of the ICT sector into a full-fledged ecosystem. At the same time, 
the decision not to regulate the emerging Internet as a telecommunication service (e.g. 
in the U.S. 1996 Telecommunications Act) and to defend, at least in the early days of 
Internet policy, the neutrality of the network (e.g. in the 1996 WIPO Treaties, in the 
1998 US Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and in the EU e-commerce and Information 
Society Directives in the early 2000s) proved essential for the diffusion of the “network 
of networks”.  
Against this background, the foundational, differentiating features of the ICT ecosystem 
can be summarized as follows: 
 Computing power and Moore’s law. The ICT ecosystem is largely based on the 
increase in computing power, which has for decades been governed by Moore’s law. 
According to this law, formulated in 1975 by Gordon Moore, the number of 
transistors – the fundamental building blocks of the microprocessor and the digital 
age – incorporated on a computer chip will double every two years, resulting in 
increased computing power and devices that are faster, smaller and lower cost. In 
other words, computing dramatically increases in power, and decreases in relative 
cost, at an exponential pace. While this feature of computing power initially 
concerned mostly hardware devices, with the advent of the Internet age and cloud 
computing exponential improvements are increasingly observed also in terms of 
broadband connectivity and digital storage.  
                                           
31  The first commercial computer was the UNIVAC I, developed by John Eckert and John W. 
Mauchly in 1951. It was used by the Census Bureau to predict the outcome of the 1952 
presidential election. For the next twenty-five years, mainframe computers were used in large 
corporations to do calculations and manipulate large amounts of information stored in 
databases. Supercomputers were used in science and engineering, for designing aircraft and 
nuclear reactors, and for predicting worldwide weather patterns.  
32  In 1975, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology developed microcomputers. In 1976, 
Tandy Corporation's first Radio Shack microcomputer followed; the Apple microcomputer was 
introduced in 1977. 
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 Modularity. The development of increasingly complex products has led engineers to 
adopt a modular architecture since the early days of microcomputers. As already 
mentioned, the personal computer launched by IBM in 1981 became an enormous 
success in terms of market uptake in particular due to its modular architecture, 
which led many industry players to converge on a single de facto industry standard 
(Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999; Shapiro and Varian 1998). The Internet adopted a 
similar modular structure, with multiple tiers of Internet Service Providers, hardware 
component that run the network and allow for data processing, storage and 
communication, a “logical layer” that determines traffic flows and exchange 
protocols, operating systems that govern the interaction between users, devices, the 
network and information flows; applications that allow end users to carry out a 
growing number of activities; content generated by users or by third parties; and the 
users themselves. 
 End-to-end architecture and neutrality. Being based on the telecommunications 
network and on open protocols, the ICT ecosystem features an end-to-end 
architecture. An end-to-end architecture implies the possibility, for every end user, to 
engage in communication and exchange information with every other end user. The 
early Internet coupled this feature with the so-called “neutrality” principle, according 
to which no central intelligence would be able to filter or manage traffic flowing 
between end users, thus making the Internet a “dumb” network, in which intelligence 
would be distributed only at the edges (i.e. end users). The Internet Protocol governs 
the way in which content is protected from inspection through a feature called 
“protocol layering” (see Yoo, 2013). However, as the Internet started to diffuse and 
permeate several other economic sectors, its neutrality features started to be 
increasingly questioned: the impossibility to inspect traffic on the network and to 
differentiate between applications that require real-time delivery and the ones that 
are more tolerant to delays have started to constrain technological development in a 
number of fields, from content and video streaming to online payments. Today, the 
end-to-end architecture appears as a crucial feature of the ICT ecosystem, whereas 
(as will be explained below) neutrality has been largely abandoned in favour of more 
complex and potentially more effective architectural design.  
 Digital information goods. The ICT ecosystem is essentially based on digital 
technology, and as such features many of the characteristics that information 
displays from an economic perspective. Since Kenneth Arrow’s characterisation of 
information and the advancement of theories of common pool resources and the so-
called “information semi-commons” (Heverly 2003), the understanding of the 
peculiar economics of information has evolved significantly in social sciences. The 
fact that goods and services offered on the Internet are made of 0s and 1s (i.e. 
digitized in binary language) bears significant consequences for the economics of the 
sector. These include: (i) endless replicability and non-rivalry in consumption: 
information goods can be replicated with no significant loss in quality, and can be 
accessed by different users from multiple locations at the same time, thus enabling 
sharing: (ii) near-zero or zero marginal costs: replicating the information embedded 
in an information good normally costs nothing (today, in most cases there is no need 
for a physical device to contain the information good, as in the case of downloaded 
content and software); (iii) plasticity and granularity: digital information (and related 
goods) can be decomposed, rebuilt and repackaged ad libitum, thus leading to 
endless possibilities for versioning, sampling, re-use, including through user-
generated content, text and data mining and many other activities.  
These foundational characteristics have determined the emergence of some of the 
features that are typically attributed to the ICT ecosystem by industry analysts.  
First, R&D intensity and innovation rates tend to be greater than in other sectors. This 
depends on a number of factors, including the acceleration in computing power (Moore’s 
law); the possibilities for diffusion guaranteed by the common architecture (Metcalfe’s 
Law); and the possibilities for participation secured by the choice of open protocols (i.e. 
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anyone can in principle develop a software or hardware that is compatible with existing 
Internet protocols).  
Second, innovation was initially largely incremental, due to modular architectural design 
that followed “big bang" inventions such as the computer chip and the Internet protocol: 
this feature is however not as evident today due to the platformization of the Internet 
and the permeation of a number of economic sectors by new and disruptive business 
models (see below).  
Third, product life-cycles become increasingly shorter due to the acceleration of 
technological change: several companies in the ICT ecosystem (and even more, the ones 
active at the higher layers, such as operating systems, other middleware, and 
applications) reportedly work on at least three successive generations of products (the 
current one, the next one, and the one after that).  
Fourth, the end-to-end architecture of the Internet and the digital nature of information 
goods have led to the emergence of network effects and large economies of scale in the 
ICT ecosystem: this, in turn, has led to the emergence of multi-sided platforms that are 
gradually changing the architecture of the network (see below).  
All these aspects bear consequences in terms of innovation performance/dynamics, 
industry performance, competition, overall societal welfare.  
 
Box 4 – Global ICT ecosystems – a EURIPIDIS paper by Martin Fransman 
The EURIPIDIS paper on global innovation ecosystems authored by Martin Fransman 
(2015) defines ecosystems as groups of symbiotically interacting ‘players’ which include 
companies and other players such as the providers of knowledge, resources, and ‘rules 
of the game’. It is the companies which constitute the economic ‘engine’ of the 
ecosystem since they create value for consumer-users, output, and employment. In 
doing so, however, the companies are also influenced by the other players in the 
ecosystem. Moreover, two levels - the sector level and the company level – in the 
ecosystems are considered to interact with the result that it is not possible to fully 
understand the one without the other. One of the main contributions of this paper is to 
demonstrate the necessity, if the process of innovation is to be properly understood, of a 
simultaneous analysis at both sectoral, cross-sectoral and company levels. The analysis 
proceeds hence in two stages. The first stage involves the identification of the main 
players within the company who are collectively involved in the company’s innovation 
process. Crucially, this analysis includes not only researchers and developers (accounting 
for the R&D on which most studies of innovation conventionally focus) but also other 
players such as those involved in company strategy, sales and marketing, design, 
software development, and distribution - players who are left out of most analyses. The 
second stage of the analysis involves situating the intra-company players within the 
broader context of the key external players who are part of the company’s Global 
Innovation Ecosystem. Increasingly (for both large and small companies) knowledge that 
is relevant for the company’s innovation process will be found not only outside the 
company’s legal boundaries but also outside its home country. This means that in order 
to benefit from this external knowledge, the company’s Global Innovation Ecosystem 
needs to be designed so that it can effectively access and use knowledge globally. The 
analysis shows that there are different kinds of company Global Innovation Ecosystems 
in the ICT ecosystem defined by Fransman (see Figure 4 below). 
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Figure 4 – A simplified model of the ICT ecosystem 
 
Source: Fransman (2010, 2015) 
 
In Layer 3 – the platform, content and applications layer – there is a unique hotbed of 
Internet related entrepreneurship and innovation along with massive entry by new 
companies. In order to explain this hotbed of activity, the report develops the argument 
that the key determinant is the emergence of what is called the Internet Innovation 
Platform. Furthermore, six key characteristics of this platform are identified that together 
make it ideally suited to facilitating the entry of new, innovative companies: availability 
of network services; open low-cost access; relatively low fixed costs; very low marginal 
costs; high consumer surplus; high scalability. Very different structural conditions exist 
in Layer 2 (the network operator layer). More specifically, this layer is driven by 
economic forces which include: very high fixed costs coupled with low marginal costs; 
economies of scale; and substantial entry barriers. The result of these forces is that 
Layer 2 is dominated by a small number of large operators. But this is not all. The 
inevitable focus of the operators on their networks has required a set of capabilities that 
are fundamentally different from the capabilities that the software-based Internet 
companies in Layer 3 need in order to become and remain competitive. This explains the 
inability of the dominant Layer 2 network operators to successfully diversify their 
activities into Layer 3 (despite their serious efforts to do so) in an attempt to avoid 
becoming the simple providers of ‘dumb pipes’ that carry data for others who make 
money from the use of that data. In addition, the innovation activities of the network 
operators in Layer 2 are also shaped by their reliance on innovation by ICT equipment 
providers in Layer 1. Having said this, the report also shows that telecoms operators 
such as Vodafone and Telefonica, have been making good use of their global networks 
as innovation platforms in their company Global Innovation Ecosystems. Finally, Layer 1 
players (the equipment manufacturing layer) may be divided into those that have 
managed to establish significant innovation platforms and those that have not. This has 
been one factor shaping their different company Global Innovation Ecosystems. A further 
force for change has been the entry of new, innovative competitors, notably Chinese 
companies such as Huawei and ZTE, but also new players from the US. The increasing 
prevalence of company Global Innovation Ecosystems challenges conventional policy in 
several key areas including: technology transfer, intellectual property rights, financing, 
taxation, public procurement and even evidence-based policy-making. The essential 
point is that in Global Innovation Ecosystems innovation is a joint product rather than 
being the result of the effort of a single firm. This means that the designers of policies in 
these areas must now take account of the incentive effects on multiple rather than single 
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players. Furthermore, they also have to understand the cooperative and competitive 
relationships between these players if they are to design effective incentives. All this can 
significantly increase the cost of formulating and implementing innovation policies in 
these three areas. 
2.2 The changing ICT ecosystem: six trends 
In this section six main trends that are affecting the ICT ecosystem are described: the 
“platformization” of the ecosystem, which implies the emergence of large online digital 
intermediaries; the increased vritualization of various parts of the ecosystem, in 
particular due to the emergence of cloud computing and software-defined networking; 
the emergence of increasingly open and collaborative business models, often involving 
(at the higher layers) open IP strategies such as open source software and open patent 
portfolios; the growing prominence of big data and data-driven innovation; the Internet 
of Things, which is rapidly leading to a world in which tens of billions of objects are 
connected; and the Internet of Value, powered by distributed architectures such as 
BlockChain, and being increasingly indicated as a new paradigm for many sectors (in 
particular, banking).  
2.2.1 Trend 1: From the “neutral” to the “platformized” ICT ecosystem 
A number of authors have illustrated the ongoing transformation of the ICT ecosystem, 
mostly due to the advent of the Internet as a major form of communication between ICT 
products. The explosion of Internet traffic in the 1990s and 2000s, powered by parallel 
streams of evolving technologies (data storage, broadband communications, data 
compression, innovation in traffic management) led to an emerging need for solutions 
that would reduce complexity: this solution was spontaneously developed by market 
forces, and mostly took the form of industry convergence towards a limited number of 
de facto industry standards at the higher layers of the architecture.  
Examples of de facto ICT industry standards in the pre-Internet age include Lotus 123, 
WordPerfect and other applications based on the original IBM PC architecture and the 
MS-DOS. Later, Windows 3.1 and Windows 95 (which ushered the Internet age) became 
widely diffused de facto industry standards. The case of Microsoft Windows is perhaps 
the most telling in the evolution that the ICT went through during the 1990s: the 
modular architecture of the personal computer entailed the existence of one layer (at the 
time, the OS layer), which would end up being essential in terms of connecting hardware 
with software and determining the compatibility and interoperability requirements of the 
whole system. Learning effects, direct and indirect network externalities determined the 
need for the market to “tip” in favour of one standard, rather than preserving a wide 
array of competing products. Microsoft adopted for its Windows application (later, OS) 
an architecture that would maximise the potential of indirect network externalities: just 
as VHS won the standards war with Betamax in the video-recorder era due to a greater 
number of applications, Windows won over its competitors by focusing on the number of 
applications that would be compatible with its standards, be they developed in-house or 
by third parties. By becoming a platform for third party applications, Windows could 
exploit self-reinforcing, centripetal forces: the more an OS becomes popular among its 
end users, the more developers will want to develop applications compatible with that 
OS; and vice versa, the more apps are available to end users, the more the latter will 
find switching to another OS unattractive. The age of platforms had officially begun: 
today, the economics of platforms has become a stand-alone field of research in 
economics and in other social sciences, encompassing management, strategy, industrial 
economics, social network analysis and many more.  
The emergence of the Internet has exacerbated this nascent feature. The addition of 
network effects in broadband communications to the existing direct and indirect effects 
generated by platforms and applications has made the ICT ecosystem a peculiar 
environment, in which leading platforms would rise and fall in just a few years; and in 
which catalysing user attention becomes the most important source of competitive 
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advantage. Terms like “economics of attention” or “competition for eyeballs” have 
become commonplace when describing the strategy followed in the ICT ecosystem by 
companies like Amazon, Google, Microsoft, or Facebook. These companies present 
themselves as the new protagonists of the “platformized Internet”. Today, the ICT 
ecosystem has evolved into a much more diverse environment in which original open 
internet architecture co-exists with various multi-sided platforms, which coordinate, 
steer and manage the innovation taking place at the higher layer of the Internet 
architecture.  
As observed i.a. by Palacin et al. (2013) and by David Clark and KC Claffy (2014, 2015), 
this transition is now evident if one confronts the original (three-tier) model of the 
connectivity and logical layer of the ICT ecosystem with the emergence of vertically 
integrated platforms that make extensive use of traffic acceleration techniques, and 
developed their own semi-walled gardens to improve their customers’ experience and 
capture the bulk of the end users’ attention (figure 5 below). For example, a company 
like Apple uses Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) like the ones provided by Akamai to 
deliver faster traffic to its FaceTime users; and at the same time hosts more specialized 
providers such as Netflix, which in turn use traffic acceleration techniques to enable 
video streaming services to subscribers through a multitude of existing platforms (iOS, 
Android, public Internet). A company like Spotify can be defined as a two-sided 
specialized platform (matching users with rights holders), but access to it mostly occurs 
through existing large platforms (iOS and Android). This phenomenon, often called 
“platformization” of the ICT ecosystem, bears far reaching consequences for both 
innovation, and innovation policy. In particular, understanding the economics of 
platforms is essential to understand the direction and pace that innovation might take in 
various parts (layers) of the ICT ecosystem, as will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Figure 5 – Old v. new Internet: platformization 
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2.2.2 Trend 2: Virtualization and the cloud 
A second, important trend that is evident in the history of the ICT ecosystem is the 
ongoing virtualization of a growing number of functions, again made possible by 
technological evolution and underlying standardization. With this standardization come 
significant cost reductions, shifting of market power and user attention, and the 
disruption of existing business models. Perhaps the most evident trends in this respect 
are cloud computing and software-defined networking.  
With cloud computing, technology has made it possible for small companies to avoid 
buying or leasing hardware and downloading software and applications: these traditional 
transactions were replaced by "everything as a service", which led to enormous 
advantages both for individuals and businesses. The transition towards a “cloud era” has 
led personal devices become increasingly light, while users were able to lease software 
located in the cloud, as well as access their files that are stored somewhere in 
cyberspace, and managed by a cloud provider: put more simply, a limitless "office LAN" 
where the main server was not located downstairs, but potentially on the other side of 
the globe33. An industry report defined “cloud implementation” as "an elastic execution 
environment involving multiple stakeholders and providing a metered service at multiple 
granularities for a specified level of quality (of service)”34. 
Cloud architectures are conceived to be very simple for end users, but feature a very 
complex architecture “behind the curtains”. As an example, Apple's iCloud allows the 
                                           
33  Cloud computing is a general purpose technology of the IT field which became widely available 
in the late 2000. VAQUERO et al. (2009) define it as "a large pool of easily usable and 
accessible virtualized resources (such as hardware, development platforms and/or services). 
These resources can be dynamically reconfigured to adjust to a variable load (scale), allowing 
also for an optimum resource utilization. This pool of resources is typically exploited by a pay-
per-use model in which guarantees are offered by the Infrastructure Provider by means of 
customized Service Level Agreements" 
34  The most widely used definition of cloud is that provided by the US National Institute for 
Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2009: "Cloud computing is a model for enabling 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources 
(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned 
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction". 
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syncing of various devices with the cloud, such that the end user always enters the same 
environment regardless of the device used to connect to the network. Similar strategies 
have been pursued for the end user market by Google (Android), Microsoft (Azure) and 
Amazon (AWS). The most widely acknowledged taxonomies of cloud computing are 
those that relate to the basic cloud "modes" (i.e. Public, Private, Hybrid); and the main 
cloud "types" (i.e. Saas, AaaS, IaaS, PaaS). The provision of platform as a service 
(PaaS), for example, leaves more control of the configuration to the client that mere 
application as a service (AaaS) or software as a service (SaaS) modes35. At the same 
time, private clouds are certainly more customized to the client’s needs than hybrid or 
public clouds, which however enjoy clear economies of scale. 
Already in the 1990s, cyber law scholars started to understand that the Internet would 
have led to the emergence of an “age of access”, in which products and services will be 
dematerialized to an extent that would make ownership and property rights less 
important, and access rights gradually more dominant 36 . The progress observed in 
ubiquitous connectivity and in compression techniques, coupled with enhanced 
possibilities to capture end users’ attention, has gradually led to the emergence of 
access-based services. These include a variety of new business models, from pure 
streaming-based content access services (Netflix, Spotify) to intermediate forms (Apple 
Music + iTunes + appleTV) which contemplate both ownership and access; and the so-
called “sharing economy”, based on a combination of network effects, granularity, and 
reputational effects (e.g. Airbnb, Uber). Many of these services rely on the “cloud” as a 
key resource for virtual access and use of IT resources.  
Figure 6 shows the changing appearance of the standard "OSI 4-layer architecture" 
(infrastructure, logical, applications and content) under the transition to a cloud 
environment, where figure 5a shows the layered structure of the best-effort Internet and 
figure 5b shows a prototypical cloud architecture. As shown in the picture, cloud 
platforms are juxtaposed to the physical layer of the Internet, and govern the provision 
of a number of services in a dedicated environment, in which cloud providers process 
and, to some extent, control continuous data flows. Given the definition of “cloud 
implementation” given above, it is also clear that cloud providers must also guarantee a 
minimum quality of service (QoS) for the services they provide. 
Figure 6 - Old v. new Internet architecture: virtualization 
 (a)  (b) 
    
Source: Author’s own elaboration  
                                           
35  Renda, A. (2012), Competition, Neutrality and Diversity in the Cloud, Communications & 
Strategies, No. 85, 1st Quarter 2012, pp. 23-44.  
36  See i.a. Gomulkiewicz, R.W. (1998), “The License Is the Product: Comments on the Promise of 
Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing”, Berkeley Tech. L. J., Vol. 13, Issue 3, p. 
891.  
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2.2.3 Trend 3: Openness and collaboration 
Another trend that has characterised the evolution of the ICT ecosystem, especially after 
the advent of the Internet, is openness. The most fast-growing, innovative parts of the 
ICT ecosystem include the emergence of the collaborative economy and distributed 
architectures. Here are some important examples to keep in mind. 
First, open source software is evolving and growing from the initial models of “copyleft” 
licensing, based on reciprocity and the voluntary commitment to refrain from claiming 
the exclusive right to commercially exploit a given invention, towards a variety of 
models, which include the making available of entire patent portfolios for free 
exploitation by users and small entrepreneurs. Today, open-source platforms developed 
through distributed co-creation, such as the “LAMP” stack (for Linux, Apache, MySQL, 
and PHP/Perl/Python), have become a standard component of the IT infrastructure at 
many corporations. The exact combination of software included in a LAMP package is not 
fixed and may vary depending on developers' preferences: for example, PHP may be 
replaced or supplemented by Perl, Python or Ruby, the OS can be replaced with 
Microsoft Windows, Mac OS, Solaris, iSeries, or OpenBSD and others; database 
component also can be replaced, and webservers other than Apache are being used. All 
this creates a collectively developed environment in which programmers and users co-
develop software that powers a large amount of new Web applications.  
Second, openness has become an increasingly dominant paradigm in research and 
innovation, thanks to the Internet evolution. Key examples include, in the public sector, 
the recent decision by NASA to make hundreds of patents available for free for 
developers37; and in the private sector, the decision by Google to open up its Android 
patents38; as well as the decision by Tesla’s Elon Musk (later followed by other car 
manufacturers such as Ford) to open up for free the company’s patent portfolio to 
external developers39. This example is being followed by governments: for example, the 
United States Open Government strategy is increasingly geared towards the diffusion of 
all information held by public administrations for use by researchers and individual 
citizens as users or contributors to innovative projects (Renda 2016). Overall, this trend 
leads to the identification of a new strategy for the launch of innovative, disruptive 
platforms, which chiefly depends on making technical information available royalty-free 
to maximise diffusion and achieve first-mover advantage. A similar strategy is being 
used by Toyota for the hydrogen car40.  
Third, the open, collaborative economy is emerging in many more sectors than the 
often-mentioned taxi (Uber, BlaBlaCar) and hotel/accommodation (Airbnb). Owyang and 
McClure (2015) describe the ever-changing landscape of collaborative economy 
champions as now composed (based on the jargon used in Silicon Valley) three Pegasus 
companies (Uber, Airbnb, Wework); a few Unicorns (Didi, LendingClub, Ola Cabs, 
HomeAway, Lyft, Instacart, Beepi, Blue Apron, Prosper, GrabTaxi, Thumbtack, 
BlaBlaCar, Etsy Tuja, Rocket Taxi); and Centaurs (Freelancer, Chegg, Rent the Runway, 
Postmates, Shyp, Inspirato, Circle, Hailo, RelayRides). The authors do not list the 
“ponies”, defined as companies with a capitalisation of less than 10 billion USD; and the 
hundreds of start-ups that have the legitimate ambition to join one of those other 
categories. Most likely, these companies will further proliferate in the coming years. The 
total capitalisation of sharing economy players calculated by the authors as of October 
24, 2015 totalled 128.7 billion USD. 
                                           
37  http://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-offers-licenses-of-patented-technologies-to-start-up-
companies/ 
38  http://techcrunch.com/2015/07/23/google-offers-to-sell-patents-to-startups-to-boost-its-
wider-cross-licensing-initiative/ 
39  http://www.digitaltrends.com/business/ford-to-open-electric-vehicle-patents-news-pictures/  
40  http://www.zdnet.com/article/toyota-pushes-hydrogen-fuel-cell-cars-with-open-patent-
portfolio/  
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2.2.4 Trend 4: The data-driven economy 
Another important trend that bears consequences for the evolution of the ICT ecosystem 
is the breath-taking surge in the availability of data, coupled with the already-mentioned 
dramatic reduction in the cost of data storage and processing. The power of big data 
analytics, according to many experts, still has to be fully discovered, especially if one 
considers that the overwhelming majority of data available for analytics (some say, 
99%) has been produced in the past two years; or, as others have observed, “the 
amount of data generated in two days is as much as all data generated in human history 
before 2003”41. Coupled with the already existing move towards access-based services, 
the use of big data can lead to important changers in the value chain of almost every 
sector, from retail (e.g. the “intelligent shelves”) to healthcare, insurance, and even 
agriculture. As already demonstrated by pilot projects such as PredPol, now implemented 
and adopted also in some European cities (e.g. Milan) after its first experiments in Los 
Angeles, also police enforcement can make extensive use of big data to improve its 
nowcasting abilities42. The list of sectors is anyway much longer, and as long as the 
economy is.  
When looking at the evolution of big data over the past years, there are important 
elements that suggest that open business models are being chosen to maximise the 
impact of existing and emerging platforms. For example, Google has been at the 
forefront of big data development, but without imposing a closed architecture on the 
market (exactly as it did with its Android OS). After Google introduced MapReduce and 
BigTable, a distributed storage system for structured data, the open source 
implementation of MapReduce, called Hadoop, emerged on the market and attracted the 
attention of Yahoo. The OECD reports that “Hadoop is now provided as an open source 
solution (under the Apache License) and has become the engine behind many of today’s 
big data processing platforms”. Besides Yahoo, Hadoop is powering many data-driven 
goods and services deployed by Internet firms such as Amazon, eBay, Facebook, and 
LinkedIn. But even traditional providers of databases and enterprises servers such as 
IBM, Oracle, Microsoft, and SAP have started integrating it, together with other open 
source tools into their product lines, making them available to a wider number of 
enterprises including Wal-Mart, Chevron, and Morgan Stanley. The key innovation of 
MapReduce is its ability “to take a query over a data set, divide it, and run it in parallel 
over many nodes” (Dumbill, 2010), often (low-cost) commodity servers that can be 
distributed across different locations”. 
The emerging ecosystem of big data processing tools can be described as a stylised 
stack of storage, MapReduce, query, and analytics application layers as illustrated in 
Figure 6 (OECD 2014). Increasingly the whole stack is provided as a cloud based 
solution by providers such as Amazon (2009) and Microsoft (2011). With Dumbill 
(2010), one could argue that this evolving stack has enabled and democratized big data 
analytics in the same way “the commodity LAMP stack of Linux, Apache, MySQL and PHP 
changed the landscape of web applications [and] was a critical enabler for Web 2.0” (see 
Section 2.1.3 above). 
  
                                           
41  See: 
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Data%20Report%20Final%2010.23.
pdf 
42  See www.predpol.com for more information. For a non-technical introduction, see the article 
published in The Economist on predictive policy, “Don’t even think about it”, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582042-it-getting-easier-foresee-wrongdoing-
and-spot-likely-wrongdoers-dont-even-think-about-it. 
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Figure 7 - The storage, MapReduce, query and analytics stack of “big data” 
 
Source: OECD (2014). 
 
Figure 8 – Hadoop’s collaboration platform 
 
Source: OECD (2014). 
Big data applications are encompassing many sectors of the economy, but also many 
forms of innovation, including, increasingly, open innovation 2.0. The OECD reports the 
example of Ushahidi, a non-profit software company based in Nairobi, Kenya, which 
develops free and open-source software for data collection. Ushahidi’s products are 
provided as open source cloud computing platforms that allow users to create their own 
services on top of it. They are free services that enable programmers to collect 
information from multiple sources (i.e. “crowd-sourcing”) to create timelines and provide 
mapping services. In addition, a key component of the website is the use of mobile 
phones as a primary means to send and retrieve data. 
2.2.5 Trend 5: Connecting everything (the IoT)  
A parallel trend to the emergence of big data is the gradual extension of connectivity to 
objects and humans. Machine-to-Machine communication (M2M) is an enabler for Data 
Driven Innovation in many industrial applications and services, including logistics, 
manufacturing, and even health care. With 50 billion devices expected to be connected 
at the end of the decade, it is easy to recognize why M2M is considered as an upcoming 
revolution, likely to connect the “remaining 99%” of things and humans that have not 
yet been connected. Again, the “internet of everything” revolution will mean essentially 
an extension of the features of ICT (in particular, network effects, platformization and 
DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION FOR GROWTH AND WELL-BEING: INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT  
14  © OECD 2014 
25. As a result, more and more business are entering the “big data” market providing a wide range of 
technologies and services for data collection, integration, storage, analysis and visualization. The combined 
effect is the emergence of a “big data” ecosystem in which goods and services are developed for data-
driven applications across society. An analysis of this ecosystem reveals the following key types of 
players: (i) Internet service providers providing the backbone of the data ecosystem
7
, (ii) IT infrastructure 
providers offering data management tools and critical computing resources including, but not limited to, 
data storage servers, database management software, and cloud computing resources, (iii) data analytic 
providers who supply software solution for data analysis including data visualisation, (iv) data providers, 
mainly the consumers (see OECD, 2015, Chap. 6), governments through their open data initiatives (see 
OECD, 2015, Chap. 7), firms such as in particular data brokers and data market places (see OECD, 2015, 
Chap. 3), and increasingly owners of interconnected machines and systems (i.e. Internet of Things, see 
OECD, 2015, Chap. 2 and 10), and last but not least (vi) data-driven entrepreneurs, who build their 
innovation on top of the resources provided in the data ecosystem in areas such as retail, finance, 
advertisement, science (see OECD, 2015, Chap. 8) and health (see OECD, 2015, Chap. 9) to name a few.
8
 
The interaction between these players can be thought of through layers as shown in Figure 6, where the 
underlying layers provide goods and services to the upper layers. For example, data-driven entrepreneurs 
rely on access to data and analytic tools as well as to IT infrastructures such as cloud computing to provide 
their innovative services. 
Figure 6. The big data ecosystem as layers of key types of players 
 
 
26. Figure 6 does not reflect an important property of the big data ecosystem which is its inherently 
global nature. The big data ecosystem involves cross-border data flows due to the very global nature of the 
key players active in it and the global distribution of technologies and resources used for value creation. 
For example, data may be collected from consumers or devices located in one country through devices and 
apps developed in another country. The data may then be processed in a third country and used to improve 
marketing to the consumer in the first country and/or to other consumers around the globe. Furthermore, 
the ICT infrastructures used to perform data analytics including the data centres and the software will 
rarely be provided only within one national border, but also distributed around the globe to take advantage 
of the variations of several factors including, but not limited to, local work load, the environment (e.g. 
temperature and sun light), and skills and labour supply (and costs). For example, firms such as Kaggle
9
 
provide crowd-sourcing platforms on which governments, firms and individuals all over the world post 
their data and let others compete to produce the best analytic results (Rao, 2011).
10
 Moreover, many data-
driven services developed by entrepreneurs stand on the shoulders of giants who have made their 
innovative services (including their data) available via application programming interfaces (APIs), many of 
which are located in foreign countries. For example, Ushahidi, a non-profit software company based in 
Nairobi, Kenya, provides its data collection, visualisation, and interactive mapping service based on 
available APIs of Internet firms such as Google and Twitter (see next section). 
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re-intermediation) to many other sectors of the economy, even those that are typically 
characterised by more “linear” models of innovation, e.g. automotive and more generally 
manufacturing. Not surprisingly, large car manufacturers already call themselves “data 
companies”, and banks are reportedly trying to reconfigure their business models to 
become “digital platforms”.  
Such a transition is likely to bear very important consequences for the industrial 
organisation of several sectors, especially due to the foreseen transition towards the so-
called “factory of the future”. Many of the major economies are working on strategies for 
the creation of public-private platforms aimed at coordinating efforts and establishing 
standards for the Internet of Things and advanced manufacturing. This will imply a 
“cocktail” of many different technologies, including smart objects (the Internet of 
Things), advanced and secure cloud computing for central data storage, infrastructure 
and frequencies for multi-tech, always-on connectivity (starting with 5G wireless 
communications, but including sensor infrared technologies and others, e.g. Bluetooth); 
advanced robotics; 3D printing; and of course Big Data Analytics for optimized 
management of the supply chain. This will be coupled with granular business models 
that will enable mass customization and real-time reconfiguration of the supply chain. In 
Europe, this trend has been accompanied by an ambitious strategy originated by 
Germany with its Industrie 4.0 initiative launched already in 2011, and currently being 
scaled up at the pan-European level.  
2.2.6 Trend 6: The Internet of Value 
The last trend identified in this report for what concerns the evolution of the ICT 
ecosystem is the emergence of distributed architectures that promise to revolutionise 
the universe of transactions at the global level. In emerging sectors such as FinTech, 
distributed architectures born thanks to the Internet are reaching new levels of 
sophistication, and empower unprecedented, disruptive innovation. One key example is 
the BlockChain technology that backs all crypto-currencies such as BitCoin, and which 
empowers distributed processing of data, robust transaction verification and potential 
applications on a variety of platforms, including on virtual reality systems such as Oculus 
Rift or Google Cardboard. Among others, Taylor (2015) explains that both permissioned 
and unpermissioned BlockChains have tremendous potential in fields such as smart 
contracts, virtual transactions, dis-intermediated mortgage and investment markets, and 
many more, creating what some commentators have defined as the “Internet of 
Value”43.  
2.2.7 The real disruption: the combination of these trends 
All six trends outlined above are very important for the future of the ICT ecosystem. 
However, even more important is the fact that they are occurring at the same time. The 
combination of disruptive innovation in network architectures (e.g. BlockChain), new 
sensor and wireless communication technologies (e.g. 5G), nanotechnologies, robotics, 
and artificial intelligence is likely to create unprecedented possibilities for innovation, 
most often based on predominantly open standards and free/open source software, low 
entry barriers, and completely innovative funding and management arrangements. 
Section 2.3 below deals with ICT innovation also from this perspective.  
2.3 Innovation in the ICT ecosystem 
In this section we explore the consequences of the four main features of the ICT 
ecosystem, and the six trends identified in Section 2.2, for innovation and 
entrepreneurship. Accordingly, the next pages explore the various elements of the 
innovation ecosystem as identified in Section 1 of this report with specific reference to 
                                           
43  http://www.finextra.com/finextra-
downloads/newsdocs/The%20Fintech%202%200%20Paper.PDF 
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ICT. This section also explores the role of key innovation drivers and policies such as 
competition, intellectual property, and sector-specific regulation.  
2.3.1 Layers: co-evolution, co-dependency, expansion 
A clear understanding of the evolution of the Internet architecture is essential to define 
the peculiarities of innovation in the ICT ecosystem. The latter can be seen as the result 
of the simultaneous evolution of various layers and platforms, which retain their 
peculiarities in terms of the pace of evolution, the actors involved, the modes of 
interaction between players, and the mode of innovation that emerges. More specifically, 
Claffy and Clarke (2014, 2015) define the ICT ecosystem as a perfect setting for co-
evolution, and explore the natural rate of change of various components of the ICT 
ecosystem, where some interdependent actors have a natural tendency to evolve faster 
than others. In particular, they observe that “the rapid pace of Moore's Law drives rapid 
innovation in the private sector, lending advantage to those who invent, discover, or 
adapt to new technologies sooner than others. But as technology is integrated into 
industry and society, different parts of the ecosystem exhibit different dynamics, 
subjecting each part of the ecosystem to evolutionary constraints”.  
Figure 8 below provides a possible representation of the ICT ecosystem, developed by 
Clarke and Claffy (2015). This picture is almost identical to the one offered by Fransman 
and described in Figure 4 above: it is and based on the OSI layers, but including also 
end users (people). There, the physical (lowest) layer experiences a rate of change 
gated by labour and sources of capital, neither of which follow a Moore's Law cost 
function. The ongoing transition to optical fibre networks (still too slow in Europe) is 
expected to bring a quantum leap in capacity, which will pay returns for several decades. 
Cloud computing is another example of the interplay of Moore's law and capital 
investment. The large data centre infrastructures supporting cloud computing benefit 
from both rapidly advancing technology and ever increasing massive arrays of 
computers. The limit to the capacity of a data centre is not primarily Moore's Law, but 
construction and operational costs. 
At the Network layer (based on the Internet Protocol, or IP), the durability of the 
specifications of the core protocols provides a stable foundation for rapid innovation at 
other layers. At the application layer, the process of innovation is driven at almost frantic 
rates that Clarke and Claffy estimate as holding a potential of 10 improvements in 
underlying technology every 5 years. At the information layer, the creation, storage, 
search and retrieval of essentially all forms of data – information, content, knowledge – 
is moving on line (see Section 2.2.2 above). Finally, the people level displays a 
transformative empowerment from the deployment of technology in the hands of 
humans. But human capabilities in no way grow on a Moore’s Law curve. As observed by 
Clarke and Claffy (2015), “we do not get twice as smart, or twice as capable of 
processing information, every 18 months. So we drown in information overload, and call 
for even more technology to control the flood, which makes us even more dependent on 
the technology”.  
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Figure 9 – Layered ICT ecosystem, and pace of evolution 
 
Source: Clarke and Claffy (2015). 
 
These different paces of technology integration across the ecosystem also influence the 
stability and agility of firms. Companies that have invested in physical assets like fibre to 
the home, towers or data centres can sometimes earn a stable place in the ecosystem 
through that investment, although a bad technology bet can leave them disadvantaged 
by a stranded investment. Firms with extensive physical infrastructure investments also 
cannot easily move, and typically remain domestic except by merger and acquisition of 
firms in other countries. In contrast, firms at higher layers are more likely based on an 
idea (like Facebook) than on heavy capital investment. The commercial ecosystem 
experiences constant pressure from application innovators to seek new capabilities from 
the physical layer (e.g., more capacity to the home), while the investment in those 
capabilities must be made by a different set of firms. According to Clarke and Claffy 
(2015), “this tension is a classic example of co-dependency and co-evolution within the 
industrial part of the ecosystem, where applications are limited in their ability to evolve 
by the rate at which the physical layer can evolve. Because the application layer depends 
on the physical layer, the application layer cannot simply out-evolve the physical layer, 
but is gated by it”44. 
Based on the above, it is reasonable to expect what follows: 
 Innovation takes place in different ways across layers. More traditional, R&D based 
innovation characterises hardware layers, even if open, distributed innovation models 
are becoming more commonplace also in those layers. To the contrary, the 
application layer is typically characterised by new business models and organisational 
innovation, rather than by new technological improvements. And while openness 
seems to be an increasingly defining feature of all layers of the ICT ecosystem, the 
degree of granularity reached by more virtualized layers such as cloud-based 
platforms and application is unrivalled in the “physical layer”. 
 Co-evolution: the pace of innovation differs across layers. The higher the layer, the 
more intangible the investment behind new products and services, the faster the 
pace of innovation. This applies also to the competitive race for each layer: while the 
physical layer has shown a relative degree of stability over time, the higher layers 
feature a constant rise and fall of dominant players, and even when players manage 
to remain prominent for a significant period of time, they do so at the cost of 
massive investment in new products and services, new markets, and in the 
acquisition of smaller players.  
 Co-dependency: the pace of innovation at each layer is dependent on the evolution 
of other layers. The existence of a robust, high capacity network and the 
                                           
44  See Clarke and Claffy (2015). 
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development of facilities such as Internet exchanges and data storage networks 
determine the evolution of the higher layers. For example, the App economy could 
develop only when the underlying mobile infrastructure and cloud platforms became 
well developed. And countries in which the infrastructure has greater capacity 
experience more developed and dynamic application and content layers. The video 
streaming market, for example, could develop earlier in the United States also 
thanks to the existence of high-speed broadband networks such as Cable operators 
using DOCSIS 3.0 and optical fibre networks built by ISPs.  
 Expansion. The ICT ecosystem is not static: the Internet is in constant expansion. 
This has to be fully taken into account before an ICT-specific innovation policy is 
conceived: the peculiarities of the ICT ecosystem are gradually permeating the 
dynamics of innovation and the re-intermediation of many other sectors, and they 
are also creating entirely new sectors. This is one of the aspects that make the ICT 
ecosystem most intractable for policymakers: as its peculiarities evolve, its specificity 
is declining, and its pervasiveness and sheer magnitude are rising.  
 
Box 5 - Models of ICT innovation – the findings of two EURIPIDIS papers 
Gabison (2015) addresses the issue of how relevant is the ICT sector in Europe, and 
offers a macroeconomic perspective of the birth and death of firms in the manufacturing 
and service sub-sectors of ICT. He finds that ICT companies constituted only 4.6% of all 
companies in 2011 and a similarly tiny fraction of employment. However, the number of 
ICT service companies was growing steadily, and the ICT service sector was growing 
much faster than the ICT manufacturing sector (which actually, appears to be shrinking 
in terms of number of firms, with deaths outpacing births). ICT service companies 
represented three out of every four ICT companies; and almost nine in every ten new 
ICT companies were ICT service companies. Consistently, the ratio of high-growth ICT 
service companies is larger than that of ICT manufacturing and ICT wholesale 
companies. Other important findings are that jobs created by new manufacturing and by 
ICT manufacturing companies do not compensate for jobs destroyed by exiting 
companies; and that new ICT companies tend to survive more often and grow faster 
than new non-ICT companies. While this is certainly useful information, the unavailability 
of data for a breakdown per layer of the ICT ecosystem prevents a full appraisal of 
modes of innovation prevailing for each layer, in line with what observed above and 
predicted, although qualitatively, by Fransman (2014) and also by Claffy and Clarke 
(2015). 
Biagi et al. (2015) can be usefully complemented by a reading of Puissochet (2015), as 
the former study provides a structured and solid empirical study that offers evidence on 
simple and complex indicators of innovative activity of the ICT sector, compared to the 
overall economy, using CIS data for the period 2004-2012 for 20 EU countries; whereas 
the latter offers an observation of 10 French SMEs mostly active as Specialised 
Technology Suppliers, and chosen by the author as examples of innovative SMEs in the 
ICT sector. The results confirm that: 
 The ICT sector is especially innovative, both in terms of share of firms (among ICT 
firms) performing R&D and in terms of firms producing technological (product or 
process innovation) or generic (product or process or organizational or marketing) 
innovation. In particular, ICT firms tend to have in-house R&D capability and 
introduce new-to-the-market product or process innovations. This finding is mirrored 
by the empirical observation of R&D intensity in ICT (Comino and Manenti, 2015), as 
well by anecdotal evidence offered by Puissochet. 
 Geographical proximity is still important. Biagi et al (2015) find that cooperation with 
entities within the home country is more likely than cooperation with entities within 
the EU, which is more likely than cooperation with entities external to the EU.  
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 Innovation systems appear incomplete, or only partly working. For example, 
interaction with universities and research centres appears very limited both in Biagi 
et al (2015) and in Puissochet (2015). Both papers observe that internal and market 
sources of knowledge are more relevant than education and research centres. 
 IPRs appear to play a limited role. Both Biagi et al (2015) and Puissochet (2015) 
conclude that IPRs are not perceived as important drivers of competitive advantage, 
whereas secrecy and lead time advantage seem to matter more. This is likely to be 
due to the fact that the current institutional setting governing IPR reduces their 
relevance as a competitiveness driver for ICT firms.  
 Key barriers to innovation include lack of finance, lack of qualified personnel and 
uncertainty over demand. Here too, both studies reach the same conclusion. 
Puissochet (2015) observes that public funding - largely focused on R&D - seems 
efficient for the support of start-ups and new companies. It can be said that 
generally, in France, companies see public funding of R&D as satisfying. Research tax 
credit and zero rate lending for R&D are widely used and much appreciated. Raising 
private funds is more difficult, especially raising funds for commercial and 
international development. Most of the private funding observed happened during the 
initial stages of the company, but getting funding thereafter for more ambitious 
growth seems almost impossible. 
2.3.2 The entrepreneurial function  
In the ICT ecosystem, entrepreneurs can be defined in different ways, and no unique 
definition has arisen to date (Bogdanowicz, 2015). A definition of “Web entrepreneur” 
adopted in a recent study for the European Commission refers to “an umbrella term that 
covers start-up founders who build innovative and often disruptive businesses on top of 
the Internet, mobile and various cloud-based technologies, programming interfaces and 
platforms”45. However, an entrepreneur is not necessarily the inventor of a new product 
or service, but rather the actor that ensures the diffusion of new ideas by providing 
means and audience to it. In this respect, the entrepreneurial function in the ICT 
ecosystem seems to be split between different types of players, all of which are essential 
for the ecosystem to thrive.  
Box 6 – Measuring digital entrepreneurship: a EURIPIDIS paper by Marc 
Bogdanowicz 
The EURIPIDIS Report authored by Marc Bogdanowicz explores the concept of digital 
entrepreneurship and the current measurement frameworks that support the empirical 
analysis of entrepreneurship, its determinants, performance and impacts. The report 
shows that a robust theoretical economic foundation for entrepreneurship has developed 
within the Schumpeterian perspective. This theoretical foundation justifies the interest of 
policy makers in entrepreneurship in advanced economies - an interest that is currently 
rooted in policies for SMEs and business conditions. To capture the digital aspect of 
entrepreneurship, the report proposes the following definitions: (i) Digital entrepreneurs 
are those persons who seek to generate value, through the creation or expansion of 
economic activity, by identifying and exploiting new ICT or ICT-enabled products, 
processes and corresponding markets. (ii) Digital entrepreneurial activity is the 
enterprising human action in pursuit of the generation of value, through the creation or 
expansion of economic activity, by identifying and exploiting new ICT or ICT-enabled 
products, processes and corresponding markets. (iii) Digital entrepreneurship is the 
phenomenon associated with digital entrepreneurial activity.  
                                           
45  See: 
file:///Users/ar376/Downloads/Open%20platforms%20for%20web%E2%80%90based%20appl
ications.pdf  
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The report states that today data availability and the emergence of the Internet make it 
possible and worthwhile to investigate the peculiarities of entrepreneurship in the digital 
sphere. The report investigates 12 existing measurement frameworks, and 6 additional 
recent mapping frameworks .This investigation leads to the following main observations:  
- the large majority of the above frameworks have no or weak links with innovation, 
the central concept of entrepreneurship in the Schumpeterian perspective.  
- most of these frameworks focus on the creation of new firms and neglect the 
entrepreneurial activity within existing firms.  
- finally, the ICT dimension is usually absent.  
These three missing aspects – innovation, 'intrapreneurship', and ICT – mean that there 
is little support for digital entrepreneurship policy making in the current empirical 
frameworks and their results.  
The report recommends that existing measurement frameworks be used to create a new 
tool targeted at data collection and analysis of digital entrepreneurship in support of 
policy making for the long-term conception, monitoring and evaluation of European 
digital entrepreneurship policies. Three operational options are proposed:  
1. The large body of surveys, analysis and research on the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) and the Global Entrepreneurship Index (GEDI) testify of two decades of 
academic work and policy support. Adapting their existing theoretical and empirical 
frameworks to digital entrepreneurship would allow to benefit from past and current 
analysis capacity.  
2. The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) is an iconic European survey which explores 
innovation at firm level. While it serves different purposes, expanding the range of its 
questions, adapting some of its structural characteristics (panel) and/or bridging its 
micro-data with other existing surveys could be envisaged.   
3. A range of recent mapping initiatives have been undertaken to investigate the 
existence and dynamics of digital start-ups and their ecosystems. These initiatives could 
be specifically nurtured bearing in mind that they were, more than other measurement 
frameworks, designed ex-ante to focus on ICT.  
The report concludes that a renewed political interest in digital entrepreneurship calls for 
renewed empirical evidence. Current policies still rely on past concepts, tools and 
analysis that mainly address SMEs and business demographic issues, and usually leave 
aside innovation, technology and in-house entrepreneurial activity. Contemporary 
economic and political thinking deserves a better understanding of the nexus 
entrepreneurship / ICT-enabled innovation / economic growth. The report suggests that 
empirical tools still need to be developed that would allow us to gather and analyse the 
evidence about digital entrepreneurship that is necessary for the conception, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies. 
 
To be sure, the existence of young, talented and skilled, risk-loving individuals can lead 
to the flourishing of innovation in the ICT ecosystem, mostly in the higher layers. A 
relatively more concentrated and stable market structure is required at the physical 
layer for the testing and development of innovation. This is potentially testified by the 
fact that large companies are still holding the majority of patents in those layers: in 
wireless networking, for example, market concentration is increasing significantly with 
the merger of Nokia and Alcatel-Lucent, and the recently expanded patent cross-
licensing agreement between rival companies Ericsson and Huawei 46. These players, 
                                           
46  Under the terms of the agreement, both firms will able to access and implement standard 
essential patents (SEP) for the likes of GSM, UMTS and LTE. Holders of SEPs are required to 
offer other companies licenses under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. 
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although with varying degree, orchestrate the evolution of technology in this part of the 
physical layer by coupling open innovation models with a fairly stable market structure. 
In this respect, they represent the existing platforms through which a smaller technology 
supplier can reach the market.  
While in the physical layer large R&D-based companies seem to be increasingly playing 
the role of catalysts of external R&D through the development and refinement of open 
innovation models, higher layers depend on the essential role of platforms as online 
intermediaries. Not only large platforms such as Google, Amazon or Facebook provide 
“eyeballs” to new products: their rivalry has led them to gradually shift to open models 
to gain competitive advantage and exploit it against their rivals through a strategy that 
chiefly depends on the maximization of applications. This led players like Amazon and 
Google to develop a wholly new menu of services for entrepreneurs, which range from 
training on specific computer and management skills to the provision of free storage 
space, traffic acceleration services, and mentoring services47.  
More generally, the role and intensity of economies of scale and network effects seems 
to vary across the layers of the ICT ecosystem. On the one hand, the physical layer 
displays high fixed costs and strong direct network effects, leading to economies of 
scale. On the other hand, the application layer, even more under the ongoing 
platformization, is not always characterized by high fixed costs (CAPEX is typically much 
greater for telecom companies than for online platforms), and even more importantly is 
pervaded by indirect network externalities and the growing importance of data 
availability: while the former factor seems to lead to short-term barriers to entry (so-
called “competition for the market”, rather than “in the market”), the latter does not 
seem to represent a real barrier to entry as of today, judging from the ongoing 
proliferation of new companies that base on big data their business model. Even more 
importantly, the layered architecture of the ICT ecosystem leads to shifting “points of 
control” (as defined by Robin Mansell48): as the ecosystem becomes platformized, lower 
layers become increasingly commoditized, and the most prominent platforms (i.e. the 
strongest layer of the architecture, as well as the most concentrated one) shifts 
upwards. As an example, the strongest layer of the ICT ecosystem has moved from the 
physical layer (e.g. microprocessors) to operating systems (Windows), Browsers (Exlorer 
and then Chrome), and now cloud platforms (Android, iOS, Azure, AWS). As the 
powerful platforms move upwards, previously concentrated (lower) layers become more 
competitive (e.g. hardware, operating systems) and entry barriers at higher layers 
collapse (e.g. in the app layer today). 
Even higher in the Internet layered architecture, platforms in cloud computing and Web 
2.0 applications increasingly depart from the firm-centric appearance described by 
Fransman, to assume a more shared and open configuration. Examples include the 
already-mentioned Hadoop, Spark and Blockchain platforms, which largely rely on open 
source-type cooperation between various types of players and programmers.  
In addition, as innovation is defined as a function of its impact on social welfare (see 
above, Section 1), then also the public sector is to be considered as performing 
entrepreneurial functions. More specifically, governments play the role of entrepreneurs 
both in terms of funding high risk-high reward basic research projects (Mazzucato, 
2013), but also by making it easier for digital innovators to use the facilities they would 
need to develop their ideas. Mechanisms such as DARPA’s Fast Track Initiatives in the 
US or the European Commission innovation vouchers provide small contracts to 
individuals, which diversify the range of ideas for projects that receive funding. Similar 
                                                                                                                                   
Read more at http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/networks/carriers/ericsson-huawei-patent-
licence-183829#7ewaFbQ4gRXZHRWL.99 
47  See: https://cloud.google.com/files/esg-whitepaper.pdf and 
https://www.googleforentrepreneurs.com/  
48  See Mansell, Robin (2015) Platforms of power. Intermedia, 43 (1). pp. 20-24. ISSN 0309-
118X. 
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approaches are being used to support citizen science and crowdsourcing projects. Here 
too, as the ICT ecosystem expands to encompass other sectors of the economy, these 
peculiarities might become common traits shared by several different economic sectors.  
2.3.3 Funding ICT start-ups: a multitude of channels 
In the ICT ecosystem, not unlike other sectors of the economy, access to finance is one 
of the key obstacles to innovation and would-be entrepreneurs. Small companies and 
individual entrepreneurs still find it difficult, especially in Europe, to access sufficient 
seed funding in order to bridge the so-called “valley of death”, which separates the 
implementation of an innovative business idea from break-even through commercial 
revenues.  
Over the past decades, Venture Capital has been considered to be the most 
appropriate form of financing for innovative firms in high-tech sectors (Koutroumpis et 
al. 2015). Studies have identified a positive link between VC funding, innovation, and 
firm performance, while others have shown that innovative firms are more likely to 
receive funding than imitators. Increases in VC activity in an industry are associated with 
significantly higher patenting rates too, while in Europe VC has helped innovative firms 
to reach IPOs in European stock markets. Over the period 1991-2005, VC has accounted 
for more than 10% of industrial innovation in Europe, and its success was mostly 
concentrated in countries with lower barriers to entrepreneurship, with a tax and 
regulatory environment that welcomes venture capital investment, and with lower taxes 
on capital gains. In spite of these effects there is a growing strand of literature 
suggesting that causality runs from patents to VC, or put another way, that innovation 
creates a demand for VC and not VC a supply of innovation49. Even more importantly, 
part of the literature has highlighted that high technology firms backed by VC are likely 
to outperform their non-VC-backed counterparts due to the active monitoring and 
coaching that VC firms undertake to their portfolio companies, and the signal of quality 
that VC investment conveys.  
 
Box 7  – Venture capital principles in the ICT ecosystem – a EURIPIDIS paper 
by Garry Gabison 
The EURIPIDIS report on venture capital authored by Garry Gabison (2015) addresses 
important issues such as: How do venture capital funds finance companies? How do they 
select start-ups? How do they affect ICT companies and innovation? Since venture 
capital funds invest in young, small, and innovative companies, their fund managers 
must defeat information asymmetries to invest profitably. They rely on signals about the 
entrepreneur (education, past experience, etc.) and about the companies (patent filed, 
turnover, etc.) to invest. This report focuses on the funds and their decisions. Once they 
invest, fund managers must face up to two problems. First, there is a moral hazard 
problem: when entrepreneurs receive an investment, they gain control of the funds and 
may not use them as agreed. Second, fund managers face an agency problem: when 
they invest, they separate capital from management and this separation means that the 
entrepreneur's and fund manager's incentives become misaligned. Therefore, fund 
managers resort to stage financing, monitoring, and exit incentives to ensure that 
entrepreneurs spend the invested money as agreed and remain motivated to perform. 
Funds invest in innovative companies because they generally generate higher returns 
upon exit. Venture capital funds often tend to select innovative companies and make 
them even more innovative. Patents and patent portfolios have been used by investors 
to measure the innovation potential of companies and subsequently invest. Patents, 
though not being a perfect measure of innovation, allow entrepreneurs to signal to 
                                           
49   See Geronikolaou, G. and G. Papachristou, "Venture Capital and Innovation in Europe," 
Modern Economy 3 (2012). 
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venture capital fund managers how ripe their companies are for investment. Because 
venture capital funds must monitor their investment, the venture capital markets usually 
remain local. Even within Europe, venture capital funds tend to invest within their 
national borders: venture capital funds of a given country highly correlate (0.92) to the 
funds received by companies of a given country. According to 2013 data, the Czech 
Republic, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom were the main beneficiaries of the 
little cross-border investment occurring in Europe. The EU has passed regulations to 
facilitate cross-border investment. The European Investment Fund has invested in many 
funds to help catalyse additional funds. The financial returns may seem low at 4.2% in 
2013 as compared to the private sector but the social impact could be greater than this 
number would imply. 
Venture capital is, however, not the only source of financing available to ICT firms. One 
peculiarity of the ICT ecosystem is the greater importance of distributed platforms for 
the funding of innovative products. The relative ease of development of prototypes and 
beta application versions in the ICT ecosystem, and the fact that innovation in higher 
layers is most likely featuring very low entry barriers and low start-up costs, is creating 
new opportunities for funding innovation, in particular through the proliferation of 
crowdfunding platforms. However, crowdfunding is still in its infancy in Europe, 
whereas in the United States it already led to the success of wearables such as the 
Pebble Watch50; gaming solutions such as Ouya51 and Oculus Rift52; Robots like Jibo53; 
connected-home systems such as Canary 54 ; and many more. A recent report by 
Massolutions shows the dramatic rise of crowdfunding volumes, poised to overtake 
Venture Capital in 201655.  
Public support schemes for ICT start-ups and scale-ups are another channel available 
to entrepreneurs. Schemes such as the US SBIR, the UK SBRI and the Horizon 2020 
SME Instrument, as well as the Start-up Europe initiative and the innovation vouchers at 
the EU level, all aim at providing entrepreneurs with funding to test and commercialise 
their innovative business ideas. In addition, the use of prizes, pay-per-success schemes 
and challenges is on the increase, particularly in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom.  
Finally, and importantly, funding and support for start-ups is provided by large ICT 
companies that adopt an open innovation model, and by platforms seeking to 
maximise the number of their applications to beat competition and establish themselves 
as de facto industry standards. For example, Google for Entrepreneurs provides financial 
support, mentoring, training to thousands of entrepreneurs at the global level56; through 
FbStart, Facebook provides start-ups with an exclusive community, worldwide events, 
mentorship, and up to $80,000 in free tools and services57; Amazon Launchpad makes it 
easy for start-ups to launch, market, and distribute their products to hundreds of 
millions of Amazon customers across the globe, with benefits including a streamlined 
onboarding experience, custom product pages, a comprehensive marketing package, 
and access to Amazon’s global fulfilment network; Microsoft helps companies in their 
start-up and subsequent phases through its BizSpark and Ventures programmes58. In 
                                           
50  https://getpebble.com/ 
51  http://www.ouya.tv/ 
52  www.oculus.com/en-us 
53  http://www.jibo.com/ 
54  http://www.canary.is/ 
55  http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2015/06/09/trends-show-crowdfunding-to-
surpass-vc-in-2016/2/ 
56  https://www.googleforentrepreneurs.com/startup-communities/  
57  https://fbstart.com/ 
58  https://www.microsoft.com/bizspark/about/. https://www.microsoftventures.com/programs  
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addition, companies like Huawei, Ericsson, Nokia, AT&T, Verizon, Orange, Deutsche 
Telekom all have programs for start-ups59. 
As will be explained in Section 3 below, there are significant differences in the availability 
of these channels for start-up funding in different countries, both within the EU and 
between the EU and other parts of the world. In particular, the relative availability of 
venture capital and crowdfunding, as well as the design of public support schemes, 
places the US and a number of EU countries (the UK, Scandinavian countries, the 
Netherlands) in a more advantageous position compared to most Southern and Eastern 
European countries. Likewise, specific regions have specialised in the development of 
hardware and software products despite the inherently global nature of the ICT 
ecosystem: for example, the software cluster in Bangalore, the Silicon Valley, European 
ICT poles of excellence such as Munich, London and Paris, emerging accelerators such as 
Berlin’s The Factory and Tech City in London display the combination of infrastructure, 
knowledge and intermediaries that is needed for start-ups to flourish60. To the contrary, 
ambitious attempts such as Russia’s Skolkovo campus have failed to create fertile 
ground for start-ups to blossom61.  
 
Box 8 – Understanding Crowdfunding – a EURIPIDIS paper by Garry Gabison 
Another EURIPIDIS paper is “Understanding Crowdfunding and Its Regulations”, 
authored by Garry Gabison (2015). This paper provides an interesting analysis of a 
phenomenon that was enabled by the diffusion of Internet connectivity, and the analysis 
focuses on crowdfunding as a potential way to overcome the often-declared problems in 
access to finance that affect most sectors, including the ICT sector in Europe. 
Crowdfunding is seen as a potential way to go beyond the traditional methods of 
financing businesses and innovation and as a potential way to address this barrier to 
innovation, and its potential appears significant in ICT. The report contains an 
explanation of how crowdfunding campaigns and platforms function and identifies four 
declinations of crowdfunding: donation, reward, lending, and equity crowdfunding. The 
report also explains that crowdfunding does not come without its drawbacks, since 
entrepreneurs must disclose information; the crowd is also exposed to potential 
fraudulent schemes, since most transactions are conducted over the Internet and are 
often far from transparent. The report focuses on equity crowdfunding because they 
involve higher funds, and surveys existing regulations in Italy, the United Kingdom, and 
France and proposed legislation in the United States, where crowdfunding has already 
emerged even in the absence of a fully defined legal framework.   
2.3.4 Users and skills 
Another key peculiarity of the ICT ecosystem, at least for the time being, is the growing 
importance of the human factor, considered as an increasingly scarce resource. The 
European Commission has long denounced the emerging skills mismatch in Europe, 
looking at the slower pace of skills update compared to technology update: “skills 
development does not come about as fast as technological development, which is why 
we are faced with a paradoxical situation: although millions of Europeans are currently 
without a job, while companies have a hard time finding skilled digital technology 
experts. As a result, there could be up to 825,000 unfilled vacancies for ICT … 
professionals by 2020”. Notably, missing skills do not include only ICT-related 
                                           
59  http://techcrunch.com/2014/11/11/deutsche-telekom-launches-620m-fund-will-focus-on-
german-startups-and-pe-deals/; Orange Fab. 
60  http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_IT_Report_2015.pdf; 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC85408/eipe_summary_final_jrc85
408.pdf  
61  http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/06/the-short-life-and-speedy-death-of-russias-silicon-valley-
medvedev-go-russia-skolkovo/  
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technical skills, but also, and importantly, managerial skills, which themselves 
explain a portion of the productivity gap between the United States and Europe in ICT: 
both these skills are part of the core entrepreneurial skills62. 
In many parts of the world, the emergence of ICT as an enabling technology and the 
gradual expansion of the ICT ecosystem into other sectors, not just as ICT-using but as 
fundamentally ICT-powered, has led policymakers to develop specific policies to promote 
so-called STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) education even in 
early school years. Recently, in the United States the Obama administration launched a 
$4 billion programme dedicated to Computer Science, with the aim to increase access to 
K-12 CS by training teachers, expanding access to high-quality instructional materials, 
and building effective regional partnerships. In the EU a recent report for the European 
Parliament highlighted “persisting skills shortages in STEM fields in spite of high 
unemployment levels in many Member States”63.  
Needless to say, skills and computer literacy are needed also from a user’s perspective, 
in order to ensure the uptake of new technologies. And these skills are increasingly 
subject to obsolescence in the ICT sector, as a consequence of shorter product life cycles 
and fast innovation rates. A high quality secondary and tertiary education constitutes a 
fundamental ingredient of the so-called “knowledge triangle”: as a matter of fact, when 
universities produce skilled graduates and high quality basic (ICT) research, and the 
legal and business environment offers the chance to translate such research in applied 
research and then innovative products, then the whole sector can profit from a more 
dynamic flow of ideas and cross-fertilization in innovation. In a recent study, Osborne 
and Frey (2013) showed that as much as 47% of existing jobs are at risk of 
computerisation in the coming years (see figure below). A recent report for DG 
Employment also highlights the challenges that this trend will create for the labour 
market in Europe64; and researchers from Bruegel have applied the framework created 
by Osborne and Frey to European data, showing results that are even more worrying, 
with 54% of jobs on average being at risk of computerisation. Even more recent work by 
James Bessen (2015) shows that the ongoing technological revolution is more likely to 
create a skills shortage than a job shortage: a finding that points at the education 
system as responsible for creating the skills needed, with the speed required65. 
In this respect, it is clear that the challenges that are already perceived today will only 
become more pressing in the coming years. Evidence from global markets suggests that 
many industrialized countries do not compete anymore on low salaries, but rather on the 
availability of reliable authorities, world-class infrastructure and, most importantly, a 
highly educated and skilled workforce. This is why re-launching Europe’s objectives in 
higher education is key to Europe’s future innovation and employment policies. As shown 
in recent research performed at the JRC, this may require fundamental changes in the 
way learning occurs both at school and university, and over the course of individual life 
(see i.a. Redecker et al. 2011; Kampylis et al. 2015), and this in turn requires a new 
framework for entrepreneurial competences (Komarkova et al. 2015). Figure 9 below 
shows the mix of entrepreneurial competences as developed by Komarkova et al. 2015. 
 
                                           
62  http://eskills4jobs.ec.europa.eu/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=b69ba1d7-6db4-415d-82e4-
ac4d700a38b8&groupId=2293353  
63  See: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/542199/IPOL_STU(2015)542199
_EN.pdf  
64  For a literature review, se http://epthinktank.eu/2015/05/11/tackling-long-term-
unemployment-in-the-eu/  
65  Bessen, James E., How Computer Automation Affects Occupations: Technology, Jobs, and 
Skills (November 13, 2015). Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper 
No. 15-49. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2690435 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2690435 
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Figure 10 – Summary of entrepreneurial competences 
 
Source: Komarkova et al. (2015), Figure 23. 
2.4 Consequences of the ICT ecosystem for policymaking: 
sectoral and horizontal policies 
After identifying the main features of the ICT ecosystem, its current evolution and the 
consequences for the nature and pace of innovation in various parts of the ecosystem, 
this section reflects on the consequences for innovation policy and “horizontal policies” 
(i.e. policies not directly related to innovation, but anyway relevant for innovation) in the 
ICT ecosystem. Section 2.4.1 below deals with innovation policies such as intellectual 
property protection and direct support for entrepreneurship. Section 2.4.2 reflects on the 
role of horizontal policies such as competition policy, sector-specific regulation and data 
protection regulation. Section 2.4.3 takes an even broader approach and reflects on the 
role of better regulation and flexible regulatory approaches in the ICT ecosystem.  
2.4.1 Innovation policy instruments: Intellectual Property Rights 
When it comes to policies for ICT innovation, the peculiarities identified in Sections 2.1, 
the trends highlighted in Section 2.2 and the features of innovation as described in 
Section 2.3 lead to the definition of specific approaches to the choice and design of 
policy instruments. In particular, it is useful to reflect on the role of intellectual property 
rights in the context of ICT markets. 
First, there is no doubt that the patent system still plays a fundamental role in 
spurring incentives to invest in R&D at the lower layers of the ICT ecosystem, and in 
particular at the physical layer. Recent research confirmed that even smaller firms such 
as specialised technology suppliers can rely on the patent system to signal their value 
and to exploit their patent portfolio as a “bargaining chip” in negotiations with larger 
firms (see box on JRC research on IPRs). For example, Comino and Manenti (2015) 
report several studies that show that possessing a large stock of patents increases the 
chances of start-ups and SMEs of being financed by venture capitalists (Cockburn and 
MacGarvie, 2009). 
However, especially at higher layers of the ICT ecosystem where innovation seems to be 
less dependent on R&D, it is important to avoid excessive rigidity in the patent system in 
order not to hamper the needs of new business models by creating incentives to 
accumulate patents and use them “as a sword” against innovative products and services. 
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In particular, technological fragmentation and the rise of system goods have led to the 
emergence of patent “thickets”. As widely acknowledged in the literature, stronger 
IPRs can incentivise disruptive innovation, but can also raise the cost of follow-on, 
incremental innovation (Landes and Posner 2003). Recently, some scholars have 
stressed how the IPR system in the United States has become “sand rather than 
lubricant in the wheels of American progress” and needs a deep reform (Jaffe and 
Learner, 2004), while others go even further by arguing its gradual abolition (Boldrin 
and Levine, 2012). Possible solutions rely on the ability of platform operators to 
“contract into liability rules” either by avoiding the clear definition of IPRs, or by creating 
patent pools or other complex forms of IPR governance.66 In these settings, forms of 
abusive exploitation of IPRs have emerged, including strategic behaviour during 
standardization and patent pooling processes, collective action and multiple 
marginalization problems (royalty stacking), patent trolling behaviour and others. While 
this evidence appears much clearer in the United States (where a revision of patent 
legislation is currently under-way exactly to avoid these types of phenomena), also 
Europe potentially displays these problems. The flip of the coin is that in the United 
States large IPR intermediaries are much more developed than in Europe, and range 
from patent exchanges (e.g. Ocean Tomo) to large-scale managers of patent portfolios 
(e.g. MPEG LA). At the same time, the new unitary patent system that EU countries are 
about to adopt is expected to have a strong impact, but could also lead to enhanced 
forms of “trolling” (or what authors call activities by Patent Assertion Entities), which can 
have both positive and negative effects, particularly in the ICT sector, where they are 
most likely to emerge67.  
Given the different pace and modes of innovation at different layers of the ICT 
ecosystem, a reflection on the possible differentiation of IPR policy seems appropriate. In 
the co-evolutionary, co-dependent setting that we described in Section 2.2 above, 
should policymakers significantly modify IP legislation to avoid stifling innovation? 
Currently, the evidence is still too thin to advocate change: however, the following 
observations suggest that the debate might become important in the future: 
 Especially in the ICT ecosystem, some companies reportedly prefer to rely on trade 
secret rather than patent law (McGurk and Lu, 2015; Biagi, Pesole and Stancic 
2015)68. This is particularly important in the ICT ecosystem, since the predominance 
of information goods exposes the sector to an enhanced risk of appropriation and 
free riding, both at the domestic and at the international level. A recent OECD study 
surveys the economic importance of trade secret, and related importance of its 
protection69.  
 Some of the layers of the ICT ecosystem display a nascent, rather different 
combination of business models and IP management practices. As illustrated above, 
some of the leading IT companies (platforms) are taking a clear stance in favour of 
                                           
66  Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1293. 
67  As Comino and Manenti (2015) define them, “PAEs are certainly the most controversial type of 
intermediary: they are responsible for an increasing number of patent lawsuits, but they may 
also significantly improve market liquidity and help SMEs to monetise the value of their IPRs. 
The available evidence on patent intermediaries and PAEs is US-based while little is known for 
Europe”. 
68  file:///Users/ar376/Downloads/IP%20Research%20Trade%20Secrets_web.pdf; 
http://hstlj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-Intersection-of-Patents-and-Trade-
Secrets.pdf  
69  OECD (2013), Approaches To Protection of Undisclosed Information (Trade Secrets) - 
Background Paper OECD Trade Policy Paper No. 162, by Mark F. Schultz and Douglas C. 
Lippoldt. TAD/TC/WP(2013)21/FINAL.  
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open business models, and have publicly announced that they will not claim 
exclusivity nor licensing fees on their intellectual property70.  
 In the already mentioned case of BlockChain, previous attempts to create a viable, 
open, permissionless distributed database were reportedly hampered by the 
existence of patents on a number of key technological features (then expired in 
1996). BitCoin was initially not patented, and use of the patent system, if anything, 
has been sought to contain their diffusion (by JP Morgan, but the patent application 
was rejected as not novel). The reaction to these attempts has been the decision, by 
Coinbase, to file nine patent applications to be used as a “shield” against similar 
attempts 71 . Previous architecture innovation and open source threads such as 
Gnutella have reportedly been key in the development of the BlockChain model72. All 
of this creates, today, a viable alternative to the IP-based model of innovation: that 
of so called “permissionless innovation”, mostly based on open source software and 
open standards. However, it must be recalled that permissionless innovation is 
happening in specific provinces of the ICT ecosystem, not in all, and it can also 
happen through a combination of patents and open standards, not necessarily only 
through open standards (Chien, 2015)73.  
In other words, at least in some sectors of the ICT ecosystem the original “innovation by 
exclusion” paradigm of patents is being replaced by a rather different context, in which 
patents are either no claimed at all; they are used only as shields to avoid strategic 
behaviour and free riding by rivals; or they are used to consolidate and then share 
system goods based on a multitude of technologies. The recently updated guide to 
alternative patent licensing produced by the Juelsgaard Intellectual Property & 
Innovation Clinic at Stanford Law School in partnership with EFF and Engine provides a 
high-level overview of several tools that inventors and innovators could use today to 
avert unnecessary and costly patent litigation (or at least to avoid “trollish behaviour” 
themselves). The tools fall roughly into three categories74:  
                                           
70  Most notably, Google’s “non-assertion pledge” on cloud-related technology offers a clear 
example of how openness stances can prevail over those of closed business models in some of 
the layers of the ICT ecosystem. Likewise, Tesla’s decision to open up its patents on core 
technologies related to electric vehicles was received by commentators as a sign that the 
patent system can, under some circumstances, act as an obstacle to innovative, disruptive 
business models. Following this announcement, Toyota and Ford made similar announcements. 
In February 2015, LG promised to open its 29,000 patents to SMEs, and an even bigger 
number to start-ups. Also companies like Panasonic (for the Internet of Things), Facebook and 
Blockstream (in 3D printing, Bitcoin, and drones) and Daewoo, Samsung, Hyundai Motors, and 
Lotte (in a variety of sectors) are following similar strategies. 
71  But the system itself was born with very limited intellectual property protection: the CEO of 
one company active in the BitCoin sphere, BitPay, reports that: “in the early days (2011) of 
BitPay we spent some time filing provisional patents (one on decentralized bitcoin exchanges 
and the other related to clearing and settlement): I felt like it was a complete waste of time 
and money … Why spend money on patents and copyrights when I could simply make these 
inventions available to anyone and profit from the increased utility of bitcoin?” Coinbase CEO 
explained that the intent of the patents were not to drive smaller companies out of business, 
but to protect themselves from services “engaging in patent warfare.” Still many in the 
community were not pleased by this response calling Coinbase “evil” and asking how they can 
patent ideas they did not invent. http://cointelegraph.com/news/115337/coinbase-on-bitcoin-
patents-dont-hate-the-player-hate-the-game  
72  http://www.ofnumbers.com/2015/07/09/a-blockchain-with-emphasis-on-the-a/ 
73  Chien, Colleen V., Exclusionary and Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law (June 29, 2015). 
Southern California Law Review, Forthcoming; Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 18-15. Available at SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2624692. 
74  See: 
https://www.eff.org/files/2016/01/26/hacking_the_patent_system_belcher_and_casey_update
d_january_2016.pdf  
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(i) Defensive patent aggregators such as Allied Security Trust, RPX, and Unified 
Patents, which use the pooled resources of member companies to purchase 
patents that may otherwise be purchased by trolls.  
(ii) Defensive patent pledges, which involve commitments to only use patents 
defensively or to assert one’s patents only under certain circumstances. Some 
pledges create a sort of demilitarized zone for patents: for example, when a 
company signs onto the Defensive Patent License (DPL), it promises not to 
offensively assert its patents against another company that has also agreed to 
the DPL. Other pledges place limits on the patent owner’s ability to sue anyone 
for infringement. For example, Twitter’s Innovator’s Patent Agreement involves a 
guarantee to employees that if they assign an invention to Twitter, the patent on 
that invention will not be used to sue anyone offensively without the inventor’s 
permission.  
(iii) Patent litigation insurance, in which customers pay a fee in order to receive legal 
assistance if and when they are threatened or sued by a patent owner (so-called 
“before-the-event” insurance). Although patent litigation insurance has existed in 
some form for several years, it has become increasingly popular in the past few 
years. In October 2015, defensive patent aggregator Unified Patents launched an 
optional insurance plan for its members at a much lower premium than other 
insurance offerings, making it a viable option for start-ups. 
Interestingly, the EFF-Stanford-Engine guide claims that the patent system “is broken”, 
and that “in many high-technology industries today, the patent system is a scourge on 
innovation. Patent trolls buy overbroad patents, often from bankrupt companies, for the 
sole purpose of extorting licensing revenues from companies that are actually innovating 
and creating new products. Overworked patent examiners increasingly grant overbroad, 
obvious, and non-novel patents—particularly on software. Some companies aggressively 
assert their patent portfolios to keep legitimate competitors out of the market entirely. 
Small companies are particularly vulnerable, since the cost of fighting a lawsuit (even a 
flagrantly frivolous one) could easily put a start-up out of business. Faced with the 
constant threat of crippling litigation, small companies often perceive their best—or 
only—option to be laying low and hoping to stay off patent holders’ radar”. Accordingly, 
the guide claims that innovators are de facto hacking the patent system to continue to 
innovate. However, patent hacking isn’t a substitute for patent reform. These hacks help 
keep some patents out of the hands of trolls but they don’t come close to preventing all 
the harms caused by software patents.  
The Intellectual Property Rights debate does not end with patent reform and trade 
secrets. Perhaps even more importantly, with the rise of the data-driven economy, 
copyright legislation is becoming increasingly unfit for purpose both for what concerns its 
overall design, and even more importantly its enforcement. This is particularly important 
for the higher layers of the ICT ecosystem, i.e. the application and content layer, and the 
user layer. Renda et al. (2015) highlight that digital technologies make it extremely easy 
to combine existing content in order to develop new artistic works and services, and that 
in Europe it is still uncertain whether the unauthorised scanning and digitisation of 
literary works which are not displayed to users but are merely used for purposes of 
data 75  and text mining 76  infringe copyright or not. 77  Considering that text and data 
                                           
75  ‘Data mining’ is normally referred to as the extraction of implicit, previously unknown, and 
potentially useful information from data. Data mining is in many ways conceptually similar to 
‘reading’ and ‘research’. It is a way for software to perform tasks such as reading, comparing 
and analysing large quantities of data in order to draw conclusions. It has become a ‘copyright 
suspect’ since the above-mentioned tasks are achieved through technology.  
76  ‘Text mining’ indicates finding structural patterns in texts, extracting information out of these 
patterns and combining them with data on the use of works such as data on searching and 
accessing works.  
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mining entails a temporary reproduction of copyright works, as a technical necessity, the 
issue is whether or not such a reproduction should be regarded as transient or incidental 
under the mandatory exception of Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. The issue is so 
urgent that the UK started developing a comprehensive reform plan that resulted, in 
2014, in the enactment of new copyright exceptions that included an exception covering 
text and data mining for non-commercial research, which was not contemplated in the 
list of exceptions originally included in the 2001 Information Society Directive.78 UK law 
now allows researchers to make copies of any copyright works for the purpose of 
computational analysis if they already have lawful access to the copyright work, without 
having to obtain additional permission from the copyright-holder to make the necessary 
copies.  
The OECD recently observed that “the potential for productivity gains in the creation of 
scientific knowledge are ... huge. However, questions have emerged about whether 
current copyright regimes are appropriately calibrated with regard to ‘automatic’ 
scientific knowledge creation”. The OECD quotes the JISC (2012) analysis of the value 
and benefits of text mining, which concluded that “the barriers limiting uptake of text 
mining appeared sufficiently significant to restrict seriously current and future text 
mining in UKFHE [UK further and higher education], irrespective of the degree of 
potential economic and innovation gains for society.” Copyright has been identified as 
one these barriers, which has led to debates between the scientific community and the 
publishers of scientific journals.  
Research on TDM techniques has advanced considerably in recent years. The OECD 
reports that the number of academic articles published on the subject of TDM since the 
beginning of the 1990s reveals that the United States has so far produced 46.6% of the 
publications dealing with TDM, followed by the United Kingdom (11.1%), Taiwan (8.8%), 
Canada (5.7%) and China (4.6%). The OECD argues that “Whether current copyright 
regimes are promoting or hindering TDM is an open question”. According to a recent 
JISC report on the value and benefit of text mining (JISC, 2012), licensing agreements 
represent a key barrier to the use of text mining techniques in the higher education and 
research communities in the UK. Recent OECD analysis has highlighted how the context 
in which IP frameworks operate has been changing substantially. In this evolving 
context, the way copyright laws address TDM is not always clear in all jurisdictions 
(OECD, 2015). According to the same report, there is some (disputed) evidence that 
researchers in certain jurisdictions (such as the European Union and Brazil) are inhibited 
from engaging in TDM due to fears of infringing copyright in the process.  
One step further, the blossoming data analytics sector seems to be increasingly reliant 
on open source software rather than on traditional copyright protection, possibly as a 
consequence of the difficulties connected with the copyright regime 79 . Many data 
                                                                                                                                   
77  On automated text processing and data mining Borghi & Karapapa point out that automated 
data processing can pursue commercially valuable objectives such as data analysis, 
sophisticated text analysis (e.g. the content of a book or the whole production of a specific 
author), analysis of metadata on patterns of use of digital copies (e.g. to create databases of 
user profiles) and computational analysis (which includes image analysis and text extraction, 
linguistic analysis and automatic translation and indexing and search) (Borghi & Karapapa, 
2013). 
78  See UK Intellectual Property Office (2012), Modernising Copyright: A modern, robust and 
flexible framework, 20 December, p. 16. Other areas in which the document announced 
legislative intervention are educational uses, quotation, parody, research and private study, 
disabilities, preservation, public administration and reporting.  
79  Clark, J. (2013), Text Mining and Scholarly Publishing, Publishing Research Consortium; 
European Commission (2014), “Standardisation in the area of innovation and technological 
development, notably in the field of text and data mining”, Report from the Expert Group; 
Filippov, S. (2014), “Mapping tech and data mining in academic and research communities in 
Europe”, Lisbon Council, 16/2014; OECD (2015a), Inquiries into Intellectual Property’s 
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processing and analytic tools that are now spreading across the economy as enablers of 
new data-driven goods and services were initially developed by Internet firms. Apart 
from the already-mentioned Hadoop, a well-known example is R, a GPL-licensed open 
source environment for statistical analysis, which is increasingly used as an alternative 
to commercial packages such as SPSS and SAS80. Today R is also an important part of 
the product portfolio of many traditional providers of commercial database and 
enterprise servers such as IBM, Oracle, Microsoft and SAP, which have started 
integrating R together with Hadoop into their product lines. The OECD report also 
mentions a study by Muenchen (2014), which suggests that the most popular statistics 
software (SPSS, SAS) is declining in popularity, while R is becoming more and more 
popular; and a survey by the data mining website KDnuggets (2013) confirms the trend 
that a large number of data analysts are using open source or free software for data 
analysis81. More specifically, RapidAnalytics (free edition), R, Excel, Weka/Pentaho, and 
Python were the top five data analytics tools used in 2013. All but Excel are free or open 
source tools. 
EURIPIDIS papers on intellectual property and ICT innovation  
The role of IPRs in the ICT ecosystem has been subject to significant analysis, in 
particular for what concerns patents, but also, increasingly, copyright. The most 
encompassing of the EURIPIDIS papers on this topic, authored by Comino and Manenti, 
provides a comprehensive and unitary analysis on the use of patents, copyright and 
trademarks in ICT industries, defined as “among the most dynamic and innovative 
segments of modern economies and … very intensive in the use of IPRs”. Important 
contributions are also found in the papers authored by Pentheroudakis (2015), dedicated 
to patent; and in another EURIPIDIS paper authored by Meniere (2015) on FRAND 
licensing.  
More specifically, Comino and Manenti (2015) observe that ICT industries feature an 
intensive use of IPRs, and that in ICT, technological complexity combined with the 
cumulativeness of the innovation process leads to fragmentation of IP rights and to the 
emergence of patent thickets (which they characterize as essentially an ICT 
phenomenon). Complexity is exacerbated by the fact that digital technologies make it 
easy to combine existing products to develop derived works, which calls for 
interoperability among different standards as a crucial factor for the success of a given 
technology. In this context, the authors explicitly discuss the challenges of managing 
patent pools and standard setting organisations (SSOs), in particular for what concerns 
the so-called “thicket” problem, for which the authors invoke a strong role of IPR 
intermediaries, including controversial ones such as Patent Assertion Entities. Another 
important issue is the need to increase the transparency of the IP system, and take 
action to preserve the quality of patents. Finally, the authors invoke the need for further 
analysis on the possible effect of an increase in European software patents, and observe 
that the new unitary patent system and unified patent court that European countries is 
expected to have a major impact on firms IP strategies and on the harmonisation 
process taking place in Europe. For what concerns more specifically ICT, the authors 
emphasize the possibilities offered by IPRs to create hybrid models that patent protected 
software and open source in composite IP bundles: however, further research is 
therefore needed to shed light on how firms mix different IPRs, as well as of the 
interplay of the various property rights.  
                                                                                                                                   
Economic Impact, OECD Publishing, Paris; JISC (2012), The Value and Benefits of Text Mining, 
JISC, www.jisc.ac.uk/sites/default/files/value-text-mining.pdf.  
80  GPL stands for “General Public License, perhaps the most well-known and established licensing 
system for open source software. 
81  OECD (2015), Data-Driven Innovation: Big Data for Growth and Well-Being, OECD Publishing, 
Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264229358-en  
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Much in the same vein, Pentheroudakis (2015) analyses and denounces the absence of 
empirical evidence on royalty stacking and patent hold-up practices, and argues that in 
its absence the debate on FRAND licensing is doomed to remain essentially theoretical. 
Theoretical arguments are usually derived from simplistic assumptions about the 
mechanisms of royalty determination such as the existence of a unique public royalty 
price for all implementers, or the absence of delay between the adoption of a standard 
and the licensing of the related standard-essential patents (SEPs). This observation 
seems to have more research implications than policy ones. Ménière (2015) observes 
once more the impossibility or defining a one-size-fits-all solution, but adds that given 
the absence of strong empirical evidence of strategic behaviour, the current focus of the 
debate should mostly fall on how to better frame the process of FRAND bargaining in 
order to prevent biases in favour of one or the other negotiating party, as well as on a 
broader set of issues, such as the governance of SSOs and patent pools, or on the 
transparency of patent licensing conditions.  
Furthermore, all authors focus their attention specifically on software, given the fact that 
the availability of patents for software has traditionally been limited and controversial in 
Europe, as opposed to the United States. The interplay between open source software 
and patent law is mentioned both by Comino and Manenti (2015) and by Pentheroudakis 
(2015) as a potential issue for policy, but especially with the emergence of non-viral 
types of open sources licenses and of giant IT companies that manage at once open 
source and patent projects (e.g. IBM, Google), the issue seems more complex82. Comino 
and Manenti (2015) provide a comprehensive analysis of various market strategies, 
which potentially create problems of co-existence between proprietary and open source 
software models; at the same time, they quote literature that questions the viability of 
software patents (Bessen 2014) and show the emergence of both offensive and 
defensive strategies that use patents to either raise rivals’ costs, extract undue revenues 
(especially in case of non-practising entities), or defend the company from strategic 
attacks (Blind 2007)83.   
With the rise of the data-driven economy, copyright legislation is becoming increasingly 
unfit for purpose both for what concerns its overall design, and even more importantly 
its enforcement. Only Comino and Manenti (2015) discuss copyright, reporting literature 
focused mostly on the music industry. They find that file-sharing technologies 
undoubtedly hamper copyright protection; however, the available evidence does not 
indicate that these technologies have lowered the incentives to create artistic works. To 
the contrary, digital technologies make it extremely easy to combine existing content in 
order to develop new artistic works and services. The authors call for the creation of an 
efficient market for copyright licensing and the simplification of pan-European licensing 
for copyrighted works.  
Finally, Comino and Manenti (2015) report that the literature on trademarks and IP 
bundles is relatively scarce and typically not specific to ICT industries, and argue that 
more research is needed for what concerns the joint use of IPRs (bundles) and a better 
understanding of the interplay of the various IPRs. 
These papers contribute to the understanding of current problems and trends in IPR use 
and protection in the ICT sector and beyond. However, they also leave some uncovered 
areas on the following issues, which are of key importance for the development of a 
suitable ICT innovation policy: 
                                           
82  There is probably a misuse of the term open innovation in that paper, at page 48. Open source 
and open innovation are two fundamentally different concepts.  
83  A series of legal controversies against Linux vendors and users has raised concerns about the 
compatibility and coexistence of patent protected software and open source. For these 
reasons, open source developers started adopting defensive strategies as the creation of 
patent pools aimed at protecting Linux. But IBM is also doing the same. 
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 Various patterns of IPR protection at different layers of the ICT ecosystem. In 
particular, trade secrets seem to have become an increasingly dominant way of 
protecting intellectual property at the higher layers of the ecosystem (McGurk and 
Lu, 2015)84. A recent OECD study surveys the economic importance of trade secret, 
and related importance of its protection.  
 An analysis of IPRs as obstacles to innovation, especially in the field of content and 
media, but increasingly in many other sectors. This should include the analysis of 
both barriers to IPRs (in particular, patent) for smaller companies (see WIPO 2015), 
as well as IPRs as per se obstacles to innovation.  
 An analysis of whether and how large platforms govern IPRs contractually in an 
efficient way in the definition of their system goods; in other words, whether large 
platform operators can act as transaction-cost reducers in what is otherwise widely 
recognised as a mounting patent and copyright thicket.  
 The potential and role of IP-backed financing for entrepreneurship in Europe. In this 
respect, Comino and Manenti (2015) report that several studies show that possessing 
a large stock of patents increases the chances of start-ups and SMEs of being 
financed by venture capitalists (Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2009). 
2.4.2 Competition policy and the role of platforms 
Another policy that is often considered to be in need of adjustment in the ICT ecosystem 
is competition policy, and in particular antitrust law. Even if a comprehensive treatment 
of this policy area would fall outside the scope of the report and would require a lot more 
space, it is important to highlight a number of issues that would deserve analysis and 
reflection in the coming years.  
At the lower levels of the ICT ecosystem attention has been devoted to the 
consequences of anticompetitive behaviour in the management of IPRs. In this respect, 
possible anticompetitive conduct has been already subject to investigation within the 
context of patent pools and so-called standard essential patents (SEPs, i.e. patents that 
are essential to produce products in compliance with a particular standard). Some of the 
grey areas that remain even after the recent CJEU decision in Huawei include: under 
what circumstances license terms can be considered “FRAND”; whether holding a SEP 
implies, per se, a dominant position on the market85. Clarifications on these issues would 
greatly improve the level of legal certainty for companies operating at the physical layers 
of the ecosystem.  
But it is at the higher layers that antitrust law seems to be most in need of a rethink. 
There, competition for the market, direct and indirect network externalities, rapid pace 
of innovation and high contestability of dominant positions create enormous problems to 
competition authorities, potentially creating significant uncertainty in the market. Renda 
(2015), in presenting the challenges the European Commission has to face in the 
ongoing antitrust investigation against Google, discusses in detail a number of issues 
related to abuse of dominance cases in the higher layers of the ICT ecosystem. These 
include86: 
                                           
84  file:///Users/ar376/Downloads/IP%20Research%20Trade%20Secrets_web.pdf; 
http://hstlj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-Intersection-of-Patents-and-Trade-
Secrets.pdf  
85  CJEU, 16 July 2015, case C-170/2013, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Deutschland 
GmbH. 
86  A good example in this respect is provided by the standard adopted in different jurisdictions on 
refusal to deal, a form of abuse of dominance that can trigger compulsory access remedies, or 
mandatory licensing of intellectual property in knowledge-based markets. This rule, besides 
inspiring competition law enforcement had a profound impact on ex ante regulatory regimes 
such as the one for electronic communications in force in Europe since 2003 (Renda, 2010, 
2013; Pelkmans and Renda, 2011; Pelkmans and Renda 2014). 
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 Whether market definition should be reconsidered in light of the platformization of 
the Internet, and the emergence of competition between platforms that, by 
definitions, belong to different relevant markets.  
 Whether the concept of dominance should be reconsidered, to reflect the competitive 
pressure exerted by players that are located outside the “relevant market”, and thus 
to reflect the original interpretation of the CJEU, according to which dominance is 
chiefly related to appreciable independence of behaviour. 
 Whether abuse of dominance should be redefined to mirror the peculiar dynamics of 
competition “for” the market, and thus by abandoning, at least in part, a 
“structuralist” view of antitrust to reflect the current landscape of competition, in 
which players are subject to competitive pressure from future products, rather than 
by current rivals. 
 What the “special responsibility” attributed by EU competition law to dominant firms 
entails for firm behaviour in digital markets. 
 Whether remedies should be carefully gauged to avoid distorting market behaviour, 
and how can such remedies be monitored and verified over time in a way that 
incorporates fast technological progress.  
Several sources of uncertainty exist with respect to these questions, especially in 
Europe, as will be clarified below. At this stage, it suffices to clarify that the solution to 
these questions appears to diverge significantly in the United Stated and in Europe; and 
that this divergence is often considered as a factor that contributes to making the U.S. 
system more conducive to entrepreneurship and innovation than the European one. This 
is even more important as the criteria adopted in antitrust law for refusal to deal are also 
the main basis for the sector-specific regulation of network industries (and notably, 
electronic communications) in major economies. This led for example the United States 
to adopt a more investment-friendly regulatory framework in broadband regulation since 
2003, whereas the EU remained faithful to a compulsory access model inspired by the 
so-called “essential facilities” doctrine (Renda, 2010; 2015). The same criteria affect the 
current debate on platform regulation, which at the EU level might lead to creating a 
specific set of rules for digital platforms.  
2.4.3 Sector-specific regulation: from infrastructure to platforms and 
media pluralism 
Needless to say, sector-specific policies can have a remarkable impact on innovation. 
Different layers of the ICT ecosystem are of course affected by different policies, and the 
trends highlighted in Section 2.2 above should be taken into account in shaping the 
overall environment for innovation and entrepreneurship. Even if a full account of all 
these policies would fall outside the remit of this report, it is important to highlight the 
following: 
 At the physical layer, traditional access-based regulation has been for a long time 
reliant on the definition of relevant markets and the identification of dominant 
positions. However, convergence between fixed and mobile operators caused by the 
advancement of wireless broadband technologies is increasingly requiring a different 
definition of relevant markets. At the same time, competitive pressure exerted by so-
called “over-the-top” players is leading to a blurring of the boundaries between the 
physical and the application layer, with products like Skype, Whatsapp and others 
being perceived as substitutes of traditional voice and SMS services. This requires a 
reassessment of the current approach to regulation in the interest of consumers. In 
addition, public support for broadband connectivity (fixed or wireless) in rural areas 
is being perceived as increasingly needed by countries that wish to harness the 
potential of the higher layers of the ICT ecosystem: this is leading to an expansion of 
the menu of possible interventions for policymakers and regulators, including i.a. 
public funding of broadband networks; the revision of universal service and coverage 
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obligations; the launch of public-private partnerships for broadband deployment; 
allowing co-investment and risk-sharing plans between competitors; etc.  
 Similarly, spectrum policy is being adapted to ensure that wireless broadband 
(including the upcoming 5G standard) is given as much spectrum as possible, both at 
low frequencies (600-900Mhz) and at higher frequencies. Availability of the 700 MHz 
band today appears as an essential, but by no means sufficient condition to fully 
embrace the mobile broadband revolution, as testified by the fact that countries that 
traditionally have assigned a much larger amount of spectrum to mobile broadband, 
like the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany are currently feeling the 
urge to further expand spectrum availability in order to enable emerging, highly 
welfare-enhancing technological revolutions87. GSMA (2015) currently proposes four 
new allocations to mobile broadband in WRC2015: one allocation in the UHF band 
below the 700MHz; the L-bank (1350-1518 MHz); the 2.7-2.9 MHz band; and the C-
band (3.4-4.2 GHz). The latter band is now being used more intensively for mobile 
broadband in some European countries (see Plum, 2015)88 and is subject to study 
also by the FCC, where there seems to be increasing awareness that this frequency 
range is particularly suitable for the evolution of 4G and future 5G innovation. The C-
Band, used in various ways in different countries, potentially offers those large 
contiguous blocks that are required for mobile broadband use as mobile data traffic 
grows.  
 
Figure 11 - New allocations identified by GSMA for mobile broadband 
 
Source: GSMA (2015). 
 
The availability of new technologies such as cognitive radio, able to navigate through the 
spectrum to avoid interference and to optimize techniques such as spectrum sharing, 
can usefully be coupled with the need for ultra-high-speed connectivity especially in 
densely populated areas. This is why device manufacturers and mobile operators are 
seeking the allocation of spectrum bands not only in UHF spectrum, but also in higher 
frequency ranges. In this ranges, capacity increases, though they require adequate 
network density, which can be reached only in densely populated (urban and suburban) 
                                           
87  Five years ago the U.S. Federal Communications Commission projected a licensed spectrum 
deficit of almost 300 MHz by 2014. Bazelon and McHenry (2015) find that by 2019, the U.S. 
will need more than 350 additional MHz of licensed spectrum to support projected commercial 
mobile wireless demand. Accordingly, over the next five years the United States (U.S.) must 
increase its existing supply of licensed broadband spectrum by over 50%. 
88  See: http://www.plumconsulting.co.uk/pdfs/Plum_Jun2015_Use_of_C-
Band_for_mobile_broadband_in_Hungary_Italy_Sweden_and_UK.pdf 
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areas89. Recently, the so-called millimetre spectrum (between 30GHz and 300Ghz) has 
become subject to enhanced attention as well, especially in light of 5G applications (See 
section 3.4 below): For example, the FCC published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
that seeks to provide “flexible spectrum use rules for bands above 24 GHz, including for 
mobile broadband use,” and including millimetre wave spectrum, with the idea that 
promoting flexible use of those spectrum bands would help support the continued 
development of high-speed mobile broadband services90.  
 At the logical layer, after more than a decade in which the ICT ecosystem was largely 
left to self-regulation by engineers and industry players (in the W3C, IETF, ICANN), 
since the early 2000s there have been increasing calls for public regulation 
mandating that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) respect the “network neutrality” 
principle. What is quite surprising is that, as the ICT ecosystem evolves, it becomes 
increasingly clear that regulation imposing network neutrality would be unlikely to 
achieve any of its stated objectives and goals (Renda 2015). This is essentially due 
to the fact that, in the upper layers of the Internet, traffic flows are already largely 
“managed”, and traffic is being prioritized in a way that many consider to be 
absolutely welfare-enhancing (Renda 2010; 2012; 2015). In addition, and relatedly, 
the Internet and its underlying technology are evolving in a way that makes the 
inspection of content that flows through servers both possible, and in some cases 
even desirable, e.g. for spam-filtering and overall security purposes (to the extent 
that users’ privacy is duly respected). Growing emphasis on the need to monitor 
Internet activity, e.g. for counter-terrorism and copyright enforcement purposes, has 
led to the definitive sunset of the “neutrality as anonymity” stances: today, it is clear 
that the current debate on Internet policy does not look at the right to surf 
anonymously as a policy goal per se, with some isolated exceptions. In other words, 
the breath-taking pace of evolution of the Internet ecosystem has made the hectic 
network neutrality debate less important for end users than it appeared in the mid-
2000s. Today, what remains valid about the network neutrality querelle are 
essentially two issues: (i) the extent to which existing rules of network neutrality 
create sufficient incentives for ISPs to upgrade their networks; and (ii) the 
distributional impacts of network neutrality legislation, in particular for what concerns 
the telecommunications operators and so-called over-the-top (OTT) players such as 
Google or Skype. The key priority today is to provide legal certainty on the types of 
specialized service that will be allowed under the EU future regulatory framework; as 
well as on the traffic management practices that can be considered “reasonable”. 
This will stimulate in particular ISPs in entering competition with higher-layer 
Content Delivery Networks (e.g. Akamai, Limelight, Level3): this competition is likely 
to spur innovation, given the growing importance of traffic management and 
acceleration in the current Internet.  
 The neutrality debate has extended over time to so-called “Internet platforms” that 
are so paramount in the application layer of the ICT ecosystem. Online 
intermediaries such as Google, Facebook, Amazon today play an important role in 
the selection of information that is made available to end users, as well as in the 
promotion of entrepreneurship. Their role is today important and potentially welfare-
enhancing, but also very delicate from a public policy standpoint. This has led them 
to be subject to different regulatory debates, which bear important consequences for 
end users. First, particularly in Europe, Internet platforms are subject to a heated 
debate on possible “platform neutrality” regulation. 91  However, the platform 
                                           
89  The density of a network can be defined by referring to the number of cell sites for a given 
geographical unit (e.g. square km).  
90  Flexibility in spectrum use implies the possibility of trading the usage right, as well as the 
possibility to change the technology used and/or the service provided by the operator that 
holds the right to use the portion of spectrum.  
91  One of the first to use the expression ‘platform neutrality’ was the French National Digital 
Council (Conseil National du Numérique), which published a detailed report on this same 
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neutrality debate evidently clashes with a simultaneous trend, i.e. the repeated calls 
for attributing greater responsibilities to digital platforms for the conduct of their 
users.92 Such trend is visible in several initiatives (especially in the EU), including 
plans to review and partly abandon the ‘mere conduit’ principle; proposals to 
strengthen intermediary liability and call on online intermediaries to cooperate in the 
enforcement of copyright and privacy laws (including the ‘right to be forgotten’), as 
well as in curbing defamation, enhancing spam filtering, notifying of security 
breaches, cooperate in the fight against terrorism and provide other monitoring 
activities. The contradiction lies in the fact that some parts of EU law seem headed in 
the direction of imposing neutrality obligations on online intermediaries; whereas on 
the other hand, other legislation is requiring intermediaries to be more proactive in 
managing, prioritising and editing the content they pass on to the end users. 
 Importantly, the debate on the role of platforms is essential also with respect to 
media pluralism stances at the content layer. However, the platform neutrality 
principle is in stark contradiction with the objective of media pluralism. The problem 
is similar to the one already outlined for net neutrality, but exacerbated by the 
scarcity of attention and trust that characterises the provision and consumption of 
media content. In short, platforms need to select content, and in selecting content 
polarise the attention of end users on a subset of available information. Several 
scholars, including Gillespie (2010), Helberger (2012), Crawford (2013), Latzer et al. 
(2014), Sunstein (2009), Zittrain (2014) and Goodman (2014) have fuelled the 
debate 93  on how to design a proactive media policy in the age of online 
intermediaries: this debate is inspired by an understandable sense of urgency as 
regards the need to address the prominent role played today by platforms in 
conveying news and content to end users.  
All in all, the economic regulation related to the various layers of the Internet (which 
largely overlap with the ICT ecosystem) is in need of careful reassessment in many 
countries. Recently, Renda (2016) provided a summary table related to the myths and 
challenges of Internet regulation, reported below as table 2.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                   
concept in June 2014, following a 2013 request from the Ministry of the Economy and Digital 
Affairs as well as the Secretary of State on Digital Affairs. See Conseil National du Numérique 
(2014), “Platform Neutrality: Building an open and sustainable digital environment”, Opinion 
No. 2014-2, of the French Digital Council, Paris (www.cnnumerique.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/PlatformNeutrality_VA.pdf). 
92  “Europe enlists Internet giants in fight against online extremism”, by C. Spillman, 9 October 
2014 (http://phys.org/news/2014-10-eu-internet-giants-online-extremism_1.html#inlRlv). 
93  See Tarleton L. Gillespie (2010), “The Politics of 'Platforms'”, New Media and Society, Vol. 12, 
No. 3 (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1601487); N. Helberger (2012), 
“Exposure diversity as a policy goal”, Journal of Media Law, 4 (1), 65-92. doi: 
10.5235/175776312802483880; Latzer et al. (2015), “The Economics of Algorithmic Selection 
on the Internet”, forthcoming in Johannes Bauer and Michael Latzer (eds), Handbook on the 
Economics of the Internet, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Sunstein (2009), On Rumors, op. cit.; 
Jonathan Zittrain (2014), “Engineering an Election”, Harvard Law Review Forum, Vol. 127, and 
Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 14-28 (available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457502); and E.P. Goodman (2014), “Informational justice as the 
new media pluralism”, LSE blog, 19 November 
(http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/11/19/informational-justice-as-the-new-
media-pluralism/).  
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Table 3 – Problems and myths of Internet regulation  
 Layer  Emerging problems  Myths  
 Infrastructure - Access policy is insufficient to 
stimulate investment in ultra-fast 
broadband 
- Public and private investment needed 
to sustain the growth of upper layers 
- The regulatory framework can have 
distortionary effects, e.g. incentivising 
less future-proof investment (ex. 
vectoring) 
- Structural remedies are proving too 
rigid and hard to manage over time 
(UK, Canada) 
- Concentrated 
markets always 
harm end users 
 
 Logical - Network neutrality regulation unlikely 
to achieve any of its objectives 
- However, alternatives so far have not 
been sufficiently market-tested 
- Desirability of network neutrality 
ultimately depends on a careful 
appraisal of costs and benefits for 
society, not on ideological stances 
- The more neutral 
the network, the 
better for end users 
- Network neutrality 
promotes media 
pluralism 
 Platforms - Platform neutrality debate appears as 
a “dead end” 
- Impossible to apply at once strict 
platform neutrality and enhanced 
platform responsibility 
- Responsible cooperation by platforms 
appears to have more legs as a future 
regulatory approach 
- Competition law must be carefully 
adapted to the economics of digital 
platforms 
- Online platforms 
would disregard 
“niche” content and 
as such reduce 
content variety 
- Online platforms are 
stifling innovation 
and preventing 
market entry 
 Applications 
and content 
- More rigid copyright protection does 
not help content production and 
dissemination in the Internet 
- Copyright legislation is becoming 
increasingly important for the 
development of the data-driven 
economy: getting it right is essential, 
and requires courage 
- A “fair use” approach seems to fit the 
peculiarities of cyberspace more than 
a closed list of exceptions and 
limitations 
- Enforcement of copyright law is still 
puzzling: co-regulation seems more 
promising than cyber-police 
- Strict privacy 
legislation protects 
and empowers end 
users. 
- Strengthening 
copyright means 
increasing the 
availability of 
content. 
- Early-on 
standardization and 
interoperability is 
always good for end 
users. 
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 Users - The end-to-end architecture of the 
Internet is what preserves its richness 
and promotes user freedom, rather 
than neutrality 
- End users benefit from a balanced 
regulatory framework: all layers have 
to be well nurtured to provide for a 
unique end user experience 
- The future will require end users to be 
more aware of their privacy and to 
accept possible disclosure of 
information only in exchange for a 
better, more customised service 
- End users want a 
neutral network, 
and desire 
interoperability and 
standardization 
 
Source: Renda (2016). 
2.4.4 Towards more flexible, adaptive innovation-friendly policy 
approaches? 
This section takes a broader approach to ICT innovation, and explored possible new 
ways to approach policymaking that leaves more space to innovation. As a matter of 
fact, one of the key challenges created by the ICT ecosystem for regulators and 
policymakers is that the pace of innovation is typically much faster than the time needed 
to review and design policies. As a consequence, sometimes policymakers feel the urge 
to regulate technologies too soon (sensing that it will take time to finalise the rules); and 
most often, they produce rules that enter into force too late, when technology has 
already advanced. In other circumstances, innovation can be hampered by the adoption 
of rules that reflect specific market conditions and are tailored to incumbent industry 
players: this might place new entrants and disruptive innovators at a disadvantage, even 
unintentionally.  
Several of the policies mentioned above, from competition law to IPRs to sector-specific 
regulation, have been subject to critiques in this same vein. Emerging new sectors such 
as FinTech, the collaborative economy, crowdfunding platforms and business models 
based on big data have already been at the centre of hectic debates on the need for a 
more innovation-friendly regulatory approach. Innovation policy, in most of the 
application layer of the ICT ecosystem, chiefly depends on the ability of regulators to 
eliminate incumbency advantages and other implicit biases in the regulatory framework 
to accommodate new, welfare-enhancing technologies, at the same time maintaining a 
sufficient level of protection for end users.  
Examples of new initiatives that aim at increasing the flexibility and future-proof nature 
of policies that affect the ICT ecosystem include the following: 
 The Regulatory Sandbox report issued by the UK Financial Conduct Authority in 2015 
within its “Project Innovate”. The regulatory sandbox aims at allowing new and 
existing financial services providers to experiment with innovative products with 
selected samples of consumers for a limited amount of time, and even encouraged 
the industry to create a virtual sandbox to pre-test with virtual customers new 
products. For example, the FCA recently hosted a forum to discuss automatic advice 
business models (“robo-advice”), where attendees noted that it would be very helpful 
if they could test their algorithms in a regulatory sandbox. A sandbox could allow a 
firm to make their advice platform available to a limited number of consumers. As a 
safeguard, once the advice is issued, but before transactions are executed, financial 
advisers would review the advice. This would allow firms to learn how consumers 
interact with their advice platform and how their algorithm performs compared to 
human assessment. The effect of the regulatory sandbox would be to allow for 
experimentation and monitoring of new products and services, under an extremely 
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simplified authorization regime. Potential benefits include more effective competition; 
reducing the time and, potentially, the cost of getting innovative ideas to market; 
enabling greater access to finance for innovators; enabling more products to be 
tested and, thus, potentially introduced to the market; and allowing the FCA to work 
with innovators to ensure that appropriate consumer protection safeguards are built 
in to their new products and services. 
 The regulatory humility approach of the Federal Trade Commission in the U.S. 
Motivated by the observation that prescriptive ex ante regulations can hinder 
innovation, the FTC has decided to award priority to ex post case-by-case 
enforcement of specific rules. This reveals a so-called “incrementalist” approach to 
regulation, which entails market monitoring and prudent vigilance, coupled with 
relatively easy market access of new products. Recently an FTC Commissioner 
argued that “incremental approaches are particularly well-suited to dealing with fast-
developing areas of technology”, and added that “another nimble, transparent and 
incremental tool that is well-suited to regulation in fast changing industries is 
industry self-regulation, with agency enforcement as a backstop”, since “compared to 
traditional government regulation, self-regulation has the potential to be more 
prompt, flexible, and responsive when business models or technologies change”94.  
More generally, the future of ICT regulation seems to be chiefly dependent on principles-
based regulation, rather than on prescriptive, command and control regulation. The use 
of co-regulatory schemes and adaptive regulation seems to be increasingly needed, 
together with specific screens that lead policymakers to focus on possible innovation 
impacts when crafting new legal rules (so-called “innovation principle”). Respect for 
flexibility and innovation in policymaking requires a degree of oversight: and indeed, in 
the United States Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai (2009) have advocated the creation of an 
Office of Innovation Policy (OIP), which would opine on regulatory issues having a major 
effect on the competitiveness of U.S. companies, and would have the power to comment 
on the competitiveness effects of major regulatory actions. 95 Similarly, the European 
Commission has recently opened a consultation for the creation of a European 
Innovation Council, although it is not yet clear if the new body will have similar powers.  
Very few commentators have directly addressed the issue of flexible, adaptive 
policymaking in the layered ICT ecosystem. In their attempt to propose an adaptive 
framework for the Internet, Clark and Claffy (2015) argue that the following 
requirements are essential:  
 Agreeing on policy goals;  
 Measuring progress towards those goals;  
 Designing regulatory options intended to move towards those goals;  
 Being able to determine that policy changes indeed caused observed outcomes; and  
 Dealing with potential destabilization of ecosystem, due to rapid policy adjustments.   
Likewise, according to Richard Whitt, policymakers should possess the flexibility to revise 
and adapt the structure of policies and programs to changing circumstances. This leads 
Whitt to look at better regulation tools, such as the use of sunset clauses and forms of 
                                           
94  See FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Procrustean Problem of Prescriptive 
Regulation: Three Principles to Promote Innovation, Engage Volume 16, Issue 3, October 29, 
2015. 
95  Stuart Minor Benjamin and Arti K. Rai, “Structuring U.S. Innovation Policy: Creating a White 
House Office of Innovation Policy” (ITIF, June 2009), 
www.itif.org/files/WhiteHouse_Innovation.pdf 
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experimental policymaking, to trigger learning on the side of government 96 . The 
“adaptive regulator” would be guided by a number of principles, including:  
 An incremental approach, meaning that small steps should be taken and social 
change should be based on experience;  
 An experimental approach, justified by the “combination of uncertainty and 
constraints on predictability [which] create … the necessity for policymakers to 
experiment;” and  
 A flexible approach, required by the existence of deep uncertainty.  
This is where this literature stops, and where new insights would be urgently needed. 
Besides the already mentioned papers by David Clark and K.C. Claffy, and the original 
insights by Richard Whitt, key contributions were provided by authors such as 
Christopher Marsden and Jonathan Cave, who look at various forms of co-regulatory 
schemes that have emerged on the Internet 97. But by and large, an elaboration of 
hybrid, dynamic and adaptive regulatory governance arrangements that can enable 
learning through experimentation in ICT policy is missing.  
2.5 Taking stock, and looking forward 
This section has surveyed the main foundational features of the ICT ecosystem (Section 
2.1) and a number current trends that are affecting the pace and direction of innovation 
in ICT (Section 2.2). A number of consequences can be identified both for innovation 
(Section 2.3) and related policy approaches and solutions (Section 2.4). Figure 12 below 
provides a graphical illustration of the logical relation between the main foundational 
elements of the ICT ecosystem, its features, its ongoing trends, the resulting 
consequences for innovation, and related policy implications. Below, we describe the 
various elements shown in the figure (all of which have been described earlier in Section 
2) and discuss the causal links and interrelations between them. 
 
Figure 12 – Logical mapping of Section 2 of this report 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
                                           
96  Listokin, Y. (2008) Learning through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 484 (2008) 
(“[O]ptimal search theory favours high-variance policies, because variance increase the 
probability of finding excellent policies.”). See also Ranchordás, S. (2013), Experimental 
Legislation: The Whys and the Woes, 1 Theory & Prac. Legis. 415. 
97  Brown, I. and C. Marsden (2013), Regulating Code: Good Governance and Better Regulation in 
the Information Age, MIT Press.  
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As shown in Figure 12, the foundational elements of the ICT ecosystem (to the left of the 
figure) must be coupled with their resulting features and existing trends (and their 
overall combined effect, as mentioned in Section 2.2.7 above) to draw conclusions on 
the resulting impacts in terms of innovation and policy. More specifically: 
- The fast pace dictated by Moore’s law affects the overall direction, pace and 
expansion of innovation at all layers of the ICT ecosystem. Vice versa, new business 
models and emerging successful platforms at higher layers generate demand for 
more efficient hardware, network equipment, data storage and traffic acceleration, 
thus affecting the pace of innovation at lower layers. Moore’s law directly affects 
virtualization (given by advanced computing capacity) and the emergence of 
previously unchartered areas such as the Internet of Things and the Internet of 
Value. This fast pace of evolution is also responsible for the relative scarcity of 
human skills and attention (skills evolve much more slowly than technology, and 
over-abundance of information determines a poverty of attention). 
- Modularity is the basis of the overall organization of the ICT ecosystem, and it is 
found both in the IT sectors (e.g. in personal computers, which are designed as 
system goods since the 1980s) and in the higher layers of the ICT ecosystem 
emerged with the Internet (such as modern smartphones and software stacks such 
as the LAMP). It chiefly affects the nature of innovation, and explains the 
predominance of cumulative innovation. Modularity is also intimately related to the 
existence of direct and (even more importantly) indirect network effects, which call 
for maximizing the amount of applications to capture the attention of end users. This, 
in turn, has led to the prevalence of openness as a dominant trait of innovation and 
business models, and is the basis for the co-evolution between layers, which often 
host complementors of the same system good. The flip of the coin is the 
platformization of the whole ecosystem: layers that exhibit the strongest indirect 
network effects tend to catalyse other products and services (complementors, 
applications) towards a single system good, and this centripetal force leads to 
cumulative innovation and co-evolution.  
- The end to end architecture is the basis for the breath-taking growth of the 
application and content layer of the ICT ecosystem, as well as the driver of direct 
network externalities. It provides the ICT ecosystem with prevalent openness 
and is the basis for the emergence of the collaborative economy. It also affects 
platformization as many of the most powerful and successful platforms of today’s 
ICT ecosystem are entirely based on interaction between end users (e.g. social 
media, sharing economy services). The end to end architecture of the Internet is also 
the basis of innovative funding channels for start-ups, such as crowdfunding 
platforms. And it is the essential precondition for the Internet of Things and the 
Internet of Value to emerge as new trends.  
- Finally, the digital nature of information goods leads to unprecedented 
possibilities for sharing, versioning, re-packaging content and – coupled with the end 
to end architecture displayed by the ICT ecosystem, has led to the emergence of 
user generated content. It is also the basis for the servicification of the economy, 
which transforms consumption patterns from property-based transactions to access 
services (e.g. streaming services for movies and music). The negligible marginal 
costs that follow digitization open up a number of important possibilities also for 
innovation (low entry barriers) and policy (ease of experimentation in adaptive 
policymaking context such as “virtual sandboxes”).   
All these interactions create important consequences for ICT innovation, and for policies 
aimed at its promotion. The prominent role of platforms in the ICT ecosystems places 
them in a privileged position to act as entrepreneurs, i.e. as talent scouts that are best 
placed to locate talent and market opportunities and thus matching ideas with user 
demand. At the same time, at the lowest layers of the ecosystem (i.e. physical layer) 
deviating from cumulative innovation is often not a rational strategy for private 
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players: this is why often disruptive innovation comes from high-risk, high-reward 
projects funded by public institutions, as shown by Mazzucato (2011) for the case of the 
iPhone. This is why also the state is a necessary entrepreneur in ICT. As recalled by 
Clarke and Claffy (2015), higher layers are characterized by innovation that is faster, 
typically more disruptive, and linked to an idea (often, a business model), rather than 
a product: this peculiar innovation process, that often is accompanied by high market 
contestability, leaves less room for the use of IP instruments such as patents 
compared to what occurs in the lower layers.  
Finally, the challenges for policymakers are evidently related to all the above. In 
particular, the need for more flexible, adaptive policymaking – as already explained 
in section 2.4.4 above – stems from the short product lifecycle, the disruptive nature of 
products and services emerging at higher layers (e.g. FinTech; collaborative economy) 
and the need to avoid incumbency constraints in all those cases in which rules are too 
rigid to accommodate innovative business models (e.g. smart grids, again financial 
services, public transportation). As already highlighted above, IPR policies must be 
tailored to the specifics of different layers to avoid creating a straight-jacket effects for 
entrepreneurs wishing to obtain adequate protection while operating at higher layers of 
the ecosystem, and at the same time offer SMEs and larger companies at lower layers 
the legal certainty and “bargaining chips” they need to signal the value of the innovative 
products they design. When dealing with higher layers, policies like data protection 
and copyright law must reflect the importance of data-driven innovation as an 
emerging trend in the ICT ecosystem. The accelerating pace of innovation at higher 
layers, compared with the slower pace at lower layers, and the slow evolution of human 
competences and skills determine the emergence of key policy challenges: on the one 
hand, governments would be less and less able to follow and support innovation efforts 
at higher layers; at the same time, they would need to engage with platforms to ensure 
the enforcement of legal rules, and even the channelling of funds towards most 
promising entrepreneurs; on the other hand, governments are likely to have a much 
more leading role in fostering the deployment of infrastructure (also since broadband 
generates very important positive externalities, which are hardly internalized by the 
telecommunications companies that deploy the network); the orchestration of mission-
led platforms dedicated to grand societal challenges such as de-carbonization (Ashford 
and Renda 2016; Mazzucato 2016); and the organization and delivery (in cooperation 
with private players) of new forms of education, aimed at generating the mix of skills 
that is needed in today’s ICT ecosystem (see Section 2.3.4 above).  
Finally, in terms of platform-building, governments are increasingly required to exploit 
both the virtues of geographical proximity as a driver of entrepreneurship ecosystems 
(Isenberg 2011); and the globally interconnected nature of specific areas of ICT. The 
combination of the main features of the ICT ecosystem, in this respect, leads to an 
almost counter-intuitive outcome: while on the one hand infrastructure is normally local, 
and services are more global, the higher layers of the ICT ecosystem have the ability to 
generate extremely local services (e.g. apps for specific cities, or even smaller 
communities); advances in technology and enhanced digitization now allow for “mass 
customization” (e.g. in Industrie 4.0); and at lower layers many technologies are being 
developed by globally interconnected poles of excellence, which pool the best 
competences available on the planet to generate products that are destined to equally 
global diffusion. This, in turn, leads to the need for an articulate mix of policies, including 
regional policies for entrepreneurship coupled with incentives for the internationalization 
of R&D and the interaction of EU ICT firms with digital global value chains and global 
innovation ecosystems (Fransman).  
As a further complication, obviously the mapping of logical relations provided by figure 
12 above is by no means final. A number of upcoming trends in the ICT ecosystem 
promise to change the current policy mix. The most likely trends to be expected are the 
following: 
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 A significant expansion of the ICT ecosystem into other sectors of the economy. This 
implies much more than using ICT in existing markets (e.g. banks launch their online 
apps to provide home banking services); it entails the platformization, dis-
intermediation and re-intermediation of entire sectors of the economy, often with the 
entry of completely new players with disruptive, transformational business models. 
Sectors such as hotels, public transportation, banking and insurance, retail and food, 
healthcare, counselling, energy, street lighting and many others are already being 
permeated by new business models that exploit the potential of ICT, and in particular 
low barriers to entry, big data analytics, IoT applications and technologies, and 
artificial intelligence (see below). 
 Further virtualization and cost reductions. In particular, software defined networks 
(SDNs) and Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) will lead to the virtualization 
(“softwarization”) of network functions previously performed by hardware, leading to 
significant cost reductions and improvements in business agility. The cost reduction 
effect is very visible: WhatsApp was able to build a global messaging system that 
served 900M users with just 50 engineers, compared to the thousands of engineers 
that were needed for prior generations of messaging systems. This will further 
reduce entry barriers even in the physical layer, potentially removing structural 
constraints towards more pluralistic market structures, and leading to new policy 
challenges and opportunities. Cost reductions at a massive scale are also being 
realized by the transition from standalone CPUs to bundles of specialized chips known 
as systems-on-a-chip (e.g. energy-efficient ARM CPUs plus specialized chips for 
graphics processing, communications, power management, video processing, and 
more), which led to a ten-fold drop of the cost of basic computing systems (from 
about $100 to about $10). Products such as the Raspberry Pi Zero (a 1 GHz Linux 
computer available on the market for $5) represent the beginning of an era in which 
sophisticated, high capacity hardware will become ubiquitous and pervasive in our 
lives.  
 Artificial intelligence and robotics. Applications of AI are currently focusing on 
machine learning techniques such as Deep Learning, now improving at 
unprecedented pace thanks to new algorithms, cheap parallel computation, and the 
widespread availability of large data sets. Importantly, many of the 
papers, data sets, and software tools related to deep learning have been open 
sourced. This has had a democratizing effect, allowing individuals and small 
organizations to build powerful applications. Software tools 
like Theano and TensorFlow, combined with cloud data centres for training, and 
inexpensive GPUs for deployment, allow small teams of engineers to build state-of-
the-art AI systems. One of the first applications of deep learning released by a big 
tech company is the search function in Google Photos, which is shockingly smart. 
Soon significant upgrades are expected in the AI of all sorts of products, including: 
voice assistants, search engines, chat bots, 3D scanners, language translators, 
automobiles, drones, medical imaging systems, and much more. The development of 
quantum computing promises to further advance AI research and its already 
outstanding potential.  
All these technological revolutions are likely to create authentic tectonic shifts in 
previously well-drawn boundaries between markets, and it is likely that the next 
revolution in the ICT ecosystem will be powered by a combination of these technological 
improvements and quantum leaps. Driverless cars, intelligent drones, automated voice 
assistants, wearables and human enhancement products are being powered by a 
combination of all these trends. And there seems to be little room for policy that does 
not use similar tools to oversee and monitor market developments in the attempt to 
protect the rights of market players and in particular end users. Figure 13 below shows 
the ongoing trends that seem likely to affect even the foundations of the ICT ecosystem, 
thus creating new, difficult to anticipate challenges for policymakers.  
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Figure 13 – How upcoming trends affect the future of policy in the ICT sector 
  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
These observations and policy implications are further elaborated, with specific focus on 
the EU, in Section 3 below.   
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3 EU policies for ICT innovation: analysis and 
recommendations for future action 
The previous sections have taken stock of existing research on the evolving dynamics of 
ICT innovation ad entrepreneurship. This section discusses the EU public policies that are 
most relevant for ICT innovation, identifying existing instruments for each of the layers 
of the ICT ecosystem, and then discussing more generally the innovation-friendliness of 
so-called “horizontal policies”, as identified in Section 2.4 above. Finally, we propose a 
framework for future action in the field of ICT innovation. As a preliminary caveat, it 
must be observed that an in-depth analysis of all EU policies that are relevant for ICT 
innovation, or even an analysis focused only on ICT innovation instruments, would 
represent a herculean task, and would fall outside the reasonable scope of the present 
report. As a result, below each policy area is sketched in its essential characteristics and 
instruments, and proposals for reform are outlined for future discussion.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 below discusses specific sectoral policies 
for each of the layers of the ICT ecosystem and proposes a number of concrete 
recommendations. Section 3.2 discusses innovation policy instruments at the EU level. 
Section 3.3 comments on the governance of innovation policy at the EU level. Section 
3.4 discusses the people layer and the skills sets that are needed. Section 3.5 discusses 
the “innovation principle” and its use in support of better regulation policies at the EU 
level.  
3.1 EU Policies for the layered ICT ecosystem 
There are a remarkable number of policy initiatives at the EU level, some of which are 
dedicated to specific layers of the Internet ecosystem. Below, we distinguish between 
the physical layer (both broadband infrastructure and data networks), the logical layer 
(network neutrality policy), the application and the content layers, and the people layer 
(i.e. skills).  
 Existing policies for the physical layer revolve mostly around sector-specific 
regulation and public investment programmes, which at the EU level include specific 
lines of actions contemplated by the Digital Agenda (e.g. the e-communications 
regulatory framework now reformed by the “Connected Continent” package); the 
Connecting Europe Facility; the earmarking of investment for broadband 
infrastructure in the structural funds; and the recently launched “Juncker plan” 
(EFSI), which mostly looks at infrastructure deployment.  
o For what concerns sector-specific regulation, the real issue today is to 
promote the deployment of ultra-high-speed broadband networks, which 
would bring Europe in line with current leaders in this field such as the U.S, 
Japan, and South Korea. Here, the problem is to revisit a regulatory 
framework that, while promoting the entry of several new players and 
relatively low prices for consumers, has proven unsuccessful in stimulating 
investment in new networks. Evidence from global practice in 
telecommunications regulation suggests that world leaders in ultra-fast 
networks (such as fibre-to-the-home) have not heavily regulated the 
deployment of broadband by imposing network sharing obligations on 
investors (Yoo 2014; Crandall 2014; Wallsten 2014). To the contrary, 
countries that have applied access regulation to new high-speed networks are 
suffering from sluggish deployment, which in turns damages end users and 
the economy as a whole (Yoo 2014). This is the case for most EU member 
states, and notably in Germany, Sweden and Italy, where the regulatory 
regime has so far not created the right incentives for incumbents to invest 
significantly in the deployment of optical fibre networks. Even more 
importantly, the absence of a timely, coordinated (if not centralized) pan-
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European spectrum policy has made Europe a laggard in the deployment of 
4G broadband.  
o Apart from regulation, the EU relies also on additional policy instruments to 
promote infrastructure deployment, potentially encompassing 
telecommunications networks and data storage networks. Part of the 
deployment of ICT R&I is carried out under the Connecting Europe Facility 
(CEF): however, the telecommunications part of CEF has a relatively thin 
budget of 1.14 billion euros, out of which 170 million euros are for Broadband 
networks, while 970 million euros are dedicated to Digital Service 
Infrastructures (DSIs) delivering networked cross-border services for citizens, 
businesses and public administrations 98. CEF supports basic and re-usable 
digital services, known as building blocks, as well as more complex digital 
services. The building blocks can be combined with each other and integrated 
with the more complex services99.  
o More recently, the creation of the new European Fund for Strategic 
Investment (EFSI) has led to the emergence of new channels through which 
ultra-fast broadband can potentially be deployed. It is too early to judge if the 
Juncker plan will be delivering results in terms of ultra-fast broadband 
deployment, and a lot seems to depend on the governance of the EFSI, 
including its dependence on cooperation with national authorities and private 
investors. There seems, already at this stage, a need to better target the EFSI 
project selection, as well as regional funds, in a way that enables fibre 
deployment, rather than less future-proof technologies. So far, the latest 
dashboard on EFSI shows that 10% of the funds will be dedicated to Digital 
Infrastructure100.  
 The key EU policy affecting the logical layer of the ICT ecosystem is the rule on net 
neutrality that was approved in 2015 with the so-called “Connected Continent” 
package. Under the new rule, the principle of net neutrality will for the first time be 
enshrined into EU law: users will be free to access the content of their choice, they 
will not be unfairly blocked or slowed down anymore and paid prioritisation will not 
be allowed. In parallel, Internet access providers will still be able to offer specialised 
services of higher quality, such as Internet TV and new innovative applications, so 
long as these services are not supplied at the expense of the quality of the open 
Internet. These rules will be a reality across all member states as soon as the text 
officially applies on 30 April 2016. However, the EU position on network neutrality is 
likely to remain controversial in the coming years, as implementation issues are still 
far from settled. Meanwhile, a number of member states have taken the initiative to 
regulate the issue, leading to notable inconsistencies across the EU. While countries 
like the Netherlands, Finland and Slovenia have enacted very strict neutrality rules, 
France has explicitly allowed traffic management practices, and the United Kingdom 
regards the possibility to charge quality of service fees as a much-needed 
opportunity for ISPs to monetise their investments in broadband networks. In this 
respect, convergence towards a balanced rule on network neutrality would be 
                                           
98  Supported projects are to contribute to improvements in the competitiveness of the European 
economy; promotion of the interconnection and interoperability of national, regional and local 
networks; access to such networks, thus supporting the development of a Digital Single 
Market. 
99  Building blocks supported so far include: eIdentification; eSignature; eInvoicing; eDelivery; 
and Automated Translation. More complex digital services supported so far cover, among 
others, the areas of safer internet, access to reusable public sector information, cyber security, 
eHealth, and online dispute resolution. The next calls will open between September and 
October and will concern digital services in the field of eDelivery, eHealth, eInvoicing, Public 
Open Data, Safer Internet, eProcurement, eIdentification and eSignature, Online Dispute 
Resolution. 
100  http://www.eib.org/efsi/ 
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desirable, in order not to stifle the incentives to innovate both of ISPs and application 
developers. Such rule would need to allow at least some degree of reasonable 
network management and traffic differentiation, not least since the 5G technology is 
already incorporating traffic differentiation to optimise the performance of the 
network; but also since the increase in the number of applications that make use of 
the Internet is leading to a wide variance in the required latency of different services, 
and network optimisation would increasingly rely on traffic monitoring and 
management.  
 At the application layer, so-called “Internet platforms” are subject to a heated debate 
on possible regulatory measures. 101  The European Commission has run a public 
consultation on online platforms, and is currently carrying out a sectoral competition 
inquiry on e-commerce. However, the platform neutrality debate evidently clashes 
with a simultaneous trend, i.e. the repeated calls for attributing greater 
responsibilities to digital platforms for the conduct of their users.102 Such trend is 
visible in several initiatives especially in the EU, including plans to review and partly 
abandon the ‘mere conduit’ principle; proposals to strengthen intermediary liability 
and call on online intermediaries to cooperate in the enforcement of copyright and 
privacy laws (including the ‘right to be forgotten’), as well as in curbing defamation, 
enhancing spam filtering, notifying of security breaches, cooperate in the fight 
against terrorism and provide other monitoring activities. The contradiction lies in the 
fact that some parts of EU law seem headed in the direction of imposing neutrality 
obligations on online intermediaries; whereas on the other hand, other legislation is 
requiring intermediaries to be more proactive in managing, prioritising and editing 
the content they pass on to the end users. 
 In addition, a multi-faceted category of “Internet services” has emerged over time, 
which is regulated by various instruments at the EU level. As recently pointed out by 
Alexander De Streel and Pierre Larouche in a report for CERRE (2016), convergence 
and the blurring of boundaries between different layers of the ICT ecosystem has 
made the distinction between Internet services, e-communications services and 
audiovisual and media services obsolete. It would be very important for the EU 
regulatory framework to eliminate this “silo” approach and to establish a level playing 
field between players providing similar services with different technologies. Likewise, 
the current distinction between linear and non-linear services established by the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive seems obsolete.  
 At the content layer, the most urgent reform at the EU level is that of copyright 
legislation. There, the original design of legislation aimed at strengthening right-
holders’ protection as well as legitimising the use of technological protection 
measures has largely failed, especially in those legal systems that have decided to 
enact a specified, rigid list of exceptions, and focused their enforcement on judicial 
redress and injunctions103. Even more importantly, the emergence of user-generated 
content and the data-driven economy has made copyright exceptions such as the 
one for text and data mining uses a must for all legal systems. The future copyright 
                                           
101  One of the first to use the expression ‘platform neutrality’ was the French National Digital 
Council (Conseil National du Numérique), which published a detailed report on this same 
concept in June 2014, following a 2013 request from the Ministry of the Economy and Digital 
Affairs as well as the Secretary of State on Digital Affairs. See Conseil National du Numérique 
(2014), “Platform Neutrality: Building an open and sustainable digital environment”, Opinion 
No. 2014-2, of the French Digital Council, Paris (www.cnnumerique.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/PlatformNeutrality_VA.pdf). 
102  “Europe enlists Internet giants in fight against online extremism”, by C. Spillman, 9 October 
2014 (http://phys.org/news/2014-10-eu-internet-giants-online-extremism_1.html#inlRlv). 
103  See Renda, A. et al. (2015), “Study on the implementation, application and effects of Directive 
2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society (InfoSoc) Directive and of its related instruments”, Study for the European 
Parliamentary Research Service. 
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regime should primarily look at the free circulation of content and information 
throughout the Single Market, the single most important precondition for the 
promotion of innovation in the EU: having to negotiate copyright licenses country per 
country is not a very attractive perspective for a would-be innovator in the media 
industry. That said, there should be also room for the promotion of specific content 
wherever market forces do not generate enough of that content (e.g. for the 
purposes of promoting local or regional culture).  
In summary, key recommendations on sector-specific regulation include the 
following: 
 Prioritize the deployment of a robust, resilient ultra-fast broadband network 
throughout the territory of the European Union, using scalable technologies 
such as optical fibre networks, rather than upgrading (for the last time) copper 
networks through vectoring and G-Fast technologies.  
 Devote more resources (e.g., from regional funds) for the development of 
the digital infrastructure, including both fixed and wireless networks and cloud 
storage facilities.   
 Strengthen the coordination of spectrum policy throughout the EU28, and 
coordinate (or centralize) spectrum award procedures in a way that maximizes 
benefits for the end users (rather than revenues for government).  
 Boost international cooperation on the 5G standard development, an area in 
which Europe seems to have taken the lead until recently, and in which cooperation 
with China seems to face important obstacles.  
 Streamline the regulatory framework for digital services, by abandoning the 
current silo approach and implementing symmetric, principles-based regulation, 
rather than asymmetric access regulation. 
 Avoid strict regulation of platforms such as platform neutrality (subject to 
sound monitoring by competition authorities), and engage with online 
intermediaries by developing principles of responsible cooperation in the monitoring 
and enforcement of specific legal rules, including counter-terrorism, copyright, 
privacy.  
 Award strongest priority to the achievement of a fully integrated single 
market for content and applications. This does not mean that all forms of 
territorial discrimination should be abolished (as in some cases they can be welfare 
enhancing). Rather, it would imply a single pan-European copyright title, and a 
flexible regime for exceptions that would unleash the power of new uses of data (in 
particular, text and data mining).   
3.2 ICT Innovation policy instruments: a focus on data-driven and 
demand-side policy instruments 
The natural consequence of our analysis in Section 2 above is that ICT innovation policy 
should, for the time being, depart from innovation policy implemented in other fields due 
to the existing differences between the ICT ecosystem and the remainder of the 
economy (so-called “brick and mortar” sectors). This, of course, does not mean that 
traditional, R&D-focused innovation policy instruments must be abandoned in the ICT 
sector. Rather, they will be more appropriate for the physical and logical layers of the 
ICT ecosystem, and their relevance will be increasingly worth a rethink as virtualization 
and platformization conquer also those layers, leading to a plethora of new, often open, 
business models and to a drastic reduction of entry barriers and computing and data 
storage costs. Accordingly, the reader should take the suggestions included in the next 
pages as not carved in stone, but rather as the expression of a peculiarity that the ICT 
sector is currently exhibiting with respect to other sectors, and which might become less 
or more prominent over time (more prominent due to increased virtualization of the ICT 
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ecosystem, less prominent as ICT conquers many other sectors of the economy and 
leads to a massive re-engineering of business models). 
As things stand, the ICT sector is emerging from the scholarly literature as 
especially innovative, both in terms of share of firms (among ICT firms) performing 
R&D and in terms of firms producing technological (product or process innovation) or 
generic (product or process or organizational or marketing) innovation. In particular, 
ICT firms tend to have in-house R&D capability and introduce new-to-the-
market product or process innovations. In the development of a strategy for ICT 
innovation at the EU level, this report has adopted a “layered architecture” perspective, 
by discussing the various peculiarities of different layers of the ICT ecosystem. Key 
barriers to ICT innovation in existing European companies covered by the literature 
include lack of finance, lack of qualified personnel and uncertainty over demand and over 
the regulatory treatment of data. Public funding seems efficient for the support of start-
ups and new companies, but is too focused on R&D and not enough on the needs of new 
business models. At higher layers, the relative under-development of venture capital and 
crowdfunding in comparison to the United States seems likely to hinder the birth and 
growth of new companies with disruptive, transformational business models. 
In this respect, the following recommendations can be formulated: 
 The role of public policy instruments for the promotion of public and private 
R&D seems to be most relevant for the physical (and partly the logical) layer 
of the ICT ecosystem, which include ICT equipment and components, the underlying 
telecommunications infrastructure and also the data storage and transmission 
architecture, encompassing emerging technologies such as i.a. traffic management, 
acceleration and content delivery networks. This is the layer in which European 
Companies seems to be also most specialised, so the added value of additional 
innovation policy instruments might not be as high as for higher layers.104 In this 
layer, instruments such as R&D tax deductions and public support for private R&D 
investment, university-industry technology transfer and the EU Unitary Patent should 
be made as effective and accessible as possible.  
 At higher layers of the ICT ecosystem, more agile instruments and 
innovative demand-side innovation policy are likely to be particularly 
effective. Existing initiatives on access to risk finance (e.g. InnovFin), the EFSI SME 
Window, the ‘Innovation in SMEs’ and actions launched within the Entrepreneurship 
2020 Action Plan (e.g. Startup Europe Leaders Club, the Startup Europe Partnership, 
the Startup Europe Accelerators Assembly, the Startup Europe Crowd-funding 
Network, the Startup Europe Web Investors Forum, and the Startup Europe Web 
Talent) are all relevant, and are flanked by a number of dedicated EU programmes 
and initiatives, such as ‘Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs’ and the ‘Small Business 
Act for Europe’, which include measures to facilitate young entrepreneurs’ access to 
finance as well as to integrate entrepreneurship into secondary school curricula. 
Further direct financial support at EU level also comes through the European Progress 
Microfinance Facility, which enables young entrepreneurs to apply for micro-loans of 
up to EUR 25,000. These initiatives should be coupled with new instruments that 
take advantage of the increasingly low startup costs observed at the higher layer of 
the ICT ecosystem, by specifying the societal challenge that entrepreneurs are called 
to address. In this respect, the following instruments are potentially suited for the 
application layer of the ICT ecosystem: 
                                           
104  As observed by Fransman (2010) and Veugelers and Cincera (2010) in their research on the 
so-called relative technological advantage (RTA), Europe is more specialized than the US in 
what these authors call “Layer I” technologies, i.e. those related to telecommunications 
networks, where the percentage of young companies is only 20%. Europe’s weakness is indeed 
in so-called Layer III, which counted in 2010 only 14 EU companies against 50 in the US, and 
an overwhelming majority of “Yollies”, i.e. young, innovative companies. Similar findings were 
also reached more recently in the PREDICT project run by the JRC. 
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o Prizes and challenges. For example, in the US a Challenges and Prizes 
Community of Practice was created, which has over 600 members. Examples 
of successful prizes are numerous105. NASA is seeking teams to build small 
spacecraft that can carry out operations near the moon and in deep space. 
Prizes are at most worth only a few million dollars, and the competition 
energizes non-governmental researchers and entrepreneurs to tackle socially 
significant problems. The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 
(DARPA) launched its first “Grand Challenge” in 2004. Whoever could design a 
driverless car that completed a desert course fastest would win one million 
dollars106. Since then, there have been more DARPA-sponsored competitions 
involving humanoid robots and radio communications, among other fields. 
Several Federal agencies have discovered that prizes allow them to: (i) Pay 
only for success and establish an ambitious goal without having to predict 
which team or approach is most likely to succeed; (ii) Reach beyond the 
“usual suspects” to increase the number of citizen solvers and entrepreneurs 
tackling a problem; (iii) Bring out-of-discipline perspectives to bear; (iv) 
Increase cost-effectiveness to maximize the return on taxpayer money; (v) 
Inspire risk-taking by offering a level playing field through credible rules and 
robust judging mechanisms. 
o Public-private demand-side instruments. Again, the U.S. experience can 
be useful in this respect. For example, GE, the NFL, Under Armor and NIST 
are using a challenge to advance the development of technologies that can 
detect early stage mild traumatic brain injuries and improve brain protection. 
Foundations can sponsor fellowships for prize designers in the public sector to 
encourage the development and implementation of ambitious prizes in areas 
of national importance.  Foundations could also sponsor workshops that bring 
together companies, university researchers, non-profits, and government 
agencies to identify potential high-impact incentive prizes. Universities could 
establish courses and online material to help students and mid-career 
professionals learn to design effective prizes and challenges. Researchers can 
conduct empirical research on incentive prizes and other market-shaping 
techniques (e.g. Advance Market Commitments, milestone payments) to 
increase the understanding of how and under what circumstances these 
approaches can best be used to accelerate progress on important problems. 
o Social Impact Bonds. These are relatively new funding mechanisms known 
also as “social innovation financing” or “pay for success”. They offer 
governments a risk-free way of pursuing creative social programs that may 
take years to yield results. Usually, governments decide what problems they 
want to address and then enter a contractual agreement with an intermediary 
(or bond-issuing organization) that is responsible for raising capital from 
independent investors including banks, foundations, and individuals, and for 
hiring and managing non-profit service providers. If the project achieves its 
stated objectives, the government repays the investors with returns based on 
the savings the government accrues as a result of the program’s success. 
                                           
105  See i.a. Audretsch, D. and T. Aldridge (2014), The Development of US Policies directed at 
stimulating Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Editors: Itzhak Goldberg, Federico Biagi, and 
Paul Desruelle. 
106  No car managed to cross the finish line that day and no one took home the prize money. But 
the challenge got brilliant minds focused on driverless technology. A decade later, Google is 
close to mastering the technology and most major automakers are working on their own 
driverless prototypes. Another well-known example of a demonstration project is the Ansari X 
Prize, which was awarded in 2004. The Ansari X Prize was awarded to aerospace designer Burt 
Rutan and financier Paul Allen for being the first private team to “build and launch a spacecraft 
capable of carrying three people to 100 kilometres above the earth’s surface, twice within two 
weeks.” 
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(Taxpayers also receive a portion of the budget gains in the form of freed-up 
public resources, though the investors may need to be fully paid first.) A 
neutral evaluator, agreed on by both parties, is hired to measure the 
outcomes and resolve any disputes that arise. 
 Most importantly, ICT innovation needs data. EU institutions can spur 
innovation at all layers of the ICT ecosystem by providing access to databases held 
by government, rather than by offering financial support. Access to datasets cannot 
be limited to EU-funded research; public administrations at the EU and national level 
hold an enormous amount of data, which could unleash all sorts of innovative 
business models. Many governments, from the United States to New Zealand, 
consider data-driven innovation to be a key source of growth for the future (OECD 
2014). For example, in the United States the Obama administration has coupled its 
efforts towards open access and government with more recent initiatives in the fields 
of citizen science and crowdsourcing: following a tradition that in some sectors dates 
back to the 1970s, the United States government has today reached new levels of 
activism in open science and open data initiatives, which rely on a set of presidential 
directives and on innovative initiatives such as the “datapaloozas” organized by U.S. 
presidential innovation fellows107. At the EU level, the European Commission recently 
stressed the importance of openness as a key principle for the European Research 
Area and for the EU innovation policy: in June 2015, EU Commissioner for research 
and innovation Carlos Moedas highlighted the importance of open science and open 
innovation and announced the creation of “a new path for European research and 
innovation policy”, fit for an open, digital and global environment.  
There is no lack of awareness at the EU level, at least in the European Commission, of 
the importance of the data economy and data-driven innovation. The Commission 
announced a number of initiatives aimed at seizing the related opportunities and 
compete globally in the data economy, such as “Lighthouse” data initiatives capable of 
improving competitiveness, quality of public services and citizen's life; Developing 
enabling technologies, underlying infrastructures and skills, particularly to the benefit of 
SMEs; Extensively sharing, use and developing public data resources and research data 
infrastructures; Focusing public R&I on technological, legal and other bottlenecks; 
Making sure that the relevant legal framework and the policies are data-friendly; 
Accelerating the digitisation of public administration and services to increase their 
efficiency; and use of public procurement to bring the results of data technologies to the 
market. The envisaged actions should result in accelerated innovation, productivity 
growth, and increased competitiveness in data across the whole economy. Also, it is 
worth reminding that the Council of the EU adopted in May 2015 conclusions on open, 
data-intensive and networked research as a driver for faster and wider innovation, which 
calls i.a. on the Commission to present a detailed action plan to accelerate the transition 
towards a data-driven economy in Europe by the end of 2015. In June 2015, 
Commissioner Oettinger also committed to work towards on a European Open Science 
Agenda with all concerned stakeholders and Member States 108 ; and Commissioner 
Moedas has also made openness its flagship commitment. Against this background, one 
important obstacle is likely to be represented by the often-denounced rigidity of the EU 
privacy legislation against the flexibility needed for big data applications (see Renda 
2015). What emerged so far is that the EU privacy legislation, while in principle 
protecting end users’ privacy more effectively, might end up proving too rigid to allow 
for welfare-enhancing cloud offerings. Also the recent political agreement reached on the 
General Data Protection Regulation in December 2015 has been accompanied by 
                                           
107  See Renda (forthcoming), “Open science, open innovation and better regulation: what lessons 
can the EU draw from the U.S.?”, forthcoming report for the European Commission, DG 
Research and Innovation. 
108  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/oettinger/blog/open-science-knowledge-and-
data-driven-economy_en  
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complaints from both sides of the Atlantic on the possible rigidity of the rules to be 
adopted109. 
3.3 Simplifying governance and access to innovation policy 
instruments 
The governance of innovation policy has always been a key problem at the EU level, 
especially in the past two decades, as innovation has started to play an increasingly 
central role in the EU agenda (see Granieri and Renda 2011). Today, there seems to be 
an excessive level of complexity in the governance of innovation policy at the EU level. 
This is not exclusive to ICT innovation, but it can hamper the ICT ecosystem even more 
due to the latter’s fast product cycles, and the prevalence of very small if not individual 
ventures especially at the higher layers.  
A number of initiatives adopted at the EU level look at the creation or promotion of ad 
hoc platforms in specific sectors, or sub-sectors of the economy. In many cases, these 
are research-oriented platforms, aimed at tackling long-term societal challenges by 
stimulating and catalysing research towards specific fields of science (e.g. the study of 
the brain; the future of food). These types of platforms correspond more closely to the 
ones that Mazzucato (2013) considers to be important sources of innovation through 
public entrepreneurship, since they end up triggering the development of technical 
solutions that large IT companies are then able to integrate in their system goods.  
At the EU level, however, a number of other platforms have been created, which appear 
more industry-based, or innovation-oriented. They include the Leadership in Enabling 
and Industrial Technologies (LEIT), which supports the development of technologies 
underpinning innovation across a range of sectors, including ICT and space, and pays 
particular attention to the development and application of KETs, stressing their 
importance for growth and jobs110; contractual public-private-partnerships such as the 
Factories of the Future (FoF), and which is supposed to attract private investment in the 
order of 5 to 10 times the level of public funding in addition to the in-kind contribution in 
the PPP projects under Horizon 2020111; and the Future Internet PPP (FI-PPP), launched 
already in 2011, which focuses on developing innovative Future Internet technologies for 
smart infrastructures, business processes, services and applications. Last but not least, 
the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) has launched a number of 
Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs).  
The ICT-related platform of the EIT has recently been transformed into EIT Digital, and 
developed a new innovation and Entrepreneurship strategy driven by eight Innovation 
Action Lines (see figure 6 below). In each Action Line, the most promising research 
results, disruptive technologies and business strategies are selected and packaged into 
innovation activities and startups, with the ambition to drive them to succeed in world 
markets and become European success stories. Sourcing is through Calls for Activities, 
whereas Startups are sourced either through the Idea Challenge, the largest European 
startup contest in information technology, or through a direct application to the Business 
                                           
109  Examples: https://www.datainnovation.org/2014/10/proposed-eu-data-protection-regulations-
could-impede-medical-research/. 
http://www.digitaleurope.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=C
ore_Download&EntryId=1078&PortalId=0&TabId=353. 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/web-to-watch/tech-gaming/2015/12/14/eu-european-
union-privacy-directive-google-facebook/77314554/. http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-
privacy-fortress-1450398921?mod=ST1  
110  With a proposed combined earmarked budget of EUR 6.663 billion, KETs represent a major 
component of the LEIT strand. Recently, there have been efforts to develop synergies with the 
ESIF (European Structural and Investment Funds for 2014-2020) to improve funding for the 
KETs. 
111  In Horizon 2020 the EU is committed for the indicative provision of about 6.7 billion euro to the 
contractual PPPs (FoF, EeB, EGVI, SPIRE, 5G, HPC, Robotics, Big Data and Photonics). 
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Development Accelerator (BDA). The BDA has a central role in the success of the 
Innovation funnel, as it coaches the entire funnel (Innovation Activities & Startups) with 
a focus on access to market - that is, customer adoption. Access to Finance is a team 
fully committed to helping BDA startups raise funds via a pan-European investor 
network. 
Figure 14 – EIT Digital: Innovation and entrepreneurship strategy 
 
Source: EIT Digital. 
Possible improvements, not exclusive to ICT, would include the following: 
 Consolidate existing research and innovation platforms by offering innovators 
and entrepreneurs one-stop-shops where to get involved with prizes, challenges and 
obtain vouchers and other form of financing to generate new ideas.  
 Empower a limited number of organizations in the management of ICT 
research and innovation projects. These could be, following Granieri and Renda 
(2011), the EIT for multi-stakeholder platforms, and the EIB for infrastructure-
related projects. They could be coordinated by the European Commission or by the 
newborn European Innovation Council.  
 Rely on these new organizations to establish technology roadmaps related 
to specific societal challenges. Such roadmaps could become essential for 
policymakers in shaping adaptive rules (see below, Section 3.4).  
 Organize the provision of support around these platforms, by establishing links 
between research, innovation, entrepreneurs and societal challenges for each of the 
platforms identified.  
 Improve the governance of individual projects by strengthening the monitoring 
and evaluation of results.  
 Expand the innovation radar to follow projects in the commercianlization phase, 
and establish their overall impact and market success. This is even more important 
since a recent study found that the EU Framework Programmes have so far not 
contributed very significantly to radical innovations (JIIP, 2015). 
 Finally, Institutional capacity at the regional and local level seems to be still 
lacking in many regions, which creates a major weakness in one of the most 
crucial actors of the innovation system, i.e. governments. The problem is so heavily 
felt that some commentators and also the Committee of the Regions have endorsed 
the proposal to create a new Flagship Initiative dedicated to the strengthening of 
institutional capacity within the upcoming review of Europe 2020.  
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3.4 The people layer: eSkills and entrepreneurship 
Important efforts must be made to improve the availability of eSkills, but the 
effectiveness of current policies, including the ones included in the Entrepreneurship 
2020 Action Plan and the ones managed under the Digital Agenda, could probably be 
improved through enhanced coordination with existing initiatives (e.g. EIPs, KICs) and 
research projects funded under Horizon 2020. To be sure, Europe needs a major 
reflection on the future of jobs, which capitalises on the first steps made with the “Grand 
Coalition”. Education is a fundamental driver of ICT uptake and competitiveness, and 
must be broadly intended to include a high-quality university system, widespread e-skills 
and digital literacy among both firms (in particular, SMEs) and citizens. 
Importantly, the skills needed are not a single set, but rather a combination of notions, 
capabilities and attitudes that can help fill all the gaps currently existing in the EU job 
market, at various layers of the ICT ecosystem. The recommended skill set includes112: 
 Coding skills, possibly to be introduced as early as possible in school years; 
 Creativity skills, to be stimulated through dedicated programmes during primary, 
secondary and tertiary education; 
 Science Technology Engineering and Math (STEM) education, in order to 
enable the application of ICT to a wide variety of sectors, from health care to energy, 
manufacturing, finance, etc.;  
 Cross-disciplinary skills, which require abandoning textbook-style education to 
forge students with enough basic knowledge and culture and advanced notions to be 
able to handle more than one discipline at once; 
 Managerial skills, which include basic entrepreneurship skills such as the ability to 
conceive of a business plan, or to define a start-up and scale-up strategy for the first 
years of a new venture; 
 Financial and accounting education, in order to empower individual would-be 
entrepreneurs in their relationship with financial intermediaries. 
 Leadership and team-working skills. For example, the e-Skills Manifesto 2014 by 
European Schoolnet introduces the INSEAD skills pyramid to divide e-skills into 
literacy and basic skills at the bottom, occupational skills in the middle and global 
knowledge economy talents at the top. The manifesto also states that not only 
programming skills but e-leadership skills – that is, the combination of ICT skills and 
leadership skills – will be high in demand in the future.  
All these skills must be developed and constantly updated. The acceleration of the pace 
of technological progress will increasingly require that beyond the work-life balance, also 
the work-train balance of individuals is adequately taken care of113. Lifelong learning 
then must be rethought to mirror the need for a constant evolution and update of the 
skills available in the labour force. Possible policy actors to be involved include schools 
(including, most importantly, re-training and empowering teachers), government 
administrations, and businesses themselves.  
                                           
112  See, for a more detailed description of coding skills, creativity skills, cross disciplinary skills, 
managerial skills, entrepreneurial skills, https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/learning-
and-skills.  
113  In this spirit, the e-Skills Manifesto 2014 by European Schoolnet argues that the ‘educate then 
work model’ is becoming less relevant as the turnover of skills accelerates, markets become 
more volatile and the linear one-way path from education followed by life-long work will have 
to be exchanged for an increasingly two-way interaction between learning and working. 
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3.5 Horizontal policies: towards simpler, adaptive regulation 
As already mentioned in this report, what matters for innovation is not exclusively 
innovation policy, especially at the EU level. Evidence of the need for simplifying existing 
instruments and funding channels, and of eliminating needlessly complicated and 
burdensome legislation (especially for SMEs) is widespread in the EU. For example, 
regulation that creates “red tape” or administrative burdens for businesses 
can, under certain circumstances, deprive entrepreneurs of resources and time 
that would otherwise be devoted to more productive activities. These tendencies work to 
the disadvantage of the innovativeness of SMEs, who lack the resources to come up to 
strict legal requirements. Moreover, several contributions in the literature have analysed 
the impact of entry requirements and regulatory compliance burdens on 
entrepreneurship: these include, most notably, the ease of doing business indicators and 
the ease of entrepreneurship index developed by The Conference Board114.  
Key aspects of regulation that affect innovation are stringency, time, flexibility 
and certainty (Pelkmans and Renda 2014). Stringency relates to how difficult and 
costly it is for firms to comply with new regulatory requirements using existing ideas, 
technologies, processes and business models. The amount of time that a regulation gives 
to the targeted stakeholders for compliance with the regulatory requirements is essential 
to stimulate innovation, but timing is a double-edged sword: too little time might 
discourage innovation and determine an unsustainable increase of compliance burdens, 
too much time might crystallize innovation efforts due to the lack of pressure to meet 
the requirements 115 . Flexible, performance- or outcome-based regulation stimulates 
innovation more than purely prescriptive regulation, provided that it is coupled with 
adequate monitoring and enforcement (see i.a. Coglianese 2015). And also uncertainty 
has been found to act as a driver and also as an inhibitor of innovation depending on the 
circumstances116.  
Against this background, a debate has emerged at the EU level on the need to 
incorporate an “innovation principle” in EU policymaking. Emphasis on this need has 
been so strong over the past months that the CEOs of some of the largest EU-
headquartered companies have decided to send a letter to advocate such a change in 
the European Commission’s approach to policy117. The exact content of an innovation 
principle to policymaking is however not fully defined yet: if anything such a principle 
                                           
114  Contributions in the literature have demonstrated that start-up costs are considerably higher in 
more regulated economies (Fonseca et al. 2001, 2007), and that regulatory reform results in 
higher rates of market entry by new firms (Klapper and Love, 2011). A recent paper by 
Braunerhjelm and Eklund (2013) based on World Bank data from 118 countries for a period of 
six years finds that the entry rate of new firms is significantly reduced by the tax 
administrative burden, and that this effect is unrelated to general taxes on corporate profits 
and is robust to the inclusion of several important control variables. 
115  BERR (2008) and Centre for International Economics (2006) discuss specifically the timing of 
standardization: here too, the message is that standardization should not occur too early, and 
also not too late to stimulate and encourage innovation. An early standard can kill alternatives 
(e.g. the GSM standard for mobile communications), creating more intra-standard competition. 
If the standard is imposed too early, this can generate an undesirable lock-in effect, which 
leaves society trapped into a suboptimal standard. Similarly, the selection of a rigid, non-
scalable standard can inhibit both incremental and disruptive innovation, and as such is highly 
damaging to social welfare and progress. 
116  Ashford et al. (1985) claim that “although excessive regulatory uncertainty may cause industry 
inaction on the part of the industry too much certainty will stimulate only minimum compliance 
technology. Similarly too frequent change of regulatory requirements may frustrate 
technological development.” More generally, it is fair to state that whenever innovation 
requires large investment in R&D, the absence of reasonable stability or certainty in the 
regulatory framework can significantly hinder innovation. Our case study of competition rules 
applied in the e-communications sector below can contribute to shedding some light on this 
aspect of uncertainty. 
117  http://www.riskforum.eu/uploads/2/5/7/1/25710097/innovation_principle_letter_4_nov.pdf  
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would help policymakers focus on innovation when drafting legal rules, although 
available guidance on how to achieve this result is not sufficient to enable fully 
enlightened choices.   
Based on our findings in the previous sections, the following recommendations on 
horizontal policies can be formulated: 
 A functioning internal market is the single most important reform for EU ICT 
innovation. The fragmentation of innovation performance is also a mirror image of 
the persisting absence of a complete internal market for many of the most innovative 
sectors, including, most notably, the services sector. Currently, financial markets are 
fragmented and the level of regulation (e.g., taxation) varies across countries. While 
a degree of diversity is required, total lack of harmonisation prevents cross-border 
venture capital investment and the creation of funds in areas where financing for 
innovation is needed. Furthermore, the obstacles to individuals’ mobility (in terms of 
taxation, portability of pension benefits, etc.) prevent professionals and business 
angels from reaching new markets and establishing their business where 
opportunities are still unexploited. Finally, as already recalled, there is no such thing 
yet as a European single market for e-communications and this also hampers the 
creation of a pan-European world-class e-infrastructure. 
 Competition policy should be revisited to mirror the peculiar dynamics of the 
ICT ecosystem. This is particularly true for what concerns rules on abuse of 
dominance, but also more generally for all those instruments and criteria used in 
antitrust law, which mirror traditional neoclassical economics, from market definition 
to the use of market shares, up to the identification of suitable remedies.  
 Data protection rules and IPR policies should be made, to the extent possible, 
simple and compatible with new, data-driven business models.  
 Better regulation tools should focus on long-term innovation impacts, 
including in the ICT sector. However, such impacts should be intended as means, 
not ends, as innovation is not a goal per se, but rather an important precondition of 
sustainable development. The “innovation principle”, in other words, should be 
translated into an “innovation for whom?” question, or a question related to the 
purpose of innovation and policies designed to promote it118.  
 Policymaking should avoid incumbency biases and accommodate innovative 
business models that make use of big data and more generally transformational 
ICT applications. Possible ways to make policy more flexible and adaptive include: (i) 
the use of regulatory sandboxes and other experimental approaches to allow for the 
ongoing monitoring of the market and social impacts of innovative techniques; (ii) 
the incorporation of technology roadmaps and the opinion of multi-stakeholder 
platforms as input into the policymaking process, to ensure that innovative, welfare-
enhancing technologies are adequately represented in policy processes and 
outcomes; (iii) the ongoing monitoring of policy impacts, including through open 
government techniques.   
                                           
118  The importance of accounting for innovation impacts of all legal rules is increasingly 
acknowledged among scholars. For example, in a recent paper Battaglia, Larouche and 
Negrinotti even question whether the EU can be said to have an innovation policy, claiming 
that “It is remarkable that, in major policy initiatives where innovation plays a central role, 
such as the Lisbon Agenda and its successor Europe 2020, little attention is paid to those areas 
of the law which influence the incentives to innovate, namely competition law, intellectual 
property law, sector-specific regulation (especially electronic communications regulation) and 
standardization”. The authors observe, in particular, the inconsistency between EU innovation 
policy and the underlying rationale of European Commission decisions in the pharmaceutical 
sector, which seem to dance to a completely different drummer. More generally, competition 
policy should be handled by the European Commission in a way that is innovation-compatible, 
and should therefore place a greater emphasis on long-term dynamic efficiency rather than 
short-term static efficiency effects of market outcomes. 
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4 Conclusion - Policy implications 
The report maps interrelations between foundations, features and trends of the ICT 
ecosystem; and their consequences for ICT innovation and for ICT policies. Analysing 
these interactions and interrelations, leads to the formulation of a number of policy 
recommendations.  
In the physical layer, EU policy should prioritize the deployment of a robust, resilient 
ultra-fast broadband network throughout the European Union. Scalable technologies 
such as optical fibre networks could be used and more resources could be devoted to the 
development of the digital infrastructure, including both fixed and wireless networks and 
cloud storage facilities. This would be helped by a more coordinated spectrum policy 
throughout the EU28, and effective EU involvement in the 5G standard development.  
In addition, it is important that the regulatory framework for digital services be 
streamlined, by abandoning the current silo approach and implementing symmetric, 
principles-based regulation, rather than asymmetric access regulation. Overall, platform 
regulation such as platform neutrality should be avoided as it contrasts starkly with the 
Internet’s current evolution.  Instead, policymakers should engage with online 
intermediaries by developing principles of responsible cooperation in the monitoring and 
enforcement of specific legal rules, including counter-terrorism, copyright, and privacy.  
In terms of innovation policy, the role of instruments for the promotion of public and 
private R&D seems to be most relevant for the physical (and partly the logical) layer of 
the ICT ecosystem. At higher layers of the ICT ecosystem, more agile instruments and 
innovative demand-side innovation policy are likely to be particularly effective. 
Instruments such as prizes and challenges, and pay-for-success schemes are potentially 
suited for the application layer. And policies should seek to facilitate data-driven 
innovation.  
It is important that the governance of innovation policy should be improved in order to 
create an environment that is more directly conducive to ICT innovation. At the moment, 
there seems to be an excessive level of complexity in the governance of innovation 
policy at the EU level. This can hamper the ICT ecosystem even more than other parts of 
the economy due to the former’s fast product cycles, and the prevalence of very small 
ventures and even ventures with a single  entrepreneur, especially at the higher layers. 
Possible improvements, not exclusive to ICT, would include the consolidation of existing 
research and innovation platforms; and the identification of a limited number of 
organizations in the management of ICT research and innovation projects, which could 
then develop technology roadmaps related to specific societal challenges. Most of these 
actions would become more effective if they were coupled with a strengthening of 
institutional capacity at the regional and local level. 
Greater efforts must also be made to improve the availability of skills. Europe needs a 
major reflection on the future of jobs. Education is a fundamental driver of ICT uptake 
and competitiveness, and must include a high-quality university system, widespread e-
skills and digital literacy among both firms (in particular, SMEs) and citizens. 
Importantly, the skills needed are not a single set, but rather a combination of notions, 
capabilities and attitudes that can help fill all the current gaps in the EU job market, at 
the various layers of the ICT ecosystem. The recommended skill set includes, i.a. coding 
skills; creativity skills; Science Technology Engineering and Maths (STEM) education; 
cross-disciplinary skills; managerial skills; financial and accounting education; and 
leadership and team-working skills. All these skills must be developed and constantly 
updated.  
Finally, what matters for innovation is not exclusively innovation policy, especially at the 
EU level. There is considerable evidence in the EU that existing instruments and funding 
channels need to be simplified, and complicated and burdensome legislation eliminated 
(especially for SMEs). Apart from the need to simplify regulation by removing 
unnecessary red tape, it is vital that regulation be made innovation-friendly. This also 
 84 
 
applies to important horizontal policy areas such as competition policy, data protection 
and copyright policy. In addition, policymaking should avoid bias in favour of incumbents 
and accommodate innovative business models that make use of big data and more 
generally transformational ICT applications. Possible ways to make policy more flexible 
and adaptive include:  
(i) the use of regulatory sandboxes and other experimental approaches to allow 
ongoing monitoring of the market and social impacts of innovative techniques;  
(ii) the consideration of technology roadmaps and the opinion of multi-stakeholder 
platforms in the policymaking process, to ensure that innovative, welfare-
enhancing technologies are adequately represented in policy processes and 
outcomes;  
(iii) the ongoing monitoring of policy impacts, using, for example, open government 
techniques.  
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